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This dissertation argues that pragmatic empathy, which is defined as the phase of 
communicative interaction where speakers respond as (an)other to common concerns, 
best articulates successful discursive encounters across cultural, political, and social 
differences. This project challenges the prevailing social constructionist paradigm that 
suggests that speakers must share cultural-linguistic conventions in order to 
communicate. By integrating the tenets of discursive interactionism—a causal description 
of language and communication—with the principles of North American Pragmatism, I 
argue that discursive competence with those we perceive as culturally, politically, or 
socially different precedes not through a sharing of signification practices but instead 
through the location and creation of meaning within the temporal limits of discursive 
encounters. Thus, pragmatic empathy names the limited nature of identification available 
to speakers in discursive exchanges across difference. The implications of this research 
are two-fold: First, it demonstrates how communication across difference does not 
require speakers to share languages or conventions prior to discourse; rather, 
understanding depends upon the speaker’s ethical stance toward the other; Second, 
pragmatic empathy offers a pedagogical and epistemological model for engaging the 
diverse discourse practices of students in the heterogeneous college classrooms of an 
increasingly globalized academy. 
(AN)OTHER WAY: PRAGMATIC EMPATHY AS RESPONSE TO DISCURSIVE 
CONFLICT 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
John W. Pell 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
 the Faculty of the Graduate School at  
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Greensboro 
2010 
 
 
 
      Approved by 
 
 
 
      __________________________________ 
      Committee Chair  
! ""!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 
 
 
 
For Tibebu - My son, there is (an)other way. 
! """!
APPROVAL PAGE 
 
This Dissertation has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty of 
The Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
 
 
 
 
       Committee Chair _____________________________ 
 
Committee Members _____________________________ 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
 
___________________________ 
Date of the Final Oral Examination 
! "#!
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 First, I want to thank my dissertation committee, Hephzibah Roskelly, Elizabeth 
Chiseri-Strater, and Stephen R. Yarbrough. Their support, feedback, and willingness to 
engage my questions and concerns made this project possible. Moreover, as this project 
demonstrates, I am indebted to their thinking. I consider myself a pragmatist, an 
interactionist, and an ethnographer because I recognize the significance of these ideas 
through their work. 
 Next, I want to thank my friends and colleagues who have helped me formulate 
these ideas. I am especially indebted to my collaborator, neighbor, and friend William 
Duffy. Thanks to our relationship, there is a voice in this text that owes much to him. I 
am also grateful to my colleagues at University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Mary 
Beth Pennington, Kristen Pond, David Rogers, Aaron Chandler, Rose Brister, Will 
Dodson, Charles Tedder, Sara Littlejohn, Brandy Grabow, Alan Benson, Tonya Hassell 
and Melissa Richard. Whether over coffee or email, each of them allowed me to share my 
thinking about pragmatic empathy at one time or another. And, of course, I am grateful 
for the support of my family. John, Ellen, Tim, Lindsey, Jack, Holly, Nick, Heidi, and 
Justin, thank you for your continued support through this process.  
 Lastly, I want to thank Sarah, Emma, and Johnny for perspective. Their smiles 
and songs reminded me that my project, at its core, is about loving others.  
 
! "!
PREFACE 
As a graduate student in the fall of 2008 I taught Ismael Beah’s A Long Way Gone 
in accordance with the University’s All Freshman- Read program. The memoir traces 
Beah’s struggles as a child soldier forced to fight during Sierra Leone’s civil war, to his 
rehabilitation in a Unicef camp for former child soldiers, and finally to his arrival in New 
York and the beginning of a new life as a human rights advocate. Given the growing 
public interest in global human rights abuses and the narrative’s coming of age 
sensibilities, it seemed a natural choice as the All Freshman-Read text. Since one of the 
goals of the All Freshman-Read is to encourage campus wide discussion, instructors 
teaching the text worked together to create discussion questions that not only brought out 
the central themes and ideas of Beah’s memoirs but also questions relevant to discussions 
across the disciplines.  
The role empathy plays in the reception of texts like Beah’s became one of the 
central themes for campus-wide discussion. The questions developed around the issue of 
empathy included: “How might students respond to Beah’s memoir given their own 
cultural-linguistic and socio-economic backgrounds?” And, “Are American university 
students ethically bound to speak up for the other?” And, if so, “How do we use empathy 
as a method for correctly interpreting the voice of the other for who we claim to 
authentically speak?” Instructors from across the disciplines found the questions 
concerning empathy to be provocative and relevant, especially given the suspicions 
circling Beah’s authority to speak as a former child soldier. 
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In late 2007, the Australian based newspaper Weekend Australian reported that a 
number of details in Beah’s account seemed fraudulent. The most significant alleged 
inaccuracy involved the timeline of events Beah constructed. In the memoir Beah 
describes a 1993 rebel attack on his village; however, the majority of villagers that the 
reporters from the Australian interviewed stated that the attack Beah describes occurred 
in 1995. This discrepancy is significant because if the later date is accurate it drastically 
changes the amount of time Beah was forced to serve as a child soldier. Records show 
that Unicef chose Beah to attend their rehabilitation camp in January of 1996; therefore, 
if the attacks Beah states occurred in 1993 actually occurred two years later in 1995, 
Beah’s conscripted service only lasted around three months not three years as he claims 
in the memoir.  
The Australian’s investigation into the veracity of Beah’s claims set off a 
maelstrom of public responses from Beah’s supporters and detractors alike. The situation 
was reminiscent of the events surrounding a similar controversy: James Frey’s supposed 
memoir A Million Lttle Pieces. As many remember, Frey’s “memoir” became a New York 
Times bestseller and Oprah welcomed him onto her show as a hero to those looking to 
find solace in another’s tale of overcoming additions to drugs and alcohol. A few weeks 
later, after Oprah publically chided those questioning the truthfulness of Frey’s account, 
incontrovertible evidence and a confession on the part of Frey brought to light the 
fictitious nature of the memoir. Frey returned to Oprah’s show only to be shamed on 
national television, and Oprah bemoaned the lack of oversight on the part of the 
publishers for not fact-checking the author’s account and for not promoting the text as a 
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work of fiction. Maureen Dowd, in an editorial piece for the New York Times, wrote of 
the televised exchange, “It was a huge relief, after our long national slide into untruth and 
no consequences, into Swift boating and swift bucks, into W.'s delusion and denial, to see 
the Empress of Empathy icily hold someone accountable for lying and conning – and 
embarrassing her” (“Oprah’s”). For Dowd, and countless other media personalities, 
Oprah’s confrontation with Frey represented a commitment to the “truth” and a defense 
of those who had read Frey’s text and empathized with the narrator’s experience.  
While the controversy surrounding Beah’s text did not receive the same type of 
publicity as the Frey-Oprah confrontation, it nonetheless caused those of us teaching the 
text to take pause and consider the role “truth” plays in the formation of empathy, the 
contemporary definition of which is the “the vicarious and spontaneous sharing of affect 
with the other.” If students read Beah’s memoir and found they responded empathetically 
to the text and the narrator, what would happen if students learned that the narrator 
embellished his claims, or worse, lied altogether? How would falsehoods perpetuated by 
Beah reshape the students’ perception of empathetic responses?  
At the time, these questions seemed incredibly important and complex, but now, a 
few years removed from the situation and committed to the principles of discursive 
interactionism—a theoretical orientation toward communication that views utterances as 
causally indicative rather than representational—I no longer find these questions relevant 
to discussions of empathy. Instead, when I hear someone speak about the veracity of 
another’s narrative, I am inclined to ask, “Given our theoretical adherence to 
poststructuralist thinking, how would one determine if what the other spoke was true?” 
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The prevailing answer to that question is “we can’t,” especially since our contemporary 
definitions of meaning suggest that all knowledge is idiosyncratic and determined by the 
cultural-linguistic systems to which we belong.  
However, since I no longer believe that “cultures” or “languages” are real, I am 
no longer bound to definitions of empathy that conflate the experience of intersubjective 
meaning with the interpretation of another’s “language.” If every person, all the time, 
speaks in their own idiolect then empathy occurs serendipitously. In other words, 
empathy is the result of mere chance, of two idiolects being similar enough for 
interlocutors to notice similarities between their world and the others, but with no 
available means to deliberately recreate those conditions. So while people share a desire 
“to know that they know the other,” they still lack a critical vocabulary and methodology 
that would make these desires a reality. And, as the world continues to shrink, each of us 
is further implicated in the lives of others; therefore, it seems crucial to develop a method 
of inquiry that allows for descriptions of shared meaning.  
 
This project begins the work of developing such a method.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTERACTIONIST RHETORICAL THEORY AND GLOBAL EMPATHY 
 
 
“The most important question facing humanity is this,” Jeremy Rifkin contends in 
his latest work The Empathic Civilization, “Can we reach global empathy in time to avoid 
the collapse of civilization and save the Earth?” (3). Rifkin’s uses the term empathy, as 
most do, to mean the “deep emotional sharing of that other person’s state, accompanied 
by a cognitive assessment of the others’ present condition, and followed by an affective 
and engaged response to attend to their needs and help ameliorate their suffering” (13). 1 
The ideal function of empathy is intersubjectivity–the sharing of meaning between 
people, and Rifkin contends that intersubjectivity is a “central human quality” that 
provides a means for avoiding conflict, and conflicts, given the Earth’s depleting 
resources, are bound to increase. Avoiding an era of continual war Rifkin concludes, will 
only “be by concerted action that establishes a collective sense of affiliation” (616). In 
other words, global empathy, at least in part, depends upon rhetoric because as Kenneth 
Burke argues determining the communication practices that encourage others to 
cooperate as a result of perceived affiliations is the central aim of rhetorical appeals.  
Since Aristotle, the guiding, general definition of rhetoric has been a speaker’s 
ability to discover the available means of persuasion in a given context. In A Rhetoric of 
Motives, Kenneth Burke argues that the key term for contemporary rhetorical study 
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should be identification, a speaker’s communicative ability to affect the other’s 
perception of the world as to align her view and her interests with those of the speaker. 
Classical rhetoric, as Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (1990) note, emphasized the 
role of invention–the “means of persuasion”–but Burke emphasized the speaker’s 
“ability” to first access those means by determining, prior to discourse, how she might 
identify her needs with needs of the audience. Therefore, as Dennis Lynch points out, it is 
no surprise that empathy, when discussed as a type of rhetorical strategy is usually 
viewed as a particular type of identifying practice (“Rhetorics” 5).   
What complicates Rifkin’s project, and discussions of rhetorical empathy in 
general, particularly in the West, is the suspicious nature with which empathy is viewed. 
Affiliation with others often leads, as Susan Jarratt suggests, to “the problem of speaking 
for others” (“Beside” 110). As Lynch states, problems of empathy force us to examine 
the rhetorical implications of “speaking in someone else’s voice” (“Rhetorics” 7).  As 
both Jarratt and Lynch make clear, rhetorical practices that claim the ability to speak in 
the other’s voice are often associated with “economic and cultural imperialism” (Jarratt 
110).  Of course, even those who would not identify as left-leaning academics are 
cautious to claim that empathy leads to an ability to speak on behalf of others. This was 
made apparent in the summer of 2009 as conservative pundits assailed President Barack 
Obama’s for his nomination of Sonia Sotomayor’s to the Supreme Court.  
The public debate following President Obama’s nomination of Sonia Sotomayor 
was particularly contentious. Conservative media outlets, still reeling from Barack 
Obama’s election, jumped at the opportunity to criticize the role Obama’s “empathy 
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standard” played in selecting a Supreme Court nominee. On several public occasions 
President Obama made clear that he viewed empathy–the ability to put oneself in 
another’s shoes and act accordingly– as an essential quality of a judge. Frothing with 
“activist-judge” rhetoric, critics of the president’s selection sharpened the focus of their 
attacks on comments made by Sotomayor during a 2001 speech at UC Berkeley that they 
believed demonstrated that the Left’s use of the term “empathy” simply denoted a type of 
“reverse” prejudice and bias. In discussing the role cultural identity plays in judicial 
decision-making Sotomayor made the following comment, “I hope that a wise Latina 
woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better 
conclusion than a white male who hasn’t live that life” (Wall Street Journal). The 
exceedingly right-wing Wall Street Journal suggested that such comments flew in the 
face of Obama’s commitment to empathy because the demonstrated that Sotomayor’s 
allegiances would be with those whom she shared similar cultural values and 
experiences; rather than demonstrating a “universal” sense of empathy, Sotomayor was 
simply guilty of “identity politics,” which, as the WSJ asserts, raises the question 
“whether a judge with an avowed commitment to applying their own ‘experience’” would 
be disinclined to arguments made “by those not sharing that personal experience” (Wall 
Street Journal). 
In a measured tone, conservative pundit David Brooks in a piece written for the 
New York Times offered a more nuanced critique of empathy that drew upon 
poststructuralist and social constructionist epistemologies which, since the “social turn,” 
have profoundly influenced how rhetoric and composition understands the notion of 
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shared meaning.2 Emotions, like empathy, Brooks writes, “are an inherent part of 
decision-making” and as such “emotions are the processes we use to assign value to 
different possibilities.” These processes, however, and this is where Brooks’ social 
constructionist attitude–the belief that all knowing derives from particular languages, 
cultures, or histories–becomes clear, are made with “certain models in [our] heads,” that 
is, “these are models of how the world works and should work, which have been 
idiosyncratically ingrained by genes, culture, education, parents, and events. These 
models shape the way judges perceive the world” (New York Times). Therefore, Brooks 
concludes that using empathy as a hermeneutic for jurisprudence is problematic because 
empathy, like any interpretive scheme, is idiosyncratic and derives from a person’s 
particular adaptation of a specific cultural-linguistic heritage. In other words, when 
people claim to empathize with the other and demonstrate these commitments through 
discourse, their “empathetic” responses tell us more about the schemes shaping their view 
of the world than these responses tell us about the other’s view of the world. While 
Brooks’ does not use such language, his short article subtly implies that language, in this 
case judicial language, and reality, the “way things really are,” are ontologically distinct. 
This distinction implies that the affective dimension of empathetic responses, our 
embodied and thereby “real” emotional responses to the other are analyzable apart from 
the cognitive dimension, our deliberate use of language to describe these empathetic 
responses.  
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Language vs. Reality: The Push Toward Social Construction 
 “For the most part,” Anis Bawarshi contends, rhetoric and composition studies 
“accepted and perpetuated the subject/object, internal/external Cartesian split that so 
dominates the Western epistemological tradition” (“Beyond” 69). In assuming that 
humans remain separated from the world and are only able to access experience through 
media like language and culture, scholars in the humanities, at least since Plato, have 
worked to understand the implications of these media on our representations of the world, 
which includes the representations of the others with whom we discourse. By 
understanding subjectivity to be constitutive of the agent’s physical embodied 
experiences in the material world because it represents those experiences through 
mediums like language or culture, the prevailing theoretical models, as Stephen R. 
Yarbrough notes, assume that “an ontological, and therefore epistemological, difference 
exist between language and reality” (After 13).  
Determining the implications of these distinctions between reality (the ways 
things are regardless of language) and the conceptual schemes that inform our 
representations of the world has been the work of poststructuralist theory for the last half-
century. The poststructuralist critique of language, which preceded the “social turn” in 
rhetoric and composition studies, involved highlighting the ways in which none of these 
schemes can actually accomplish the tasks they are intended to complete: to represent the 
world “as it is.” However, as Derrida demonstrated, language can perform no such 
function because linguistic signs are arbitrary, and therefore, the relationship between 
signified and signifier is never stable; moreover, claims of stability call to our attention 
! '!
the imposition of structures outside the text upon the text. Thus, the current trend in 
rhetorical theory and scholarship involves analysis of those structures that impose 
themselves upon communicative acts in an attempt to stabilize meaning, and the tracing 
of these structural developments. 
Social constructionist theory views the structures to which Derrida refers as the 
products of socially authorized conventions through which members of a particular group 
or culture construct their view of the world. This position owes much to the work of 
Thomas Kuhn, Stanley Fish, and Richard Rorty, but through the work of theorists like 
Kenneth Bruffee and Karen Burke LeFevre, social constructionism found its ways into 
the disciplinary conversations of rhetoric and composition. In “Social Construction, 
Language, and Knowledge” Kenneth Bruffee claims “social constructionist work in 
composition is based on the assumption that writing is primarily a social act. A writer’s 
language originates with the community to which he or she belongs” (784). Given that 
language use originates with the communities to which speakers belong, the inventive 
nature of rhetoric is a “dialectical process in that the inventing individual(s) and the 
sociocultural are co-existing and mutually defining” (LeFevre 35), while the analytic 
dimension of rhetoric is akin to Richard Rorty’s description of critical thinking, which is 
“playing off alternatives against one another, rather than playing them off against criteria 
of rationality, much less against eternal verities” (“Hermeneutics” 11). Whether 
understood as Fish’s “interpretive communities,” Bruffee’s “discourse communities” or 
the “cultures” of social science, social constructionist thought claims that the meaning of 
our utterances lie not in their capacity to represent “truth” in the structuralist sense that 
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language corresponds to unmediated reality; rather, the meaning of an utterance lies in 
locating the social institution from which it came. That is, since language, or culture, or 
history, cannot fulfill their mediating function, the goal of rhetoric is to determine the 
social location from where utterances derive, and thereby understand the conditions that 
make other’s utterance “true” with respect to their particular discourse conventions.  
While social constructionist thinking provides a description of communication 
that does not depend upon correspondence theories of meaning and instead focuses on the 
contingent and ever-changing dynamics of human experience, it by no means abandons 
the notion that structures like language and culture are ontologically distinct from the 
material world. From a constructionist perspective the languages and cultures from which 
our discourse derives exist prior to our interactions with them, and will continue to exist 
regardless of our intervention. Moreover, these conceptual schemes vary not only from 
community to community, from culture to culture, but also from person to person. 
Therefore, in order to claim that one can empathize with another, they must first 
somehow demonstrate the capacity to share the other’s idiosyncratic conceptual scheme.3 
Or, as Thomas Kent frames the problem, if all we know derives from communities in 
which we live then how would it be possible to share meaning with the other from a 
different community (“On the Very Idea” 426)? Furthermore, if we believe that things 
like “culture” are real in the sense that they exert force upon its members by shaping their 
discourse practices, then claims of shared meaning between interlocutors from different 
cultural-linguistic backgrounds implies that somehow they have come to share the other’s 
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“culture,” and thereby denies the fundamental differences between people that the 
contemporary emphasis on cultural studies tries to protect.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest at this point that claims of empathy fail 
strictly based on the prevalent theoretical approaches to discourse that prevent us from 
theorizing how we might locate meaning that we can share. However, as mentioned 
earlier, claims of empathy are not only problematized not only by our current notions of 
meaning but also by the notion that the affective dimension of empathy and the cognitive 
dimension of empathy somehow exist discretely. In other words, the ontological 
distinctions we assume to exist between language and reality, culture and nature, are the 
same type of distinctions we encounter when discussing empathetic responses. 
 
Empathy’s Dualistic Epistemology 
Contemporary definitions of empathy rely upon the collaborative, albeit tenuous, 
relationship between the affective and cognitive dimensions of the process. As 
neuroscientists and social psychologists like C. Daniel Batson, Jean Decety, Martin 
Hoffman, Marco Iacobani, Carl Rogers, and Nathaniel Teich tell us, empathy is both an 
affective experience and a cognitive process that human beings are able to study as a 
result of our evolutionary capacity to use symbols. Jean Decety makes this clear when he 
writes, “empathy cannot be described only as a simple resonance of affect between self 
and other. It involves an explicit representation of the subjectivity of the other and a 
minimal self-other distinction” (“Social Cognitive” 264). Empathy when understood as 
purely affective remains speculative; there is no way to know if our responses to the 
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other’s states are accurate. Therefore, the validation of one’s empathetic response toward 
the other depends upon the cognitive assessment of the other’s cultural, historical, and 
environmental conditions, assessments clarified and validated dialogically with the other.  
As the above discussion of social constructionist thinking demonstrated, the 
notion that interlocutors can come to share meaning via dialogic encounters is nullified 
by the paradoxical claim of discourse communities. However, Decety’s comments point 
to a problem that has long haunted rhetoricians, particular feminist scholars working to 
redefine the role emotional affect plays in rhetorical invention: “Is it possible to gain 
unmediated access to the embodied affective responses without cognitive, that is, 
cultural-linguistic assessment. Many feminist definitions of empathy fixate on the notion 
that the embodied experiences of affect that initiate the empathetic process will inevitably 
be distorted because in order to share meaning with the other we must interact with them 
discursively, and any interaction will necessarily draw upon our own peculiar scheme 
through which we view the world thereby distorting what the embodied responses mean. 
This problem, I suggest, is simply another example of the affective, embodied, 
experience being subordinated in favor of cognitive descriptions of invention. That is to 
say, while we may, as many feminist and postcolonial scholars have, assert that empathy 
is part of the rhetorical process, these assertions often ring false because the standard 
practice of rhetoricians is to examine the affective dimension through the cognitive 
process of intentional discourse. As Mary Ann Cain, Ellen Quandahl, Lynn Worsham and 
countless other feminist scholars note, emotions, like any other conceptual object 
(throughout this study I use “object” to mean the conceptual and material things to which 
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we fix out attention) are socially constructed through institutions. Therefore, to discuss 
our affective responses is to necessarily enter into the cognitive dimension. We might 
say, as we would of “language versus reality” or “culture versus nature,” that the 
affective dimension and the cognitive dimension of empathy are assumed to be 
ontologically distinct and therefore produce vastly disparate epistemologies. In fact, 
given poststructuralism’s insistence that speakers cannot access a pre-discursive self–all 
beliefs, attitudes, and ideas are the product of social interaction with others through 
discourses that exist regardless of our intervention–the affective dimension of human 
subjectivity is silent, hiding in the space between words and feelings. From this 
perspective, empathetic responses are genuine so long as they remain unspoken. We 
might never know when we connect at that deep emotional level with the other because 
these connections only exist in the silences. 
The guiding assumption of my current project, however, is that we do want so 
share meaning with others, especially those with whom we differ greatly. Most of us 
believe, at some embodied level, that empathy is possible, but our critical language 
betrays these commitments. The goal of this study is to provide a description of empathy, 
which I believe is more accurately understood as intersubjective meaning, that avoids the 
pitfalls of constructionist thinking, and also allows the affective dimension of human 
experience to play a crucial role in the determination of meaning. In fact, not only do I 
believe that shared meaning with others is possible, I will argue that collaborative 
interaction is the epistemological imperative for an interactionist approach to rhetorical 
study. Discursive interactionism, Yarbrough writes, is a “development of pragmatism” 
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and “it is the view that the meaning of an intentional event, such as an utterance, is the 
product neither of its coherence with an already existent linguistic or cultural system of 
conventions, nor of its correspondence to an already existent set of ‘real’ things, nor of its 
mere effects upon its perceiver.” Rather, the meaning of an intentional event, like an 
utterance, “is the relation between the effects the agent expects the event to produce and 
the effects it actually does produce, so that meaning continually emerges as the agents 
interact” (“On ‘Getting It’” 2). Or, more simply put, if two interlocutors who did not 
speak the same language respond to a common object, a chair for example, then “finding 
out what ‘chair’ means, what a chair is, and what to do with a chair and with the word 
‘chair’ are exactly the same” (Inventive 46). “There can be no chair,” Yarbrough 
concludes, “until interlocutors discursively interact with the chair as a ‘chair’” (46). The 
interactional, inferential process Yarbrough describes assumes that comprehension and 
shared meaning are part of the same causal process – interlocutors responding to similar 
stimuli in a shared world.  
Instead of continuing to believe in the mediating function of language and culture, 
I am convinced that we should instead focus on the causal effects of discourse. That is, in 
order to share meaning with the other, rhetoricians need to abandon the notion that we 
can somehow see through the other’s eyes, and instead focus upon seeing with the other. 
In order to do this, however, we need to view discourse not as dependent upon abstract 
structures and antecedent meaning; rather, discourse names how we use marks, noises, 
and gestures to direct the other’s attention to objects in a shared world. This description 
of discourse, as we will see, derives from a number of rhetorical theorists, but has 
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recently been supported by the work or neuroscientists looking at the function of mirror 
neurons. Therefore, before I offer an interactionist definition of empathy, I first want to 
examine how mirror neuron research suggests that not only is interactionism’s approach 
to discourse valid, but also more adequately corresponds with intrinsic human 
neurological function. 
 
Mirror Neurons  
 The discovery of mirror neurons by Giacomo Rizzolatti and his team of 
neuroscientists provide an occasion to re-think, as Marco Iacoboni suggests, absolutely 
everything about the human condition. For as long as human beings have recorded 
history, we have recorded stories of our capacity to understand and empathize with others 
in the world we share. And while cognitivisits, phenomenologists, poets, and painters all 
inferred the human capacity to empathize and share meaning with others, “No one could 
begin to explain how it is that we know what others are doing, thinking and feeling” 
(Iacoboni, Mirroring 4). In 1988, however, Rizzolatti and his colleagues stumbled upon 
something that would offer invaluable insight into how human beings share meaning with 
others. 
 While working with primates, Rizzolatti’s team discovered that the animals’ brain 
activity, activity usually associated with “goal oriented action”–grasping a particular 
object, placing on object on a particular surface, moving an object to a particular location, 
and the like–increased when the primates observed another completing these same goal 
oriented actions. While it is common for animals to exhibit neurological activity to visual 
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stimuli just prior to use, the scientists did not expect to see increased neurological activity 
when the animals observed from a distance others completing activities with familiar 
objects. Rizzolatti’s team referred to the neurons that “discharge to the simple 
presentation of food or of other interesting objects” as “canonical neurons” (Fogassi, and 
Gallese, “Neural”15-16). Canonical neurons discharge when monkeys are presented with 
an object, or when the monkeys direct their attention toward an object of interest, an 
object that is not being manipulated by another sentient being. Canonical neurons do not, 
however, discharge as noticeably when scientists perform simple tasks in front of 
monkeys. In other words, canonical neurons fired when the primates oriented themselves 
to objects of interest, but did not fire when the actions of another sentient being attracted 
their attention. 
 Mirror neurons (often referred to F5 neurons because of the location they 
discharge in the brain) on the other hand, fire when a monkey observes “another 
individual performing a hand action in front of it” (16). Hand action refers to the 
scientist’s manipulation of an object (a cup for example) with which the monkey is 
familiar in a similar fashion to how the monkey might interact with the object.  
Moreover, when scientists simply mimic tasks in front of the primates, “the response of 
mirror neurons is much weaker or absent” (21). That is to say, if a scientist mimes the 
picking up of a cup, mirror neurons did not fire with as much strength as when they 
observed the scientist actually picking up the cup. In other words, the monkeys did not 
recognize the scientist’s miming as a familiar goal-action with a familiar object, and 
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therefore did not register the scientist’s movements as similar to their own. The lack of 
real exigency determined the monkey’s interpretation of the scientist’s actions.  
These discoveries led scientists to hypothesize that “mirror neurons may have a 
crucial role in goal detection, and therefore in action understanding” (21). In other 
words, the monkeys responded to the scientist performing the task and the object to 
which the task was directed. Mirror neurons, which fired weakly when the monkeys 
viewed acts of mimicry, fired strongly when they viewed another carry out a goal-
oriented task directed toward an object. We might say, to use Donald Davidson’s terms, 
that the monkey and the scientist triangulated upon the object of common cause, in this 
case the coffee cup, and consequently, at the most intrinsic, neurological level shared 
meaning emerged as the beings oriented themselves to each other and the objects of their 
shared world. As Iacobani summarizes, mirror neurons show “that we are not alone, but 
are biologically wired and evolutionarily designed to be deeply interconnected with one 
another” (Mirroring 267).  
 The implications of mirror neuron research on neuroscience is profound, but as 
Iacobani contends, these finding also challenge “the most dominant thinking about the 
mind – at least in Western culture” that the starting point of all thinking and all knowing 
is the solitary, private mind (261). Since Descartes famously stated, “Cogito ergo sum,” 
Western thinking has located the genesis of thought and meaning in the subjectivity of 
the individual agent. As Iacobani notes, this philosophical position also influenced the 
underlying assumptions scientists traditionally held about the study of the brain. These 
assumptions, in part,  
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can be formulated as such: the cognitive agent or subject understands the objects of the 
world by using internal mental states that represent those objects of the world, and, by so 
doing, produces knowledge. These internal mental states represent the outer objects of the 
world in an inner mental world; thus these representations do not really depend on the 
objects they represent. (“Existential”440) 
 
As Iacobani’s comments make clear, the assumptions that guide scientific research 
maintain the same dichotomist view of the world criticized by thinkers like Bawarshi, 
Davidson, Kent, and Yarbrough. Iacobani summarizes the outcome of this dichotomist 
view in the following way: “If I have access only to my own mind, which is a private 
entity that only I can access directly, how can I possibly understand the mind of other 
people? How can I possibly share the world with others, and how can they possibly share 
their own mental states with me?” (Mirroring 263).  
 Interestingly, Iacobani’s critique of the scientific community resonates with the 
above-mentioned theorists’ critiques of social constructionist thinking. Scientific thinking 
about the mind, Iacobonai argues, is atoministic, which “basically means that one 
assumes that the mind can process elements of the world independent of each other and 
the world they are in” (“Existential” 446). What emerges from the findings of mirror 
neuron research, however, “is the view of a human brain that needs a body to exist in the 
world of shared social norms in which meaning originates from being-in-the-world” 
(440). Of course, it is crucial to point out that Iacobani is not describing the “social 
norms” of constructionist thinking, which assume discourses “social norms” exist a 
priori; rather, Iacobani is pointing out that the neural patterns his team observed during 
their experiments suggests a “holistic stance toward contexts, actions, and intentions,” 
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which is to say, the meaning of objects emerges as people interact with objects and each 
other in a shared world (448).  
 The emerging scientific view of human subjectivity, Iacobani argues, is that the 
default state of human experience is not internal cognition, but external sociality. This 
new understanding of our neurobiology demonstrates the “interdependence between the 
self and other” in the making of meaning (Mirroring 265). This intersubjectivity, 
Iacobani concludes, “commits us to others” at the most basic biological levels. Iacobani 
is cautiously optimistic that mirror neuron research will help people reconsider the role 
empathy plays in developing intersubjective meaning. Neuroscience is demonstrating that 
sharing meaning with the other is not only possible, but, to some extent, built into or 
biology. Yet, as Iacobani points out, we typically do not see “true cross-cultural 
encounters” because these encounters are “made impossible by the influence of massive 
belief systems” (271). And, while Iacobani’s work does not explore the fuller 
implications of mirror neuron research on rhetoric and composition studies, his remarks 
remind us that holistic and interactional views of shared meaning are often stymied by the 
beliefs and theories that try to make “knowing” the other a function of flawed interpretive 
processes. Too much of our theoretical work continues the reification of the Other’s 
subjectivity, which is to say, in order for interpretive theories like deconstruction or 
social construction to work, the Other must remain static at least long enough for the self 
to trace the antecedent structures that imbue the Other’s discourse with meaning. While 
postcolonial theorists encourage interlocutors to see the Other’s subjectivity as dynamic 
and contingent as the self, this awareness simply leads to a new interpretive problem. If 
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everyone’s utterances derive from idiosyncratic applications of ever-changing social 
structures, which determine a person’s communicative practices, then it is impossible to 
claim with even the slightest sense of certainty that two people from different 
backgrounds could share meaning with each other about objects in the world.  
 Mirror neuron research, however, suggests that shared meaning emerges as a 
result of difference, two or more sentient beings interacting with objects in a shared 
world with exigencies at stake. Sharing the same massive belief systems or socially 
constructed conceptual schemes as the other is not a prerequisite for intersubjective 
meaning. In fact, as Rizzolatti’s research shows, being a member of the same species 
might not even be a prerequisite. Moreover, those neurological functions associated with 
mirroring and empathy do not fire when the subjects are left to themselves. When the 
primate interacted with the cup privately, his mirror neurons remained dormant; however, 
when that same primate noticed the other, in this case the scientist, interacting with the 
same familiar cup, the primate’s mirror neurons fired. Mirror neuron research is 
demonstrating the contention held by interactionists, like Yarbrough, who argue that 
communication—the use of marks, noises, and gestures we use to direct the other’s 
attention—“is motivated by the perception of differences, by disparities between the 
responses that we expect to our utterances and the actual responses we receive” (After 9). 
So, as in the case of the monkey and the scientist, as in all cases of communicative 
interaction, meaning emerges not because interlocutors create a priori identifications or 
somehow come to share the same schemes about the world; rather, intersubjective 
meaning emerges because of our differences. 
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Pragmatic Empathy and Interactionist Rhetorical Theory 
 Rhetoric and composition studies have already been introduced to the notions of 
shared meaning as emergent intersubjectivity that mirror neuron research supports 
through the work Donald Davidson, Thomas Kent, Anis Bawarshi, Mathew Snead, Kevin 
J. Porter, and most notably, Stephen R. Yarbrough, who refers to the view that discursive 
practices produce intersubjective meaning as discursive interactionist theory. 
Interactionism receives little attention from the field of rhetoric and composition because 
of the provocative nature its major tenets. The rest of this project will explore the 
implications of this theory for a reconsideration of what it means to empathize with the 
other, but in order to extend the work of interactionism, which my theory of pragmatic 
empathy intends to do, I need to first provide an outline of the genesis of my thinking, 
that is, of how my reading of interactionist theory motivates the development of my 
current project. For the sake of clarity, then, I will conclude this introduction by offering 
a brief summary of interactionism’s major theoretical tenets and how those tenets helped 
me to arrive at the thesis of this project: pragmatic empathy names the methodological 
imperative of interactionism, and provides a means of viewing discursive interactions that 
1) allows for the emergence of intersubjective meaning, and 2) allows speakers to remain 
distinct, that is, to share meaning without relinquishing their agency or losing their 
subjectivity. Pragmatic empathy suggests that the intersubjective meaning that emerges 
as a result of discursive interaction is dependent upon speakers viewing their 
communicative acts as contingent, mutable, temporally bound, and dependent upon the 
collaborative, that is coordinated, interaction of at least two interlocutors. As my use of 
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methodology suggests, pragmatic empathy does not assert a specific epistemology; 
rather, pragmatic empathy names the orientation interlocutors assume in order for 
discursive interactions to achieve their ends, which I understand to be the continually 
emergent process of collaborative meaning making, or, for the sake of brevity, 
understanding.  
 Moreover, this project offers pragmatic empathy as a methodological imperative 
because too often the work of interactionism is dismissed as difficult, impenetrable, and 
too radical to be of use in the work of contemporary rhetorical scholarship. However, 
given discursive interactionism’s insistence on collaboration and given that increasing 
globalization creates situations in which communicative encounters with the other are 
unavoidable, I believe that an interactionist rhetorical theory is not only applicable to 
contemporary problems of “communication across difference,” but interactionism also 
offers hope that we might be able to articulate a theory of discourse that demonstrates the 
veracity of shared meaning. By offering a methodology, a type of practice and orientation 
toward discourse, I hope that the students and teachers of rhetoric concerned with the 
communication problems associated with difference will find discursive interactionism a 
useable theory that allows for the continued belief that intersubjective meaning is 
possible.     
 Finally, this project provides an answer to Rifkin’s problem, “how do we achieve 
global empathy?” The answer is counterintuitive and perhaps provocative: we don’t, 
can’t, and shouldn’t attempt to achieve empathy because this statement implies that in 
order for understanding to occur interlocutors must somehow use language to bridge the 
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metaphysical gaps assumed to exist between speakers. In its contemporary usage, 
empathy names a discrete rhetorical strategy that seeks to bridge these gaps between 
speakers through appeals of pathos. As I argue though, empathy, or rather, intersubjective 
meaning is not a discrete rhetorical strategy but a characteristic of knowledge and its 
production. Thus, to claim understanding with those whom we differ implies pragmatic 
empathy. Therefore, it seems to me that discursive conflicts arise not because we cannot 
achieve intersubjective meaning with the other but because conflicts are typically the 
result of ignoring the other with whom we can share. This project is an attempt, then, to 
make clear that those moments when understanding eludes interlocutors does not 
demonstrate the fatal flaw Derrida suggested lay at the heart of communication; rather, 
understanding, like everything else we do in the world, requires deliberate, reflective 
engagement, which is to say, work. This project attempts to provide a definition of 
communication that makes this work possible. 
 The method I propose develops primarily from the ideas of Donald Davidson; the 
work of North American Pragmatists C.S. Peirce, George Herbert Mead, Jane Addams, 
William James, John Dewey; contemporary pragmatists who also happen to identify 
themselves as rhetoric and composition scholars, namely, Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater, Kate 
Ronald, Hephzibah Roskelly, William C. Jones, Keith Gilyard, and Robert Danisch; and 
discursive interactionist theorists of Stephen R. Yarbrough. Together, these thinkers have 
helped me construct my argument by changing my thinking about the nature of points of 
communicative interaction, and I want to conclude this chapter by summarizing those 
points as they provide the foundation for this project’s argument. 
! #"!
Triangulation, Discourse, and Affective/Cognitive Erasure 
 First, my work depends upon the acceptance of perhaps Donald Davidson’s most 
radical claim concerning communication–“there is no such thing as language.” This is not 
to say that interlocutors do not use marks, noises, or gestures to communicate, but that 
“there is no such thing as language apart from the sounds and marks people make and the 
habits and expectations that go with them…. There is no additional entity we possess in 
common any more than there is an ear we share when I lend you an ear” (Truth 131). 
Davidson’s point is clear, “language” is a description we apply to our acts of 
communication, but is not a thing unto itself that exists regardless of human intervention. 
Therefore, the corollary point is also true; if language does not exist as an ontologically 
distinct entity then it cannot function as a medium through which we experience the 
world. Instead, Davidson prefers to think about language in terms of sensory organs. For 
example he writes, “We do not see the world through language any more than we see the 
world through our eyes. We don’t see through our eyes but with them,” therefore, 
language, like other organs, helps us “come into direct contact with our environment;” 
organs “are not intermediaries, screens, media, or windows” (130, 131). “Language” 
Davidson concludes, “is not something that comes between us and reality; it can’t come 
between, since it is part of us” (133). For Davidson, discursive actions are tools that 
interact with the physical environment and therefore maintain no ontological distinction 
from other objects with which we interact, or as Yarbrough states, “there is no difference 
between the way I understand…this desk at which I sit, and the way I understand these 
marks with which I write about this desk,” (Inventive 14). We understand discourse as we 
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understand other things, “through the inference of causes from their effects” (24). Given 
that there is no difference between “words” and “things,” “language” and “reality,” 
discourse simply refers to the marks, noises and gestures we use to direct the other’s 
attention toward the objects of common cause, and as Yarbrough makes clear, discourse 
“is the human mode of interacting with an environment, and environment includes things 
and people and the marks and noises they make to affect one another” (14). Throughout 
the rest of this study, then, I use the term to “discourse” to signify the interactionist 
understanding of communication, and refer to “language” only as a means to draw 
attention to contemporary theoretical positions that continue to rely upon the distinction 
between words and things. 
 Davidson’s notion of triangulation (a concept explored in great length throughout 
this study) provides rhetoric and composition with a description of how intersubjectivity 
emerges via discursive interaction. As Stephen R. Yarbrough points out, Donald 
Davidson’s notion of triangulation is essentially an inferential process in which 
interlocutors attempt to “affect the other creature’s response” to a common object. As we 
will see, Davidson offers an inferential means of sharing meaning with the other; 
discursive competence is not dependent upon interlocutors sharing the same language, 
culture, or conventions. What is required for speakers to share meaning is an object of 
discourse toward which they direct each other’s attention, precisely the same conditions 
from which Iacobani claims mirroring occurs. Thus, Davidson’s theory of triangulation 
offers a minimal theory of discourse; a theory in which understanding the other does not 
depend on the sharing of “massive beliefs,” or conceptual schemes like language and 
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culture, but instead understands shared meaning as an intersubjective, holistic, and 
unitary process of interaction.  
If discourse names the available tools with which interlocutors can direct the 
other’s attention then Davidson’s notion of triangulation explains how the uses of these 
tools become meaningful. Davidson calls the intentionally discursive and interactive 
process of at least two interlocutors triangulation. I will not rehash the interpretations of 
triangulation made by Kent, Yarbrough, and Bawarshi, which emphasize the mutually 
conditioning nature of triangulated discourse– “the response, counter-response of 
(minimally) two interlocutors to a resistant third object that both human interlocutors 
identify as the ‘common cause’ or their respective responses” (Yarbrough, “On ‘Getting 
It’” 4)–rather, I want to emphasize Davidson’s claim that the mutually conditioning 
discourse of triangulation explains how interlocutors hold any propositional belief. 
Triangulation, therefore, not only refers to the process through which the meaning of 
those objects of discourse we typically view as “social” (the way we order food, or the 
kinds of things we believe are appropriate to say to children, or the rules of a particular 
game) emerge, but as Davidson contends, triangulation also explains how those 
propositional beliefs typically associated with inner-subjectivity of the self emerge during 
triangulated discourse. 
 At the end of his essay “The Second Person” Davidson writes this about 
triangulation:  
 
 
 
The considerations I have put forward do not apply to language only; they   
 apply equally to thought in general. Belief, intention, and the other   
 propositional attitudes are all social in that they are states a creature cannot  
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 be in without having the concept of intersubjective truth, and this is a   
 concept one cannot have without sharing, and knowing that one shares, a   
 world, and a way of thinking about the world with someone else.     
 (Subjective 121) 
 
 
Davidson’s comments should not be taken as a form of Wittgenstein’s “language games” 
that suggests the limits of our language are thereby the limits of our world(view).4 
Instead, Davidson explains that without triangulation there would be no way for a person 
to determine what objects were impinging on her senses. A person responds to the objects 
of attention in differential ways, but as Davidson states, this person would have not the 
grounds upon which to state the location of the object affecting her experience at a 
particular moment, no way to triangulate the location of the stimuli in the world. 
Triangulation provides the means through which a person might locate the object 
affecting her responses. Davidson clearly explains this concept when he writes, “The 
sharing of responses to stimuli found similar allows an interpersonal element to emerge: 
creatures that share responses can correlate each other’s responses with what they are 
responses to” (Truth 140).  Davidson’s notion of triangulation not only erases the 
“boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around the world 
generally,” but triangulation also erases the need to assume an ontological distinction 
exists between the affective and cognitive dimensions of thought. This distinction is 
crucial to any reconsiderations of what it means to empathize with the other because the 
guiding view maintains that affective response to the other cannot be adequately 
translated through cognitive language use. Or, as Lynch contends, to empathize is to 
“presuppose a transparency to one another that does not, finally, exist. We simply cannot 
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know the fullness of someone else’s experiences and understandings,” and we cannot 
know the other because rendering the affective through language irrevocably alters the 
experience for all parties involved.  
 I, too, would agree that discourse alters experiences and environments, but this 
does not preclude us from sharing meaning with each other: it simply suggests that our 
dependence upon notions like language, including Chomsky’s notion that affective 
experiences are governed by an internal syntax and grammar, might stifle our efforts to 
understand others because we always assume problems of translation will arise (Rules 
and Representation). In simpler terms, the prevalent assumption is that our affective 
responses “speak” a different language than the languages we cognitively develop, and 
therefore empathetic responses are betrayed by problems of translation. The problem 
some theorists find with empathy is that our rendering of affective responses through 
language does not adequately represent what a person experiences internally in the 
empathetic moment. This problem, as Yarbrough points out in After Rhetoric, is simply 
another version of the assumption that successful communication depends upon speakers 
coming to share the same meaning about the same objects through the same linguistic 
structures (172-173). However, this is not the definition of successful understanding 
promoted by discursive interactionism. For interactionist, the understanding that emerges 
through triangulation is defined by interlocutors’ responses to the other’s discourse in the 
manner the other intended. 
 To be clear, though, triangulation does not result in interlocutors collaboratively 
“naming” or “creating” the objects in their world. This is a constructionist notion. 
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Instead, discourse, because it is causally indicative, directs the other to notice our 
interactions with the object of our discourse, and vice versa. What emerges through 
triangulation, then, is a set of relationships: how each interlocutor interacts with the 
object of discourse, how each interlocutor uses marks, noises, and gestures to interact 
with the object, and how they use these same tools to direct the other’s attention toward 
those relationships with the objet of discourse. The intersubjective meaning that emerges 
from triangulation then is not dependent upon interlocutors sharing the same language, or 
even the sharing the same attitude or opinion toward the object of discourse. The 
intersubjective meaning that emerges during triangulation is the interlocutors’ awareness 
of the conditions that inform the other’s interactions with both the object of discourse and 
the other with whom they discourse. These conditions, however, are not stable. 
Intersubjective meaning continually emerges because interlocutors and the objects of 
their attention continually influence the discursive choices and thereby the conditions that 
make their marks, noises and gestures meaningful.  
 Intersubjective meaning names interlocutors’ abilities to recognize and respond to 
the relationships formed through triangulation.  “The set of these relations,” Yarbrough 
writes, 
 
what the object will come to be to the interlocutors, is unified by their   
 common relationship with, or attitude toward the object. The signs they   
 use during the interaction–their gestures, marks, or sounds–do not    
 constitute the object, for the set of relations that the objects come to be for  
 them is constituted neither prior to comprehending that the sign refers to   
 the object, nor subsequently to comprehending that the sign refers to the   
 object they have already perceived. Rather the constitution of the object,   
 the interpretation of the signs they use to interact with it, and the    
 comprehension of the relations between the object and the signs are one   
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 and the same event. In short, the mental events are identical with the   
 physical events.   (“On ‘Getting It” 5, emphasis added)   
 
 
When applied to the problem of empathy, discursive interactionism offers a much 
different understanding of what it means to share affective and cognitive states with 
others. Rather than assuming that any intentional descriptive act directed toward our 
perceptions of the other’s emotional and physical state necessarily distorts our affective 
experience, discursive interactionism suggests that since all knowing is relational, purely 
affective responses are simply responses that have yet to coordinate with other objects 
and interlocutors. Moreover, since interactionism sees discourse as a unitary process, 
“emotions are not attached to or merely associated with but fully integrated with our 
purposeful activities” and thereby emotions, like all of our discursive tools, are intended 
to affect those objects with which we interact (Inventive 132). 
 A person’s initial affective response to another’s situation is of course strikingly 
different from what we might typically think of as a deliberative discursive act intended 
to direct the other’s attention. However, since my commitment to interactionism prevents 
me from claiming that internal affective responses are ontologically different from my 
deliberate, that is “cognitive” discursive actions, I need to provide an answer to the 
question, “How does an interlocutor’s initial affective responses to the other’s state of 
being coordinate with the speaker’s intentional uses of discourse?” The answer to this 
question lies in interactionism’s pragmatic orientation toward belief. One of the central 
tenets of pragmatism, as Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly note, is the “relationship 
between belief and action, knowing and its consequences… an idea is defined by its 
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consequences” (“Untested” 619). Pragmatism, which William James makes clear 
functions as a method of inquiry and not an theory unto itself, sees the “meaning” of 
inquiry as identifying the effects produced by the objects of inquiry because these effects 
determine what the object means for us. The need for inquiry, C.S. Peirce argues, only 
arises when our habitual responses to situations do not provide adequate solutions to 
current exigencies. 
 The realization that our habitual responses are inadequate to deal with a particular 
exigency arises in what Peirce calls the “irritation of doubt.” When our discursive actions 
do not produce the effects we intended and expected them to produce on the other, when 
our intentionally discursive tools are inadequate, all we have left are our affective 
responses, which registers as a kind of “doubt” signally that the relations we maintain 
with the objects of our attention are inadequate for addressing the needs of the discursive 
situation. While I agree with Peirce that our affective responses signal the inadequacy of 
our discursive habits, I am more inclined to argue that terms like “doubt” or “sadness” or 
“joy” only make sense once interlocutors reorganize their relations between each other 
and the objects of their attention. For example, the “dread” we feel when the phone rings 
late at night, corresponds to the discursive relationship we maintain with our aging 
parents in the hospital battling illness; however dread quickly changes to “relief” when 
we realize someone simply dialed the wrong number. The affective experience did not 
change. What changed are the relationships affecting our discourse. The initial affective 
response emerged because of our relationship to phone etiquette–people should not call 
other people late at night. Thus, the initial “irritation of doubt” occurred because many of 
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us do not have habitual responses to phones ringing in the middle of the night. The 
feeling of “dread” develops because we try to make some sense of this break in our 
habitus. For this relationship to hold, however, requires the person on the other end of the 
line to be the purveyor of bad news. When we realize that the person on the other end of 
the line is not a family member relaying bad news about our parents, our habitual 
responses to “dread” no longer hold relationally. That is, to interact with the news and the 
person on the other end as one experiencing dread would limit the possibility that 
intersubjective meaning would emerge since the person on the other end of the line would 
be unable to locate the cause of our responses.  
“In short, emotions are the measure of an initial response to the resistance of 
things to our current beliefs about the situation in which we are engaged,” and as such 
once we change our orientation, when our discourse and the discourse of others directs us 
to notice different relationships, our affective responses make those changes as well 
(Yarbrough, Inventive 146). Affective responses signal to us that our discursive 
orientation toward others and objects are inadequate for the sharing of meaning. 
However, these responses are not different ontologically than our intentional discursive 
responses; they are simply a different phase of the same process. What we initially “feel” 
toward the other initiates further triangulation.  Our affective responses signal to us the 
resistance between the objects and others with whom we discourse and our habitual 
responses to those conditions. From the perspective of interactionism, understanding 
develops through the unitary process of discursive triangulation; therefore, our affective 
discursive responses phase into our intentional discursive acts. Our feelings are not lost, 
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or mistranslated, or corrupted, or ignored, because of our discourse; they change, as does 
everything when it interacts with the environment.  
 
Toward a Methodology of Pragmatic Empathy 
I conclude this section by stating the aims of this study, which in many ways is 
intended to function as an introduction to the methodology implied by the 
epistemological aims of interactionist theory. In the work of the pragmatists, Davidson, 
and Yarbrough, I see a hope that as people we can determine the best courses of action 
and our discursive acts can help facilitate this process. Interactionism, as the above 
summary demonstrates, suggests that in order to “say what we mean and mean what we 
say” we must abandon many of poststructuralism’s notions of language, culture, and 
history that shape our current theoretical dispositions. This project’s goal is to articulate 
the methodology central to an interactionist approach to communication. Pragmatic 
empathy names this method. Moreover, pragmatic empathy not only provides an 
explanation of how intersubjective meaning emerges when interlocutors neither share the 
same language or culture, but pragmatic empathy also demonstrates how our 
intersubjective meaning emerges while keeping or differences and individuality intact. In 
other words, this project seeks to provide a method of inquiry for the communication 
problems facing a globalized world. 
 In order to make this approach to rhetorical studies clear, I have structured this 
project in the following way. In Chapter One, I outline the connections between empathy 
and Burke’s notion of rhetorical identification. Here, I suggest that while identification 
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provides the means by which rhetoric and composition typically enter into discussions of 
empathy and intersubjective meaning, identification offers no objective or verifiable 
means of explaining how meaning is shared. This problem, I argue, stems from Burke’s 
social constructionist view of discourse, which assumes that all discourse derives from a 
priori institutions that both shape and inform our discursive acts. I then argue that 
interactionism challenges the constructionist view of language that Burke promotes, and 
provides the departure point for an alternative description of intersubjectivity, one that 
does not view identification as a prerequisite for shared meaning.  
 Chapter Two suggests that in order to share meaning with the other we must have 
beliefs that can in fact be shared. Here, drawing upon the North American pragmatists, I 
suggest that an interactionist understanding of belief is defined by our commitments. 
“Commitments” provides an alternative term for the troubled notion of “belief.”  I 
demonstrate that all “beliefs” are types of commitments–temporally bound, mutable, and 
environmentally contingent beliefs about our relationships toward the objects of 
discourse, which emerge through triangulation with others. Commitments are pragmatic, 
interactional, and necessarily intersubjective. That is, not only can commitments be 
shared, but they also only exist in the sharing of objects with others. I conclude this 
chapter by demonstrating—by means of a thorough articulation of Peirce’s notion of the 
“irritation of doubt”—how the “crisis of commitments provides the impetus for 
triangulation. 
 In Chapter Three, I define pragmatic empathy as a response to Burke’s 
constructionist methodology of identification. Here, I contend that while Burke’s notion 
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of identification attempts to provide a description of how interlocutors share meaning 
with the other, he is unable to make a convincing argument because he continues to 
believe that language is a medium and that language is socially constructed. After 
illustrating the internal inconsistencies of social constructionism, I offer an extended 
definition of pragmatic empathy—interactionism’s methodological imperative.
 Finally, I offer a few tentative remarks about the pedagogical implications of 
pragmatic empathy. Because the discursive relationships between objects and 
interlocutors that emerge during discursive triangulation are temporally and 
environmentally bound, any pedagogical application of interactionist theory needs to 
address these limitations. Moreover, I argue that deliberate discursive engagement that 
leads to shared meaning with the other is possible, but we must be able to identify, 
accurately, the others and objects that form the apexes of triangulation. In other words, 
pragmatic empathy is useful in the classroom insofar as it helps us understand that 
intersubjective meaning is a local and temporal phenomenon. 
 In many ways, this project is an attempt to give a method to the madness of 
interactionist theory. As the world continues to shrink and our encounters with difference 
increase, we need theories of discourse that will allow us to share meaning with others so 
that we avoid conflict and develop understanding. In the simplest terms, this project is an 
act of defiance against the cynicism of contemporary theory that says we can only know 
others on our own terms.  
There are no “terms,” only people in a shared world that use marks, noises, and 
gestures to survive – a task best accomplished collaboratively. 
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NOTES 
1. I use the term “affect” in the same fashion as The American Psychological 
Association, which defines affect as the experience of feeling or emotion and a key part 
of the process of an organism's interaction with stimuli. The word also refers sometimes 
to affect display, which is "a facial, vocal, or gestural behavior that serves as an indicator 
of affect" (APA Dictionary of Psychology 26). 
 
2. Throughout this project my use of “social turn” will reflect rhetoric and 
composition’s disciplinary movement away from expressivist and process pedagogies 
and acceptance of theories of discourse that emphasized the socially constructed nature of 
both our communicative practices and our subjectivities. John Trimbur introduced the 
term “social turn” to a wider audience in his 1994 review of postprocess scholarship 
entitled “Taking the Social Turn: Teaching Writing Post-Process.”  
 
3. “Conceptual Schemes,” Donald Davidson tells us, are “ways of organizing 
experience; they are systems or categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are 
points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene” 
(Essential 196). 
 
4. I use the term “world(view)” when referring to poststructuralist and social 
constructionist thinkers to highlight the theoretical implications of assuming all speakers 
orient themselves to the world differently, which implies that agents do not have 
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unmediated access to the world, only their perceptions of it,  and do not share the same 
world, but has his or her own idiosyncratic mediated relationship they call “world.” 
!
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CHAPTER II 
 
TOWARD EMERGENT INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANING 
 
 
“A person starts to live when he can live outside himself.” Albert Einstein 
 
“Belief, intention, and the other propositional attitudes are all social in that they are states 
a creature cannot be in without having the concept of intersubjective truth, and this is a 
concept one cannot have without sharing, and knowing that one shares, a world, and a 
way of thinking about the world with someone else.”  Donald Davidson 
 
Understanding Empathy 
It goes without saying that rhetoric and composition sustains a tenuous 
relationship with notions of truth, and for many scholars and teachers of rhetoric, the 
post-structuralist project of questioning the efficacy of language resonates profoundly 
with their disciplinary tendency to recognize and critique discursive practices that 
promote overly simple notions of objectivity. Thus, when Jeremy Rifkin in The Empathic 
Civilization suggests that our continued existence and the planet’s well being depend 
upon our capacity to empathize with others, the rhetorician’s tendency is to remain 
skeptical, questioning how such a project would proceed, and whether such a project is 
even possible given our current understanding of intersubjectivity, culture, and discourse. 
Rifkin’s claim is particularly interesting given rhetoric’s historical association with
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empathy through Burke’s notion of rhetorical identifications–the relationships people 
and groups create through their use of symbols (language, art, culture, etc.) in order to 
share meaning. From a rhetorical perspective, Rifkin’s claims about global empathy 
encourage a reconsideration of identification, rhetoric and composition’s supposed 
conceptual equivalent. To understand the connections between empathy and 
identification, however, requires a brief summary of empathy as a concept and its 
traditional application in rhetoric and composition scholarship.  
Empathy, traditionally understood as the capacity of human beings to vicariously 
share affect, remains a crucial topic of literary theory, particularly the psychoanalytic and 
phenomenological traditions which value inquiry into the affective dimension of 
interpretation. This relationship between literary study and empathy is rather self-evident, 
especially when examining the concept’s historical roots. “Empathy” derives from the 
German word Einfühlung, a term coined in 1872, and key concept in German aesthetic 
perception theory (Reed, “The Antithetical Meaning” 7). As Rifkin points out, 
“Einfühlung relates to how observers project their own sensibilities onto an object of 
adoration or contemplation and is a way of explaining how one comes to appreciate and 
enjoy the beauty of, for example a work of art” (12). The appearance of empathy in the 
literature of psychology, however, stems, in part, from the word’s alternative definitions, 
which as Evelyn Schwaber points out, suggest “to feel within” and to “indwell” (27). For 
psychologists, empathy provided an explanation for how therapists enter into the 
emotional and cognitive states of the patient in order to provide diagnosis. Wilhelm 
Dilthey conflated these various meanings of Einfühlung and began to use the term as a 
! "%!
way “to describe the mental processes by which one person enters into another’s being 
and comes to know how they feel and think” (Rifkin 12). Thus, empathy became not only 
a way to describe how therapists understood the psychological issues afflicting patients, 
but also provided a language for how human beings appear capable of understanding the 
actions and thoughts of others.  
To empathize, then, names a process by which “humans come to know what 
others are thinking and feeling” (Baston 3). This “psychological process” Martin 
Hoffman explains, “makes a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s 
situation than with his own situation” (qtd. in Rifkin 13). Hoffman implies that to 
empathize involves an individual understanding his or her cognitive and emotional 
responses from “within” the perceptive space of the other. As Joseph Litchtenberg points 
outs, empathy demonstrates the human capacity for intersubjectivity – the ability to enter 
into another’s internal states of being (3). These qualities of empathy are summarized 
clearly when Suzanne Keen defines empathy as the “vicarious, spontaneous, sharing of 
affect” (207). The above mentioned scholars provide the theoretical scope of empathy – 
what empathy can supposedly accomplish – but there still remains the pragmatic 
question, which Scwaber asks when she writes, “But what does this mean, to place 
oneself within the experience of another in order to comprehend the inner reality of the 
other?” (27). 
Louis Agosta offers “one possible answer” by suggesting that empathy “as a form 
of human understanding” forms something like Heidegger’s “’hermeneutic circle’” (45). 
Generally, the hermeneutic circle represents the “circularity” of human experience – 
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everything, always, exists in the realm of interpretation, or as Agosta writes, human lives 
“are composites consisting of many aspects that take their meaning from the whole of 
which they are a part and, in turn, lend meaning to that whole” (45). For Agosta, empathy 
exists, but its recognition is part of its genesis. In other words, to empathize is to interpret 
the experience of the other in light of our own experiences, and thereby empathy is a 
circular hermeneutic process. To empathize in order to share meaning with another 
requires, as Hoffman suggested above, allowing our interpretations of the other’s 
discursive acts condition both our affective response and proceeding utterances. 
These interpretive capabilities exist, Reed argues, because our “communal 
discourse” is “flexible enough to accommodate individual differences and firm enough to 
withstand too much divergence” (10). Reed, in the same vein as rhetoricians like Kenneth 
Bruffee and Stanley Fish who embrace social construction, explains that communal 
discourses develop by “virtue of common cultural heritage and similar educational 
experiences; by virtue of common sharing of goals and assumptions, theories and works” 
(11). Consequently, people (and, especially for Reed, psychologists) are able to see the 
“written word” as a “vehicle of affective experiences, beliefs, associations, and 
fantasies.” Because “of the extensive similarity of experience represented by a sharing of 
theory and work, the word itself has an evocative potential”(11). Thus, “empathy occurs 
in an interpersonal setting between persons who remain aware of their separateness, yet 
in essence it is an intrapsychic phenomenon based on the human capacity to know 
another’s person’s inner experience from moment to moment” (Buie qtd. in Reed 12).  
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To social constructionists, then, the ability to empathize with the other exists as a 
function of already shared meaning: the particular linguistic, cultural, and historical 
conventions people share that allow them to share affective responses to given artifacts. 
However, this view of shared meaning implies that individuals are cognitively distinct 
from each other—that our views, experiences, and perceptions of the world are wholly 
different and unique.  Simply put, according to constructionist theory, we empathize 
because we do not share the same world. Empathy allows us to momentarily share 
conceptions about object in the world, but the divisions between us, whether linguistic or 
cultural, ultimately define our existence. 
In other words, empathy, as a key term for the social sciences, names a process by 
which people bridge the metaphysical gap that exists between them, and in constructing 
these bridges, which is the sharing of meaning demonstrated through similar affective 
responses, these metaphysical distances become evident. This, of course, is exactly the 
same position Burke holds when he discusses rhetorical identification, a supplementary 
concept necessary for persuasion, and the term most commonly invoked by rhetoricians 
concerning discussions of empathy. Burke, like the social scientists mentioned above, 
believes that shared meaning both illuminates our divisions and provides evidence for our 
affiliations. For, Burke, a rhetor’s capacity to identify with the other stems from the 
sharing of communal conventions and symbolic systems; moreover, identification, like 
empathy, simultaneously marks moments of “consubstantiality” while reminding 
speakers of their irrefutable separation. We can understand what Burke calls 
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identification as a rhetorical version of the concept of empathy, and thereby the term 
through which rhetoricians may enter into Rifkin’s global project.  
Central to Rifkin’s re-telling of human history through the lens of empathy is the 
notion of intersubjectivity—a quality central to Kenneth Burke’s notion of identification, 
which serves to “re-tell” the story of rhetoric. In his now famous passage, Burke explains 
identification in the following way:  
 
 
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A  
is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests  
are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so. 
Here are the ambiguities of substance. In being identified with B, A is  
‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he 
remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and 
separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (20-21) 
 
 
Rhetorical identifications, Burke contends, names what since Cicero has been understood 
as the primary goal of rhetorical study: understanding how to navigate partisan 
relationships in such a fashion as to serve the greater good.2 Or, as Burke defines the 
purpose of rhetorical study, “put identification and division ambiguously together so that 
you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other begins, and you have the 
characteristic invitation to rhetoric” (25). Rhetorical identifications, like the definitions of 
empathy explained above, represent an attempt on the part of distinct individuals to share 
meaning with the other, to experience, in similar fashion, the world with someone else.  
As Dennis A. Lynch points out, rhetoricians often reformulate questions of 
empathy, persuasion, and audience into questions of identification. Thereby, rhetoric 
scholars avoid the pitfalls created by discussions of affect, which often lead to mystical 
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and romantic appeals, and instead draw upon the work of Kenneth Burke who, Lynch 
contends, most clearly anticipated the “turn toward empathy,” evidenced through his 
redefinition of the aims of rhetoric in terms of identification: “You persuade a man only 
insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, 
idea, identifying your ways with his” (Rhetoric 55). Yet, while Burke and, as Edward 
Schiappa suggests, the ancient rhetoricians, including Isocrates, believed that the ability 
to experience the world like another through empathy/identification was essential to 
effective persuasion, and cooperative action, these terms remain prone to criticism.  
 “Empathy used to be at the center, at the heart, of rhetorical studies,” Dennis 
Lynch points out, and it “used to names kinds of strategies (appeals to pity, compassion, 
sympathy, and empathy),” and also “served as a mode of invention (a speaker or writer 
imagines an audiences response by imagining what really matters to them)” (5). 
“Rhetoric,” Lynch summarizes, “cannot proceed without empathy–or if it does, it is sure 
to fail”; however, the notion of empathy is typically discussed within the context of 
pathos, deliberate appeals intended to elicit affective responses from an audience. 
Rhetorical studies, with its historical and continued emphasis on understanding pathetic 
appeals, has much at stake, then, in Rifkin’s project of understanding how to share 
meaning in an ever-shrinking world in which differences are encountered more 
frequently. However, rhetoric and composition’s use of empathy as a strategy for 
communication is complicated by the postmodern suspicion of intersubjectivity, the 
notion that two or more individuals can share meaning about a particular object as a 
result of coordinated interaction.  
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Empathy, which necessarily requires intersubjectivity, remains a contentious term 
in postmodern philosophical thought because it challenges Cartesian dualism, the critical 
position foundational (irony intended) to postmodern thought. The “Cartesian split” 
assumes that division defines human existence. These divisions come in a number of 
forms: the interiority of the mind and the exteriority of the physical world; the division 
between self and other; and the division between nature and culture. Each of these 
divisions, to varying degrees, exists because our philosophical assumptions continue to 
derive from Platonic thinking: human beings are separated from the physical world and 
from each other; therefore, to “encounter” the world is to articulate the world through a 
particular idiom. To know the world is to know a particular way to speak about the 
world. Consequently, to empathize with the other is to imagine one like the self in the 
world of which the self speaks. That is, in the Platonic view, empathy requires that people 
share both similar idioms with which to speak about the world and similar experiences in 
the world upon which to draw their actions and utterances toward the other. Painting in 
broad strokes, then, it is reasonable to suggest that the critical tradition of the West 
developed with the assumption that all of us, all of the time, are able to experience the 
world and each other only through the lenses (language, culture, history, etc.) given to us. 
Achieving an epistemology based on empathy, as Rifkin wants to suggest with his 
project, requires an answer to a seemingly basic question: “how does shared meaning 
come about?” And, if shared meaning is possible, “how could it be recognized 
objectively, which is to say, in a fashion that validated the experiences, beliefs, and 
actions of all parties involved?”  
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The “social turn” in rhetoric and composition studies raises substantial challenges 
to claims of identification and empathetic response. Perelman and Obrecht-Tyteca were 
some of the first rhetoricians to articulate this suspicion.  In The New Rhetoric they write, 
“the post-Cartesian concept of reason obliges us to make certain irrational elements 
intervene every time the object of knowledge is not self-evident” (3). These “irrational” 
interventions often include appeals to “suprarational sources of certitude such as the 
heart, grace, “Einfuehlung (empathy),” or “Bergsonian intuition”; however, Perelman and 
Obrechts-Tyteca contend that appeals of pathos are “completely artificial and contrary to 
the real processes of our thoughts” (3). Instead of expending energy summoning the 
mythical powers of empathy and grace, Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca exhort 
rhetoricians to better understand the socio-economic and cultural-linguistic environments 
of their audience, which will allow for a better understanding of the identifications that 
are most persuasive. Without understanding and responding to the social conditions that 
determine an interlocutor’s possible discursive choices, “argumentation would be 
pointless and without result. For all argumentation aims at gaining the adherence of 
minds, and, by this very fact assumes the existence of an intellectual contact” (14).  
Perelman and Obrechts-Tyteca’s comments anticipate Kenneth Bruffee’s social 
constructionist view of discourse, which Bruffee defines as the view that “writing [all 
communicative modalities] is primarily a social act,” because a “writer’s language 
originates with the community to which he or she belongs;” therefore, “We use language 
primarily to join communities we do not yet belong to and to cement our membership in 
communities we already belong to” (“Social Construction” 784). Or, in Burke’s terms, 
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communication makes our identifications, or lack there of, across perceived cultural, 
social, or historical differences clear. Communicate also strengthens existing 
identifications with those whom we share common interests. Thus, as Gretchen Flesser 
Moon points out, the general thrust of twentieth-century rhetorical study, thanks in large 
part to the importance of Burke’s thinking and the influence of social constructionist 
theory, involves “returning the rhetor’s attention to invention, and, at least implicitly, to 
the ethical dimension: the problem for rhetors in questions of value and judgment…is to 
find the common ground between rhetor and audience in attitudes and states of mind” 
(“The Pathos of Pathos” 34). In the most basic terms, if I. A. Richards is correct and 
rhetoric is “the study of misunderstanding and its remedies” then those remedies are 
located in the interpretive work associated with accessing and developing arguments in 
the idiom of the other’s conceptual schemes.  
Of course, as Rifkin alludes, the notion that individuals remain cognitively 
distinct and yet capable of sharing meaning through the translation of conceptual schemes 
represents an insurmountable problem for contemporary rhetorical theory with its 
predilection for postmodern critiques of culture, history, and language. As Diane Davis, 
Richard Coe, and countless other Burke scholars demonstrate, identification is Burke’s 
humanist attempt to explain how speakers might negotiate the “originary divisiveness” 
that defines human existence through symbolic interaction intended to bridge the 
metaphysical and cultural-linguistic space between agents (Davis 128). These symbolic 
interactions are predicated upon, as Burke states, the ability of speakers to share enough 
linguistic and syntactical similarities in their discourse to identify themselves with the 
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needs of the other, demonstrated in the other’s utterances. In this way, Burke writes, 
“‘belonging’…is rhetorical” (Rhetoric 28). That is, when we identify with the other, we 
have entered into the realm of the rhetorical because if “men were not apart from one 
another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (22). 
However, as many contemporary Burke scholars point out, Burke’s notion of rhetorical 
identification, which remains central to contemporary rhetorical theory, cannot avoid the 
inherent inconsistencies associated with appeals to languages representational capacity. 
In other words, it is questionable whether speakers have the capacity to demonstrate 
empathy through affective rhetorical appeals because such demonstrations imply that 
speaker’s can in fact share the Other’s conceptual schemes, a notion that flies in the face 
of contemporary theory’s commitment to incommensurability. 
The limitations of empathy as a viable means of initiating inventive strategies that 
address the needs of other’s has most recently been taken up by scholars like Patricia 
Roberts-Miller and Kristie Fleckenstein. In her essay “The Tragic Limits of 
Compassionate Politics” Roberts-Miller suggests that not only are rhetorical appeals 
purporting claims of empathy self-indulgent–“the love that one feels for someone with 
whom one empathizes is a kind of self –love”– but these appeals often focus on “saving 
the individuals from the system [oppressive social institutions]” rather than programs of 
large-scale social amelioration (692,693). Both of these problems, Roberts-Miller argues, 
stem from a speaker’s identification with the other, that is, speakers tend to act 
compassionately only when they identify the other as similar to the self and therefore the 
environmental forces impinging upon the other could, at least potentially, impinge upon 
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the self. Kristie Fleckenstein, in her essay “Once Again with Feeling,” a response to 
Roberts-Miller’s argument, accepts the premise that identification is potentially 
undermined by speakers’ hermeneutic tendency to interpret the other’s actions through 
the lens of the self; however, these tendencies do not negate the fact that people claim 
embodied, affective experiences of identification with others via empathy. Therefore 
issues of empathy and pathos need to be continually addressed in the theoretical 
discourse of rhetorical studies. In short, emotions are bound up in rhetorical acts, but as 
Fleckenstein, Roberts-Miller, Mary Ann Cain, Ellen Quandahl, Lynn Worsham, and 
countless other scholars note, emotions, from a rhetorical perspective, are constructed 
responses or topoi, determined by the cultural, linguistic, social, and historical 
conventions of particular discourse communities. Thus, discussions focusing on the 
rhetorical function of empathy, emotion, or any other appeal to pathos, are 
simultaneously conversations dealing with the extent to which speakers can effectively 
interpret, or “bridge the gap” between their socially constructed interpretive schemes and 
those interpretive schemes that shape the other’s rhetorical acts.  
Rhetorical strategies drawing upon the language of empathy, as Nathaniel Teich 
points out, often use spatial metaphors to describe the empathetic process. 
Metaphorically, speakers traverse the metaphysical space between themselves and their 
audience, a description of empathy often used in psychiatric discourse from which 
rhetoric draws from heavily in its theorizing of affect. Teich suggests that psychologist 
Carl Rogers’ use of empathy when discussing “client-centered therapy,” which 
emphasizes an “active listening” that facilitates “attitude change” provides rhetoricians 
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with a useable definition of empathy because of Rogers’ focus on conversations that lead 
to meaning making and sharing–a central rhetorical concern since Plato and Aristotle. 
Rogerian Rhetoric, as Teich and others make clear, emphasizes the importance empathy 
plays in interlocutors’ interpretation of the other’s discourse in order to determine the 
other’s orientation to the discursive problem at hand.1 Rogers like the rhetoricians 
mentioned above, often uses spatial metaphors to describe the empathetic process. Rogers 
sees empathy as the ability to “adopt the client’s frame of reference” and “enter fully into 
the world of his feelings and personal meanings and see these as he does” (On Becoming 
53). Doug Brent adapts this Rogerian concept of “entering into the other’s world” for 
rhetoric and composition studies, writing, “Rather than simply imagining an isolated set 
of arguments for an opposing viewpoint, the write must imagine the entire worldview that 
allows those arguments to exist, that makes them valid for the other” (Brent “Rogerian”). 
Empathy, as a rhetorical concept, names the inventive process through which speakers 
develop appeals based upon their entering the “space” of the other, and through this 
intersubjectivity developing strategies that identify the other’s needs with regards to 
particular discursive exigencies.  
Empathy, though, as Rogers points out, is not a claim of “pure identification”—to  
lose the self over to the other (a continued concern of philosophers like Martin Buber and 
Immanuel Levinas) . Rather, “being empathetic is to perceive the internal frame of 
reference of another with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings 
which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but without ever losing the ‘as if’ 
condition” (A Way of Being 140-141). Rogers, like Roberts-Miller, Fleckenstein, and 
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Perelman and Obrecht-Tyteca, is cautious not to oversimplify the affective dimensions 
and cognitive dimension of empathy. Martin Hoffman, like the aforementioned 
rhetoricians, sees empathy as a complex human-centered analytic, the “ideal vantage 
point from which to examine” affective and cognitive processes associated with shared 
meaning (“Interaction” 103). However, as Hoffman notes, and my project intends to 
makes clear, empathetic responses are too often examined as either affective displays 
intrinsic to human experience and thereby beyond analysis, or when empathy is viewed 
through the lens of poststructuralist discourse, as cognitive misperception that cannot 
accomplish its task of helping speaker’s “feel what another person feels” (103).  
In her essay “Class Affects, Classroom Affectations,” Julie Lindquist engages the 
problems associated with the affective/cognitive divide and suggests that scholars often 
ignore the affective dimension of writers’ experiences as a result of the “social turn” in 
rhetoric and composition studies. Instead of interrogating the “complex affective 
experience” of issues like class, gender, and race, scholars tend to view student resistance 
as determined by sets of “social issues” identifiable “through systematic analysis” (190). 
Lindquist, in order to address the “naïveté” of critical pedagogies that ignore the 
implications of affect, proposes that teachers of rhetoric and composition allow students 
to express their affective experiences, a process made possible by a teacher’s ability to 
employ strategic empathy. Lindquist, using the language of theater and performance, 
suggests that strategic empathy involves teachers “deep acting,” the ability to turn their 
selves over to the possibility that they may in fact respond empathetically to the student’s 
affective performance, even though they are cognizant of their desire to “seem 
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empathetic.” Through this deep acting that leads to seemingly authentic displays of 
empathy, teachers create an environment in which students are able to interrogate the 
complex structures that shape their identity by playing their affective responses off the 
teacher’s affective responses to them. The engaged empathetic listener, through her 
affective performance in response to the student, is able to highlight the tensions and 
complexities present in the student’s thinking and thereby challenge him to develop 
cognitive awareness alongside his affective responses.  
Much could be said about Lindquist’s “hidden script,” and the implications of 
“acting” on critical pedagogy’s goals of interrogating ideology, especially given that 
many oppressive ideologies continue to function as a result of their disingenuous 
engagement with people. However, this project is more interested with Lindquist’s 
vacillation between empathy as affective experience and cognitive analytic. Students, 
Lindquist contends, are often limited by their “historical cultures,” which we might 
understand as “home languages,” or “discourse community,” or any other moniker that 
signifies a set of conventions developed away from and prior to entrance into the 
academy. A student’s historical community varies greatly from the “political cultures” of 
the university, those cultures that promote critical practices intended to illuminate the 
tensions between institutions and individuals. Students, Lindquist argues, respond 
emotionally to the criticisms of “political cultures” that teachers often level at the 
discourse communities with which they identify. Therefore, a “political culture’s” 
critique of meritocracy may be met with anger and frustration from a working-class 
student that views the academy as a means of upward mobility. A student’s affective 
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response to ideas that challenge her prior commitments represent crucial first steps to 
developing rhetorical awareness; however, these initial responses, while in need of 
careful consideration, are nevertheless initial, and therefore teachers should use strategic 
empathy as a means of allowing these initial responses to do the work of critical inquiry 
so that students can develop more mature rhetorical practices. In other words, Lindquist, 
ironically, in her contention that writers move from affective responses to the cognitive 
ability to engage multiple discourse communities, is demonstrating the social 
constructionist contention that she criticizes. While affectations may be embodied, that is 
to say “real” in the biological and neurological sense, ultimately these expressions can be 
traced to particular conventions of prior conceptual schemes through a writer’s 
articulation. For Lindquist, affect and cognition are discrete elements of rhetorical 
performance that can be analyzed separately like any other element of the composition 
process. 
Theresa Kulbaga, however, suggests that the degree to which we empathize with 
the other, while our affective engagement may motivate us, is limited to our capacity to 
understand the “cultures” that shape the other’s responses to the world. Kulbaga criticizes 
the consumptive behavior of the West as it pertains to texts like Reading Lolita in 
Tehran, which (re)present the “Other” in terms of Western ideologies. The “Oprah Book 
Club Culture,” Kulbaga quips, too often views texts involving the ethnic other as 
moments for “transnational empathy,” or, the belief that consuming the other’s stories 
will lead to empathetic development, a pedagogical assumption, Kulbaga argues, which 
shapes the approach readers take toward texts dealing with cultural and ethic differences. 
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So, while Kulbaga and Lindquist both agree with Lynn Worsham and understand 
affective responses as socially and historically constructed and performed through 
embodiment, Kulbaga highlights the limitations of embodied responses. Like Jacobs and 
Micciche, Kulbaga sees appeals to empathy as “evidence of one’s position in social 
relations,” which is to say, empathy is socially constructed through a person’s 
membership in particular cultural institutions  (A Way to Move 4).  
Kulbaga and Lindquist, like the other writer’s mentioned above, continue 
wrestling with the classical problem of pathos. As feminist scholars like Catherine A. 
Lutz point out, emotions have traditionally been discussed in terms of “female” attributes, 
“something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational,” and “physical 
rather than mental or intellectual” (“Engendered Emotions” 69). Therefore, in order to 
recover the role emotions, like empathy, play in the construction of rhetorical appeals, 
scholars, particularly feminist and postcolonial scholars, argue that emotions be viewed 
as “connected to our rational and ethical lives” (Jacob and Micciche 5). The problem, 
however, in arguing that affective responses are as essential and as rational as other 
deliberative rhetorical acts is that it simply applies the same social constructionist 
analysis to emotions. That is, in accepting the notion that the affective dimension is 
embodied but only made visible to others through discourse, scholars have simply 
multiplied the interpretive problem that influences contemporary rhetorical theory, 
namely, that any conceptual scheme is susceptible to critique on the grounds of 
idiosyncrasy and speculation. Simply put, if our interpretations of the other are relative to 
communities, cultures, and languages, then claims of “shared meaning” remain 
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susceptible to critiques of solipsism and ethnocentrism, a critique particularly damaging 
to notions of identification. 
Burke’s sense of rhetoric’s identifying capacity, the belief that interlocutors can 
both share meaning and remain distinct, is continually challenged by Burke’s own view 
that language functions as a medium. Richard Coe summarizes Burke’s position clearly 
when he writes, “For Burke, everything essentially human derives from our being 
symbol-making animals…. Our very perceptions – as well as our interpretations, 
attitudes, judgments, choices, and the actions that follow – are all mediated by the 
symbols we make, use, abuse and are, in this sense used by” (40). Coe concludes, “As 
historical and social groups, we make language” and, therefore, “Everything we do is 
mediated by our symbols” (41). As Coe’s comments make clear, Burke’s notion of 
identification is similar to Agosta’s claim about empathy – identification functions in a 
hermeneutic circle. Diane Davis notices this feature in Burke’s writing as well when she 
writes, “Burke describes identity as an effect of the processes of identification and 
identification as the achievement of an already discernable (biological) ‘identity’” (128). 
In the same fashion as empathy, identifications between people are both the product of 
and the evidence for shared meaning. Therefore, “from the moment he [Burke] 
determines that identification is a function of (rather than the condition for) shared 
meaning–as soon as he situates identification within the arena of representation, in other 
words–he has already presumed a prior divisiveness and engaged the necessary 
contradiction” (129).3 The contradiction Diane Davis points to is Burke’s notion of 
substance, one of the focuses of his essay A Grammar of Motives.  
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In A Grammar of Motives, Burke argues that human experience takes place within 
the paradoxical space of substance. Substance, for Burke, is the a priori condition within 
which all humans find themselves – a world of symbolic interactions. As Burke suggests, 
people are “separated from [their] natural conditions by instruments of [their] own 
making” (qtd.in Richter 633). Rather than referring to human beings as homo sapiens, 
Burke argues that homo symbolicus more accurately describes human existence. Human 
beings exist in a state of constant symbolical interaction. This constant state of symbolic 
interaction makes up the substance into which the drama of life unfolds. Moreover, these 
interactions within substance provide us with the only available means of accessing the 
other’s thoughts, and without knowing the other’s thoughts sharing meaning with others 
about the world is impossible, an impossibility that challenges our survival. “Indeed,” 
Burke writes of the internal/external dualism that defines human experience, “we can 
take it as a reliable rule of thumb that, whenever we find a distinction between the 
internal and the external, the intrinsic and the extrinsic, the within and the without…we 
can expect to encounter the paradoxes of substance” (1008). As David Richter points out, 
people are “so conditioned by language and the social aspects of life that are created 
within and through language that even his physiology has changed from that of the 
arboreal apes from which he descended” (633). So central to human experience is 
identification that Burke suggests it should replace persuasion, traditionally the key term 
of rhetorical study, because we can persuade a person “only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways 
with his” (55). In other words, identifications occur as interlocutors translate the symbolic 
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actions of another into familiar symbolic patterns, and this process of translation, which 
Burke calls identification, makes the paradoxes of substance clear: we can identify with 
the other and share meaning, but in doing so we are made aware of our distinctiveness, of 
what we typically don’t share.  
Shared meanings–the result of rhetorical identifications—exist only insofar as we 
are able to decode the symbolic acts of others and enter into their cognitive space. Thus, 
while Burke argues for a constitutive understanding of symbolic interaction, he 
nonetheless implies that the central function of identification, to make persuasion 
possible, necessarily means that on occasion persuasion is not possible, which means 
speakers may not arrive at shared identifications in all circumstances. In other words, the 
metaphysical divisions that define us remain, and while we continue to interact in a 
shared substance, we do not necessarily share in identifications. That is, we are unable to 
create identifications when the metaphysical distance between the other and ourselves is 
too great–when the space between our languages, or cultures, or histories, is greater than 
our bridge building capacity.  
Herein lies what I term Burke’s contradictory potentiality: Burke is neither a 
social constructionist nor a proto-interactionist; therefore, his work serves as both friend 
and foil to my current project. This contradictory potentiality rears itself when Burke 
writes, “In pure identification there would be no strife. Likewise, there would be no strife 
in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through mediatory ground 
that makes their communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for 
their interchange of blows” (Rhetoric 25). Here Burke identifies why substance remains 
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crucial to any theory of discourse: even though theorists have long sought to banish the 
term, “far from banishing its functions one merely conceals them” (“Grammar”1006). 
Therefore, life is a constant struggle between symbolic interactions because we are never 
absolutely the same as the other, nor are we ever so different that we avoid strife because 
it is impossible to share any similar conceptions of the same world. Thus, as we will see, 
Burke’s thinking is not that far afield from the work of Donald Davidson or George 
Mead, the thinkers most influential to what Stephen R. Yarbrough names discursive 
interaction. However, it is the one difference that makes all the difference: Burke 
continues to believe in the existence of language – a metaphysical reality that exerts force 
on the world of objects. For Burke, symbols are real: they exist prior to human use of 
them. In this way Burke’s theory of identification remains open to poststructuralist 
critiques that question the capacity of language (or any symbolic system) to create shared 
meanings. This, then, is identification’s contradictory orientation toward an interactionist 
notion of empathy, which views the sharing of language irrelevant to the sharing of 
meaning. However, I intend to demonstrate the potentiality of Burke’s thinking to an 
interactionist definition of intersubjective meaning. First, though, it must be made clear 
how poststructuralist critiques of identification are simply tautological, or as Kenneth 
Gergen suggests, once a critique begins with assumption that there are “texts,” we have 
entered into “the self-created prison” of contemporary theory. There, Rifkin’s proposal 
remains hopelessly unattainable, and rhetoric’s best means of entering into Rifkin’s 
discussion, identification, appears fatally flawed. 
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The “Post” Problem: Poststructuralism and the Question(able) (Notion)  of  Shared 
Meaning  
As Richard Coe points out, rhetoricians are apt to honor Kenneth Burke “more 
than we use him” (39). In part, this lack of use stems from the difficulty of Burke’s prose. 
I find Burke’s theory confusing because on many occasions Burke sounds very much like 
the poststructuralist, post-process rhetoricians who, at least since “the social turn” in 
rhetoric and composition studies, have, to a large extent, influenced the field. For these 
theorists, discourse is derivative of and evidence for particular communities, cultures and 
histories, which are unstable, contingent, and subject to change given historical, 
discursive conditions. Or, as Sidney Dobrin writes, “post-process composition studies” 
focus on “issues of social construction rather than on issues of the individual writer 
working within an individual process (“Paralogic” 132).4  By emphasizing “larger 
influential structures,” like language, culture, community, history, and the like, rhetoric 
and composition turned away from the expressivist impulse to imagine discourse as the 
evidence of a fully-constituted agent’s internal dialogue. As Daniel Smith argues, “many 
of us in rhetoric and composition have relinquished the idea of a self-constituting, 
sovereign subject in favor of conceiving of the subject as ‘socially constructed’” (887). 
Given Dobrin’s and Smith’s comments it is easy to read Burke’s work as influencing this 
social constructionist paradigm, especially when he writes, “Man, qua man, is a symbol 
user. In this respect, every aspect of his ‘reality’ is likely to be seen through a fog of 
symbols” (136). For Burke, all experiences, beliefs, attitudes, values, and decisions are 
the result of “larger influential structures.” As the symbol-using animal, human beings 
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are bound to the world and each other through the mediation of symbols; this is the 
essential characteristic of human existence. Burke’s position is echoed in James Berlin’s 
definition of Social-Epistemic Rhetoric, which he describes in the following way: “Only 
through language do we know and act upon the conditions of our experience. Ways of 
living and dying are finally negotiated through discourse, the cultural codes that are part 
of our historical conditions”; therefore, “the subject that experiences and the material and 
social conditions experienced are discursively constituted in historically specific terms” 
(82). Berlin’s remarks, along with the work of Kenneth Bruffee, Karen Burke LeFevre, 
Stanley Fish, and Thomas Kuhn, help define social constructionist thinking, and align 
well with Burke’s understanding of how all human experience is mediated through 
language, culture, or history – the a priori socially determined symbolic systems that 
human beings employ to make sense of the world.  
Richard Coe adequately summarizes the implications of Burke’s social 
constructionist position when he writes, “our interpretations, attitudes, judgments, 
choices and the actions that follow” are “all mediated by the symbols we make, use, 
abuse, and are, in this sense, used by.” Human beings are thus “removed from nature into 
culture” (43). “Culture,” a substance in which the constant interaction of symbols occurs, 
“negates nature” and creates the “nature/culture boundary,” and thereby the human 
condition “becomes more social than natural”(43) or, as genre theorists Janet Giltrow and 
Michele Valiquette suggest, the supposed “shared-knowledge-of-the-world” that culture 
provides to its members is “boundary-forming” (49). The cultures that are formed 
because of symbol-use are assumed, as Kenneth Gergen writes, to give shape to the 
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exterior (the physical world), but culture also creates the totality through which the 
physical world is imbued with meaning. Simply put, our understanding of the world is 
relative to the linguistically determined communities to which we belong. And, since, as 
Richard Coe contends, “we are…beings who continually define and redefine ourselves 
through the symbolic processes of language, discourse, rhetoric, culture” (48), it seems 
reasonable, therefore, to agree with Thomas Kent that for Burke, Coe, and the countless 
others that identify as social constructivists “our interpretations do not correspond to a 
world outside of our communities, nor do our interpretations represent anything except 
the reality we communally construct or ‘invent’” (“Ethnocentrism” 91). Thus, whether 
understood as Rifkin’s project of global empathy or Burke’s hope for identification, both 
terms run up against the same troubling reality—the meaning of rhetorical appeals made 
to shared meaning are always already imaginary. That is, if Burke, and the social 
constructionist thought he inspires, is correct, all we can know about the world, and 
thereby the other, is what we already know, the result of our acculturation into particular 
discourse communities. 
This is precisely the problem Elaine Scarry points out when she writes, “The way 
we act toward ‘others’ is shaped by the way we imagine others,” and at the most basic 
level we fail in imagining others “in their full weight and solidity” because interpretation 
is limited to the subjective interiority of each person (40). Learning to imagine the other, 
which is to say, share meaning about the world, is, as Rifkin passionately argues, a 
necessary step in saving the planet from destruction: “Only by concerted action that 
establishes a collective sense of affiliation with the entire biosphere will we have a 
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chance to ensure our future” (616). Rifkin’s remarks are similar in scope to Gary Olson 
when he writes in “Encountering the Other” that poststructuralism and postcolonialism 
illuminate the inherently ethical questions at the heart of discourse in a new global age. 
Stated succinctly, our discourse practices influence our ethical practices (or, as Burke 
might say, our symbolic interactions create the cultures to which we attribute our ethical 
value systems), and these practices develop intersubjectively with others through 
communication. Thus, “Ethics is the encounter with the Other” (85). To encounter the 
Other, however, remains a problematic proposition because of the inherent Cartesian 
dualism at work in social constructionist thinking. As Scarry’s remarks demonstrate, to 
engage the other ethically demands both that meaning be shared and the other remain 
distinct (“full weight and solidity”). However, to empathize (identify) with the other 
implies, as Burke does, the human capacity to bridge the metaphysical gaps that exist 
between people, an implication that, as Donald Davidson demonstrates, is dubiously 
paradoxical. 
If we continue to hold the belief that we “see the world through language,” we are 
unable to describe how people, regardless of their assumed cultural similarities, could 
share meaning (Davidson Truth 127). This problem is made quite clear in contemporary 
rhetorical theory dealing with issues of cross-cultural communication. For example, 
Krista Ratcliffe (tangentially working with Burke’s notion of identification) argues that 
rhetorical listening “may precede conscious identifications” (19). If I understand 
Ratcliffe correctly, conscious identifications are the product of rhetorical inventions that 
result from interpretive listening. That is, when confronted with “cross-cultural” expanses 
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that seem too great to cross, interlocutors may use rhetorical listening as a means to 
locate metaphysical crossings that are more manageable. As Ratcliffe states, “they 
[conscious identifications] provide ground for revising identifications troubled by history, 
uneven power dynamics, and ignorance” (19). Discovering the grounds for identification, 
given that “words” for Ratcliffe function “not as transparent descriptors of thought that 
stipulate only dictionary definitions but rather as tropes (i.e., rhetorical figures) that 
suggest multiple meanings,” seems like an impossible task (9). However, if Ratcliffe 
believes what she is saying about meanings always being multiple, how do speakers and 
listeners know when they have arrived at feasible identifications?  
Ratcliffe further muddies her project when, in an attempt to avoid offering a 
totalizing theory that essentializes the other, writes, “Listening metonymically signifies 
the rhetorical-listening moves that listeners make in public discussions when identifying 
a text or person with a cultural group; specifically, this tactic invites listeners to assume 
that a text or a person is associated with – but not necessarily representative of – an entire 
cultural group” (77). Here, Ratcliffe seems to step away from her original argument that 
an interlocutor’s ability to listen rhetorically provides the means by which she may 
determine the cultural-linguistic institutions that influence the other’s discourse, 
recognition that leads to the construction of rhetorical identifications. Instead, Ratcliffe 
warns that an interlocutor’s discursive practices are never entirely the consequence of a 
particular community’s influence. There is no determining, at least not through 
Ratcliffe’s theory, when an interlocutor’s discourse is the product of a particular 
community or the product of her own idiosyncratic behavior. In other words, language 
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leads to culture, and interpretation of language derives from culture. Therefore, 
rhetoricians are to assume that both are at play in the constructions of an interlocutor’s 
rhetorical acts. And, while I agree with Ratcliffe that our utterances are formed 
holistically, I am uncertain as to how she expects interlocutors to identify with each other 
when her theory offers no way for interlocutor’s to claim they know with certainty the 
other’s orientation to particular discursive exigencies. Ratcliffe, like many contemporary 
theorists, is more concerned with questions of agency—knowing from where the 
individual’s discourse derives–rather than the actual sharing of meaning. That is, her 
theory of rhetorical listening offers no way claim that we actually “hear” each other; 
instead rhetorical listening reminds us that there are a multiplicity of structures that 
define an our communicative acts, and thereby a multiplicity of structures that will 
interfere with out interlocutors’ ability to share meaning with us.    
Susan Jarrett, like Ratcliffe, uses the term “metonymic” when she discusses the 
usefulness of postcolonial theory for rhetoric and composition studies in helping writers 
locate the multiple identities that intersect to determine agency. Using the language of 
Deborah Sommer, Jarrett describes metonymy as “a lateral move of identification-
through-relationship, which acknowledges the possible differences among ‘us’ as 
components of centerless whole” (qtd. in Jarratt 113). Identification in Jarratt’s formation 
is much like Diane Davis’s description of how Burke views identity. That is, identities 
are internalized collections of the mutable, contingent, and unstable identifications that 
form from the individual’s constant interaction with other symbol-users, or as Kwame 
Anthony Appiah writes, “individuality presupposes sociability” (20). Thus, Jarrett, and I 
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think Ratcliffe, although she is less clear, assume that an ethical approach to the other 
involves the realization that there are no “essential identifications” – identifications exist 
in relationship to other people and texts, which is to say they are subject to oppression, 
violence and discrimination from those in power who cannot or will not locate shared 
meanings.  
Jarratt hopes that interlocutors will discourse with each other ethically because 
they come to realize that a person’s existence, which is recognized by the linguistic 
constructions he or she creates in response to the exigencies of particular relationships, is 
expansive and occasionally contradictory – “we write multiple versions” of ourselves 
(128). Both Jarratt and Ratcliffe find the answer to the ethical dilemma Olson proposes 
by emphasizing the dynamic multiplicity of identifications that intersect to form 
identities. We might say that for Jarratt, Olson, Ratcliffe, and others, a rhetoric of identity 
is similar to Paul de Man’s “anti-definition of rhetoric”: identification is the name for 
“that which is the limit – that which escapes, that which is the residue of efforts at 
‘catching’ things with systems” (298). Identifications, shared meanings of any kind, are 
the residue of larger institutions that shape discourse, but these institutions exist prior to 
and regardless of human intervention. Therefore, as Jay Jordan writes, “identity is always 
already an active, social process” because identification as the “basic ‘function of 
sociality’” underlies both positive and negative associations; moreover, these associations 
cannot be avoided (“Dell Hymes” 266). Jordan’s comments point the direction for most 
contemporary theory dealing with questions of difference: identifications with cultures, 
languages, and others is unavoidable, but to propose totalizing theories that explain these 
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interactions is impossible. Thus the goal of rhetoric should be to provide interlocutors 
with methods capable of producing ethical identifications across difference. 
Some, like Patricia Bizzell, have engaged the contemporary rhetorical problems 
of communication across difference by arguing that interlocutors must be familiar with 
numerous “cultural literacies” in order communicate effectively. In her essay “Beyond 
Anti-Foundationalism to Rhetorical Authority,” Bizzell criticizes the ethnocentrism and 
simplicity of E.D. Hirsch’s claim that Americans lack a shared cultural literacy. As 
Bizzell points out, for Hirsch, sharing a common discourse “means not only sharing a 
tongue but also sharing a mass contextual knowledge that renders a tongue significant” 
(662). In other words, Bizzell argues that to have language implies having culture, and, 
therefore, “every form of literacy is a particular cultural literacy” (662). Implicit to 
Hirsch’s argument, Bizzell continues, is the notion that “stable entities” like discourse 
communities exist. Bizzell remains suspicious of this notion, stating, “I now think the 
academic discourse community is more unstable than this – more fraught with 
contradiction, more polyvocal – and that this instability is a sign of its health, its ability to 
adapt to changing historical conditions” (662-663). Bizzell, then, might agree with 
Phyllis Mentall Ryder when she writes, “To teach ‘public literacy’ for a multicultural 
society is to teach the logic and argument of multiple rhetorics” (508). Thus, Bizzell and 
Ryder, like other critical pedagogues who feel the role of writing is to expose and 
respond to ideologies that shape our identities, believe, like Burke, that language serves 
as the means by which communities, identifications, and identities are formed. Also like 
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Burke, Bizzell sees these communities, identifications, and identities as dynamic, 
contingent, and subject to change in response to historical and discursive conditions.  
Bizzell’s emphasis on contingency serves as a caution to rhetoricians too willing 
to imagine discourse and community as stable entities, an idea numerous rhetoricians 
exploring the discursive problems associated with what Linda Flowers calls 
“communication across difference” have examined. Whether it be the work of thinkers 
like Victor Villaneuva, Keith Gilyard, and Min-Zhan Lu, who examine the centrality of 
ethnicity to rhetorics of identity; ecocompositionists like Sidney Dobrin, Christian 
Weisser, and Julie Drew who attempt to explore the role place plays in the construction 
of identity and identifications; or, genre theorists like Anis Bawarshi, Amy Devitt, and 
Mary Joe Reiff, who explore the vitality of genre to explain the capacity to create shared 
meaning through mutable, contingent linguistic conventions, all of these views work to 
describe how it is that discourse helps create shared meaning without falling into the trap 
of essentializing either discourse communities or the people that comprise these unstable, 
dynamic social collectives. 
Theresa Kulbaga’s essay “Pleasurable Pedagogies” provides a clear example of a 
thinker trying to navigate the problems of social construction and the poststructuralist 
insistence on instability. In her essay Kulbaga challenges Reading Lolita in Tehran 
author Azar Nafisi’s claim that reading about the lives of the other leads to “transnational 
empathy.” Kulbaga, looking to explore “the emergence of empathy as a key transnational 
discourse,” suggests that rhetorics of empathy often elide their connection to 
consumption. Too often, readers, particularly Western readers, “consume” literature and 
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thereby “the other’s story of pain and pleasure” –literally, the other is subsumed within 
the imagination of the reader (507-508). Kulbaga sharply criticizes what she calls 
members of the “American Oprah Culture” who, like those who participate in Oprah’s 
book club, view reading about the other “as an act of pure imagination, a magical means 
of self-discovery as well as empathetic connection,” confirming the message of Oprah’s 
book club that literature should be self-empowering and life-affirming (508). Kulbaga is 
clear in her position: empathy is a type of discourse, and therefore like any discourse is 
local, volatile, and subject to historical conditions. Therefore, claiming “to empathize 
with the other,” especially the transnational other, is a project rife with problems and 
often leads to the type of essentializing postcolonial theorists like BhaBha, Said, and 
Spivak warn against. That warning is against as Deepika Bahri describes, forgetting that 
postcolonialism, whether applied to literary theory, rhetoric, writing pedagogy, or 
Oprah’s book club, is still the exploration of the effects of interactions between 
colonizing powers and colonized peoples, and the cultural, linguistic, historical, and 
social scars that from those interactions (74-75). In other words, as Patricia Roberts-
Miller argues, appealing to rhetorics of empathy obscures the oppressive force of those 
with discursive power, which often leads to a version of identification with the other that 
is voyeuristic and self-centered. 5  
In “The Tragic Limits of Compassionate Politics,” Roberts-Miller demonstrates 
how empathy, like identification, intends “to collapse the space between people”; 
however, “the degree to which we feel compassion and outrage depends, in large degree, 
on how much we identify” with the other (692, 693, emphasis added). Thus, and this is 
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perhaps the most damning critique of identification, our ability to empathize with the 
other and create identifications, exists to the extent that we care about ourselves, a “kind 
of self-love,” which is to say, “one loves the other person because (and to the extent that) 
one could be that person” (692). For Roberts-Miller, the reductive tendency of rhetorical 
identification and empathy impedes any real capacity for altruism, let alone shared 
meaning. Roberts-Miller’s comments sound similar to the concerns raised by postcolonial 
thinker and activist Gayatri Spivak when she writes,  “The anti-essentialist cannot 
conceive of an identity (even in the case of Luce Irigaray when the female body is evoked 
as foundational) somehow existing outside the constraints of a particular culture in a 
specific time and place: ‘The self is always production rather than ground’” (212). 
Identifications, even those that supposedly begin with empathy, will remain unstable, at 
times incoherent, and likely to fail if the cultures from which interlocutors derive their 
discourse are too disparate. Simply put, there is no way to know that we know anything 
with the other. At best, shared meaning is speculative. At worst, impossible. 
It is this dire cynicism—believing there is no way to share meaning with the other 
in any objective fashion given the representational limits of language and culture–that has 
led thinkers like Richard Miller to abandon the notion that the study of rhetoric and 
writing can help interlocutors develop agency and identifications. Instead, Miller suggests 
that we would be better off simply working through our personal “institutional 
biographies” and developing narratives, albeit misinformed and incomplete narratives 
due to the limits of discourse, that explain how we have been thoroughly constructed by 
the institutions that determine our existence. Michael Bernard-Donals, even more adverse 
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to Burke’s identification project, suggests that rhetoricians would do well to dispense 
with notions of “the public or of common ground,” which is to say identification 
altogether, and instead see argument as “beginning with the instability of the human 
subject” (31). Bernard-Donals, like Miller, seeks to begin his exploration with “the 
marginalization of subject positions” (31). So, while Burke’s theory of identification 
acknowledges the divisions between people, he also assumes that identifications 
necessarily develop within the substance of discourse, an essential characteristic of the 
symbol-using animal. Bernard-Donals, however, believes that discourses that avoid 
appeals to the public or the common “acknowledges that between ourselves and the 
neighbor there is a space that, as often as not, can’t be traversed” (48).  
In many ways this literature review is intended to demonstrate the disciplines 
simultaneous and contradictory claims with regards to communication across difference. 
The predominant, disciplinary view of discourse, in the field rhetoric and composition 
studies, is clearly articulated by Kenneth Gergen: “the terms and forms by which we 
achieve understanding of the world and ourselves are social artifacts, products of 
historically and culturally situated interchanges among people” (49 emphasis in the 
orignal). This view leads to the problems of identification described above. While we 
want to suggest that discourse provides the means of creating meaningful identifications 
between people, it seems impossible to claim that such shared meaning is possible, at 
least in any objective fashion. Of course, if Rifkin is correct and empathy is central to 
solving the problems of the twenty-first century then rhetoric and composition has little 
to offer to his project because our contemporary theoretical models fail to move beyond 
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the internal/external problem that has haunted the Western tradition since Plato suggested 
that all discourse is representational. Or, as Thomas Kent phrases the problem, if “human 
subjectivity embodies all that we can know about the world,” then “we obviously cannot 
explain how is it that we know anything at all about the world outside of our own 
subjectivity,” and “in addition we cannot explain how it is that we know the mind of the 
other [the phrase Kent uses to describe what I have been referring to as shared meaning 
or identification] since we only possess contact with our private minds or our internalized 
conceptual schemes” (“Externalism” 61). In the end, there is no way to create 
identifications that do not beg the question. That is, identifications remain purely 
speculative if we continue to discourse with the assumption that things like language and 
culture are real. 
 
Meaningful Provocation - Beyond Substance Toward Discourse Studies 
My study is determined to demonstrate the following. First, rhetoric and 
composition needs to develop a methodology for engaging the project of global empathy. 
Second, to achieve this goal requires an interactionist approach to rhetoric and 
composition studies. However, before we can explore or explicate either of these goals 
we must take a crucial and provocative first step: the dismissal of language and culture as 
the substance in which our discourse occurs. Or, perhaps, to say this in an even less 
politically correct fashion, the study of rhetoric and composition, if it is to aid in Rifkin’s 
proposed project, needs to begin with the seemingly counterintuitive step of claiming that 
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language and culture are not real, at least not in the ways our discipline continues to 
assume.  
Stuart Hall’s comments are extremely helpful in describing the debilitating affect 
of contemporary theory. In an interview with JAC, Stuart Hall painted the following 
picture of contemporary thought: 
 
 
We are trapped by the deconstructive moment in some of the primary concepts  
with which cultural studies is trying to operate. These are its concepts. Each of 
them is no longer tenable in terms of an old vocabulary, but we have no entirely 
new dispensation with which to think. It requires a kind of double operation, 
rhetorically, discursively, in that one uses terms that are untenable; one occupies a 
conceptual world but one no longer believes in the translation.   
(Drew, “Cultural Composition”)   
 
 
His statement, in many ways, summarizes the findings of my analysis from the previous 
section. Rhetoric and composition studies continues, as John Schilb suggested at the 2010 
MLA conference, to focus on questions of agency, and the concept of agency seems to 
vacillate, quite readily, between the “autonomous writer of foundationalism” and the 
notion that subjectivity is simply a “deliberating pun, and agency an illusion” (Jones 
“Beyond” 81).  
This conceptual back and forth, however, is understandable given the assumed 
polarities between which rhetoric functions – the distance between the “subject/object, 
internal/external Cartesian split that so dominates the Western epistemological tradition” 
(Bawarshi,“Beyond Dichotomy” 69). Since Plato had Socrates discuss his cave, the 
Western intellectual tradition developed under the assumption that internal mental states 
rendered experiences in the physical world meaningful. The supposed separation between 
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the mind and the world necessarily created problems of representation – the only way to 
know the world is to know a particular kind of language to describe the world. Truth, 
therefore, became the product of language. The more accurately a word, or sentence, or 
figure, could represent the “reality” of the world, the more truthful. Of course, this 
foundationalist position, supported by a structuralist notion of language that suggested 
meaning derives from the systematic relationship of signs, lacked the capacity to 
withstand post-structuralist critiques, which demonstrated that language could not fulfill 
its representational function because the meaning of a word or figure is always deferred. 
This deferral, of course, is the natural outcome of system of signs that depends upon the 
relationships between signs in order to make meaning – meaning is deferred because 
systematic relationships are infinite. Thereby, meaning and “truth” are speculative 
characteristics of discourse because relationships between signs are never stable. 
In order to soften the blow of poststructuralist thinking, particularly the 
deconstruction of Derrida, social constructionists argued that the instability of language, 
while prevalent, is not totalizing. There are still ways to locate meaning, but to do so 
requires the hermeneutic work of determining the social conditions, and the practices and 
conventions stemming from those conditions, that shape a person’s or community’s 
discourse. Kenneth Bruffee famously uses “conversation” as the metaphor for describing 
a socially-constructed discourse: “any effort to understand how we think requires us to 
understand the nature of conversation; and any effort to understand conversation requires 
us to understand the nature of community life that generates and maintains conversation” 
(421). Implicit in Bruffee’s comment is the notion that discourse is the product of a 
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particular community life or culture, and interlocutors can decode the discourse practices 
of the other if they understand the culture that shapes the other’s utterances.  
Since Bruffe made these remarks, however, many have questioned his assumption 
that translation is possible. As Ratcliffe and Jarratt demonstrate above, “decoding” the 
linguistic and cultural practices of the other is a hermeneutical process, and like all 
interpretive processes it stems from a particular view of the world. In other words, what I 
know about you stems from my view of the world as rendered through the linguistic and 
cultural “lenses” that shape my thinking. There are no innocent interpretations–all 
meaning is the product of a particular community’s discourse. Thus, we have returned to 
Burke’s original claim, identifications imply division and these divisions are not only 
biological (I am not physically the other), but also cultural (I do not participate in the 
socially determined activities as the other). However, theories like Burke’s concept of 
identification, which assumes that human beings must accept the ambiguity of division 
and consubstantiality, offer little more than new terms for Cartesian dualistic thinking.  
There seems no reason to continue exploring the possibility of identification, 
empathy, shared meaning, or intersubjectivity, if these ambiguities remain unchallenged. 
All that can be said about sharing meaning has been written, or, as John Schilb quips, too 
much of our disciplinary writing begins with a “drive-by Foucault quotation” intended to 
direct us toward the same critiques of agency, ideology, and culture that started when 
Derrida first mentioned the word “deconstruction.” In other words, our theoretical 
approaches to discourse can no longer answer the pragmatic question, “what difference 
does it make” to continue pointing out the limitations of language and culture to provide 
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a description of shared meaning, especially given that, for the most part, most tend to 
believe this? 
As a pragmatist, however, I believe these rhetorical problems are still relevant, 
especially given the unique situations in which we find ourselves at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. More than ever, discursive interactions occur between others. As 
technology further shrinks our world, these interactions will become more frequent and 
more important. Is it possible, in order to share a world with finite resources and a limited 
geography, to discourse with the other respectfully, compassionately, and with civility? Is 
it possible to create identifications with the other that neither appeal to the 
foundationalism of Western ethnocentrism nor the nihilism of post-structuralist thinking? 
Is it possible to articulate a version of rhetorical empathy that allows the other to maintain 
his or her “full weight”—the full weight of his or her traditions and practices, which are 
viewed as central for informing one’s action in the world? I believe we can answer all 
these questions in the affirmative, but to do so requires a view of identification that 
locates meaning not as a conceptual object of a person’s interiority, a product of an 
idiosyncratic usage of language and culture. Instead, I propose that rhetoric and 
composition explore the implications of Donald Davidson’s proposal that there is no such 
thing as language, at least not the current view of language, which describes language as 
a representational medium that exists prior to discourse, mediates experience, and 
continues to function regardless of human intervention. Meaning, from this view, is 
always idiosyncratic, the product of one’s unique interaction with language. I argue that 
rhetoric and composition would be better served by accepting an interactionist account of 
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discourse, which views the determination of meaning an inherently intersubjective 
process.  
A useful understanding of interactionism, however, requires a brief discussion of 
two of its key concepts. First, interactionism derives, in part, from Donald Davidson’s 
causal/external understanding of shared meaning. Second, if shared meaning is possible, 
it will require a dismissal of the notion of substance, which, in our current historical 
moment, is most commonly understood as “culture.”  
The first step is to understand what Donald Davidson means by his “fully 
external” approach to meaning. In order to avoid the perpetual paradoxes of 
internal/external, nature/culture, and language/experience dichotomies that define the 
Western intellectual tradition, and thereby the rhetorical tradition, we require an 
explanation of meaning that gets “outside” subjectivity. Davidson refers to this position 
as externalist thinking. Thomas Kent describes Davidson’s project as “Moving beyond 
the inherent Cartesianism present in cognitivist and social constructionist theory”; 
instead, “Davidson invites us to imagine writing as a hermeneutical interaction among 
language users, a conception of writing that does not require us to posit a split between a 
knowing subject and an imperturbable world of objects and events” (“Language 
Philosophy” 2-3). In suggesting that meaning occurs outside the interiority of 
subjectivity, Davidson eliminates problems of incommensurability, which are inherent in 
dualistic thinking because the assumption is that to share meaning means to enter into the 
other’s cognitive space. Davidson’s externalism requires no such journey into the mind of 
the other. 
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In believing that these divisions exist, interlocutors must assume that experience 
is therefore mediated through some kind conceptual scheme. Conceptual schemes, 
whether understood as language or culture, function as the medium through which people 
“see” the world. As social constructionist point out, however, each agent interprets and 
thereby uses these schemes in unique ways. Hence Davidson’s remark, “Conceptual 
relativism,” the belief that all people speak their own language, possess their own culture, 
or scheme for interpreting the world, “is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we 
could make sense of it” (Essential 196). The problem with this doctrine, which is to say 
the problem with social construction in general, is that, “Different points of view make 
sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the 
existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability” (197). 
Conceptual schemes, like language, further complicate the claim that speakers can share 
meaning because the guiding poststructuralist assumption “is the idea that any language 
distorts reality, which implies that it is only wordlessly if at all that the mind come to 
grips with things as they really are” (197). The only way to understand the other, then, is 
to translate his scheme into a recognizable idiom, and by doing so we have no longer 
maintained our ethical obligation to maintain the other’s “full weight.” 
Therefore, in order to save the notion of shared meaning, yet allow the other to be 
the other, Davidson seeks a description of communicative interaction that seeks to 
provide “an alternative account that doesn’t depend upon people doing the same thing” 
(Kent, “Language Philosophy” 11). In order to provide account of how interlocutors can 
communicate without sharing the same things, Davidson offers the notion of 
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triangulation. I will explore this concept in great detail in chapter three, but for now, it is 
important to note that triangulation provides the genesis for my understanding and 
application of what Stephen R. Yarbrough calls discourse studies. Triangulation suggests 
that communication does not depend on shared language, culture, history, or any other 
conceptual scheme. This point cannot be emphasized enough. Nearly all rhetorical 
problems, that is, problems of locating the available means of persuasion in a given 
context, are supposedly problems, as Davidson would say, of translation: Interlocutors 
are unable to share meaning with the other because they cannot translate the conceptual 
schemes influencing the other’s discourse, cannot access the linguistic or cultural 
repertoire that make utterances meaningful for the other. Instead of trying to explain how 
translation is possible, triangulation focuses on how the sharing of objects of common 
concern provides a definition of communication between genuine others. 
Triangulation, or rather, how triangulation is understood, helps to divide up the 
disparate strands of externalist thinking that derive from Davidson’s work. In the simplest 
terms, triangulation is the interactive process through which two (at least) interlocutors 
direct their partner’s attention toward an object of common concern, and, through their 
interaction of marks, noises, or gestures, begin to respond to the object in a similar 
fashion. For Kent, the central importance of triangulation lies in interlocutors using 
paralogic hermeneutics to arrive at shared meaning. Kent summarizes his version of 
externalism in the following way, “Because we can never match precisely our 
hermeneutic strategy with another’s strategy…we ceaselessly shift ground in our guesses 
about how others may be interpreting our language code” (“Paralogic” 35). Kent makes 
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clear that making ourselves clear is the purpose of triangulation. That is, Kent takes as a 
given that the object of triangulation, to some extent, functions similarly for both 
speakers; therefore the “most fundamental activity of discourse production is the 
hermeneutic act,” or, how interlocutors continually adjust their responses to each other so 
that they arrive at a common “language code” for a given object. 
At this point, then, I want to mark the distinction between Kent’s externalism 
(also see: Bawarshi, Reed Way Dasenbrock, Matthew Heard, and Kevin J. Porter) and 
Stephen R. Yarbrough’s conception of discursive interactionism, the pragmatically 
influenced view of externalism to which I subscribe and to which this project hopes to 
contribute and further. For Yarbrough, Kent’s version of externalism misses the mark 
because Kent assumes that the primary function of triangulation is learning to decode the 
other’s marks, noises, and gestures. However, as Yarbrough makes clear, Davidson’s 
fundamental concern lies in the inventive process of determining the relationships 
between interlocutors and objects that influence their marks, noises, and gestures toward 
each other. Yarbrough explains this idea in the following way, “Invention, conceived as 
the attempt to reproduce the conditions that will affect our hearer’s or reader’s object (the 
problem to be solved) is fundamental” (After 223). This notion, that interlocutors share 
meaning because their discourse mutually conditions the relationships of triangulation 
represents the key interactionist principle of discourse: finding out what an object means, 
what an object is, and what do with the object are exactly the same process (“Passing” 
85).  
! %%!
This conception of discourse leads to the next important idea on the way to 
understanding what is meant by the phrase discourse studies. Meaning, in an 
interactionist account of triangulation, is necessarily shared, and as we will see later, 
meaning is also environmentally and temporally bound, mutable, contingent, and 
objective. Moreover, since meaning is created via an inferential process that mimics how 
we get around in the world – we respond, adjust, change, and react based on temporally 
bound conditions of our environment – we can agree with Davidson that once we give up 
the notion of language or culture, we realize that communication is no different than 
anything else we do in the world. In short, communication is causal because it exists in 
the world as marks, noises, and gestures: “language” is simply a theory we apply to those 
events after the fact. Therefore, as Yarbrough explains, rhetoricians might benefit from 
dropping terms like language and culture, and instead focus on discourse, “the human 
mode of interacting an environment, and environment includes things and people and the 
marks and noises they make to affect one another” (Inventive 14). Discourse studies, the 
term Yarbrough uses to describe the study of communicative interaction after rhetoric, 
seeks to “help others understand the objects of your own concerns, and to seek together 
the common causes of your questions and problems” (210).  
Thus, interactionism provides an externalist definition of meaning that is 
necessarily collaborative, which implies the cooperation of at least two interlocutors. 
However, neither Davidson, nor Kent, nor Yarbrough, nor other externalist, focus on how 
this description of shared meaning might challenge or change the Burkean notion of 
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rhetorical identification. My goal is to do just that, but in order to move forward, one 
further theoretical roadblock needs to be removed: culture.  
It should be clear by now that to avoid the problems of conceptual relativism, 
externalists challenge the very notion that conceptual schemes actually exist and serve as 
mediums through which people experience the world. As noted early in the chapter, 
Burke believed the characteristic feature of humanity was its symbol use, and this 
constant, ever changing, symbolic interaction created the grounds upon which human 
existence took place – the substance through which everyone moves. And while we 
seldom hear thinkers refer to “substance,” the concept nevertheless continues to function, 
only now we refer to substance as “culture.” As Yarbrough points out in After Rhetoric, 
our contemporary moment views “culture” as the a priori foundation through which we 
move, work, and communicate. Simply put, then, culture is yet another conceptual 
scheme, another name for the supposed gap that exists between subjective cognition and 
physical experience in the world. Even the most cursory glance of newspapers, 
magazines, and professional journals will demonstrate the centrality culture plays in our 
global discourse. 
The question, of course, for me, a Western white male and privileged academic, is 
that in dismissing the concept of culture am I also dismissing the belief that authentic 
differences exist between people, differences currently attributed to culture? And, am I 
also dismissing, out of hand, that certain groups of people have historically aligned their 
beliefs with each other in response to particular environmental conditions? The answer to 
both questions is “no.” If we want to learn to discuss rhetorical empathy effectively, we 
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can no longer adhere to the belief that somehow a substance like culture determines 
everything about human discursive interaction. Do groups of people share particular 
beliefs about objects in the world? Of course, and they most likely share a sense of 
camaraderie because of these beliefs. However, sharing beliefs because of interactions 
with others in the world with objects is much different than claiming solidarity based on 
a priori substances that dictate action simply by virtue of birth in a particular location. 
Continuing to believe that substances like “language” or “culture” exist will only 
result in further conflict and struggle. For every claim praising the notion of a “cultural 
identity,” an equal but negative claim could be made about the ethnocentrism implicit in 
believing that cultural groups determine our views about the world. Instead, I suggest that 
we drop the notion of culture altogether, and instead explore on how discursive 
interactionism provides a means for breaking down the boundaries between people. 
Simply put, my project argues, which is to say, I want to believe–I need to believe–that 
the erasing of cultural boundaries is possible because pragmatic empathy demonstrates 
that shared meaning is a function of discourse. 6 If we choose to discourse with the other, 
we can know the other. Contributing misunderstanding to “cultural differences” is simply 
an apathetic response to the hard work of living, working, and speaking with others in a 
shared world. 
Before we can move into a description of pragmatic empathy as the imperative  
interactionist methodology, we must first explore an interactionist account of belief. If, as 
Davidson suggests, triangulation names the process through which beliefs are made 
apparent, it seems crucial to extrapolate the epistemological implications of such a 
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position. In other words, what we believe about our beliefs will significantly determine 
our capacity to share them with others.  
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NOTES 
 
1. See also: Richard Coe, “Classical and Rogerian Persuaion: An 
Archaeological/Ecological Explication”; Rebecca Stephens, “Rogerian Principles and the 
Invention Process”; and Richard E. Young, “Rogerian Argument and the Context of 
Situation: Taking a Closer Look.” 
 
2. Cicero’s pedagogical focus in the De Oratore stems from his concern for the 
state. For Cicero, the responsibility to train rhetoricians to draw upon “the universal 
treasure-house of memory”—shared cultural values that undergird the nation-state—falls  
squarely on the shoulders of the pedagogue.  
 
3.  Burke’s conception of identification shares a great deal with postcolonial 
theorists conceptions of identity. For example, Kwame Anthony Appiah in his 
monograph The Ethics of Identity argues that “individuality presupposes sociability,” 
which results in “collective identities” (20-21). Moreover, these collective identities “are 
not just social because they involve others, but because they are constituted in part by 
socially transmitted conceptions of how a person of that identity properly behaves” (21). I 
bring this connection into focus to highlight the crucial role rhetorical theory can play, if 
rhetoricians so choose, in conversations about ethics and globalization.  
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4. As Dobrin’s comments should make clear, postprocess scholars directly 
criticize the work of expressivists, particularly Peter Elbow. Also see Anis Bawarshi and 
Thomas Kent.  
 
5. In After Rhetoric, Stephen R. Yarbrough defines discursive power as “the 
crediting of rhetorical force”: “a speaker gains power to the extent that others credit his or 
her ability to persuade still others to credit him or her with force, rhetorical or 
actual”(23). While there is not room in my current project to explore the implications of 
Yarbrough’s claim, these ideas do represent an important departure point for further 
discussions concerning power and resistance in the classroom. 
 
6. John Tibebu Pell, July 2, 2009. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE CRISIS OF COMMITMENTS 
 
“We cannot live or think at all without some degree of faith. Faith is synonymous with a 
working hypothesis.”  
William James 
“The Sentiment of Rationality” 
While the central aim of this project is to redefine empathy and intersubjective 
meaning in light of discourse studies / discursive interactionism, such a project requires a 
redefinition of what it means for interlocutors to hold a belief. Intersubjective truth, the 
outcome of discursive triangulation, implies that parties involved in interlocution can and 
do identify meaning–they know when and what they believe. This implies, then, that 
interlocutors approach discursive situations with particular beliefs about how discourse 
proceeds. As Kevin J. Porter argues in Meaning, Language and Time, rhetoric and 
composition studies often extol the critique of beliefs and the social contexts responsible 
for their construction, but seldom do rhetoricians define what they mean by meaning. 
Instead of examining the constitutive characteristics of discursive situations, like what it 
means to believe, social constructionism critiques the ideologies shaping beliefs, and 
“generates its own evidence and grounds for communication” as a means to support its 
conclusions (Porter, “Methods” 427). Thus, the social turn in rhetoric and composition 
always already provides the evidence of its own efficacy, and thereby falls into what 
Dasenbrock calls “a cozy communal solipsism” (“Truth” 560). Consequently, my current
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project, which aims to challenge and change beliefs is doomed to fail… unless I first 
articulate an alternative understanding of what it means to enter into discourse with the 
beliefs we hold. In other words, before I can offer an interactionist description of what it 
means to “share meaning” I must first provide an alternative, interactionist definition of 
belief, a definition that accounts for the possibility that beliefs may be shareable.  
As Davidson, Dasenbrock, Kent, and Yarbrough make clear, social 
constructionism, because of its reliance on conceptual schemes like language and culture, 
cannot offer a description of belief that allows for the sharing of meaning. Discursive 
interactionism, however, provides the theoretical foundation for an alternative definition 
of what it means to hold a belief. Drawing together the work of interactionists and the 
North American pragmatists, I argue that beliefs are best understood as commitments– 
active contingent, and mutable sets of topical relationships, pragmatically and historically 
formed in response to particular discursive conditions. To hold a belief, I contend, is 
simply another way of saying that we are committed to engaging a discursive situation in 
a particular fashion, but these commitments necessarily change and adapt if we want to 
function, as Davidson suggests, as the interpreter of our interlocutor. That is, to share 
meaning is not something done to beliefs; rather, sharing meaning is what it means to 
have a belief. Of course, such a position requires an interactionist definition of belief, 
which is to say, a new meaning of meaning. 
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The Problem of Beliefs: Conceptual Schemes and Static Meaning 
When speakers suppose that meaning derives from conceptual schemes they 
encounter a number of insurmountable problems with respect to the prospect of sharing 
meaning with others. While this project is particularly concerned with the ethnocentrism 
characteristic of appeals made to conceptual schemes, this problem is systemic of the 
larger problem of how social contructionism understands the notion of belief. As 
Yarbrough notes in After Rhetoric, the traditional, “Platonic,” view of discourse claims 
that “ ‘reality’ exists prior to our discussions about it” and therefore, the aim of 
communication “is to discover the configurations of that reality and persuade other to 
accept them” (51). Traditionally, then, rhetoric’s goals have been to persuade others that 
one version of reality is more “real” than alternative versions of reality, and agreement 
about versions of reality will be beneficial to continued, and hopefully, cooperative 
existence of the parties involved in the discursive exchange. 
However, as Yarbrough makes clear, interactionism is not a “contemporary” 
approach (read: poststructuralist) to discourse. A contemporary approach to discourse, 
Yarbrough argues, assumes that “discourse is always already open,” and the proper aim 
of discourse, and thereby rhetoric, is to “persuade others to disregard or deconstruct every 
structurally intact field of discursive play one should run across” (52). The interactionist 
view of discourse, however, is that “reality,” when understood as a description of 
experience mediated through conceptual schemes like language and culture, exerts force 
on our interactions with each other because speakers accept these schemes and the 
propositional beliefs associated with them. Therefore, “because people credit them 
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[concepts like language and culture] and act upon them, they are part of the way things 
are. They cannot be simply dismissed” (54). In other words, people have beliefs, and 
these beliefs are credited with the capacity to shape our discursive decisions. Thus, rather 
than continuing to critique how speakers employ discourse in order to articulate their 
beliefs, I believe it more beneficial to change our definitions of how beliefs arise and are 
maintained during discourse and thereby make our theoretical approaches toward 
discourse compatible with concepts like sharing meaning. 
The difficulty in making this argument, however, lies in rhetoric and composition 
studies’ historical reliance on notions like conceptual schemes to explain how 
interlocutors hold beliefs. As I argued in the previous chapter, rhetoric and composition 
studies primarily view the study of discourse as a hermeneutical act. 1 To develop a 
rhetorical presence, in this model, is primarily an interpretive endeavor where the 
individual attempts to locate the meaning of a discourse by locating the cultural and 
linguistic schemes shaping an interlocutor’s communicative practices. Supposedly, then, 
once a person learns to effectively interpret texts she will be capable of constructing her 
own discourses that adequately account for the schemes shaping every part of the 
discursive exchange. 
For rhetoric and composition studies the term “writing process” most readily 
describes the ways beliefs are perceived to develop as writers learn to interpret the 
schemes shaping discourse. Broadly conceived, the writing process signifies the means 
by which writers learn to communicate effectively in a given context by learning, as 
David Bartholomae suggests, “the commonplaces,” or linguistic habits and practices 
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relevant to a particular group. Thomas Kent provides a clear example of the typical 
understanding of how the writing process shapes our view of beliefs, or at least how we 
come to understand beliefs rhetorically, when he writes, “In most writing and reading 
courses, instructors usually assume that they teach a body-of-knowledge, knowledge that 
is organized by a predictive theory of composition or literary theory” (“Paralogic” 35). 
Kent’s use of the term “predictive” illustrates the assumption that beliefs exist as bodies-
of-knowledge that develop interpretively in a predictable fashion. As Kent concludes, in 
believing that a person can “discover, in some predictable way, what it is she wants to say 
and how to say it, we mistakenly assume that a fit, link, or convention exists between the 
different hermeneutic strategies employed by both writer and their reader,” and by 
assuming this link exists or can be constructed we have little hope of understanding why 
miscommunication occurs, other than simply assuming the author or the reader did not 
adequately learn the body-of-knowledge necessary for interpreting the particular 
discursive event (36).  
Kent’s critique is similar to the one given by Donna Qualley in her monograph 
Turns of Thoughts: Teaching Composition as Reflexive Inquiry. Here Qualley argues that 
the perceived efficacy of the writing process promotes “teaching methods of composing” 
that value writers placing “preformulated ideas together in acceptable or standard forms, 
without also teaching students how to examine the implications of their compositions” 
(4). Both Kent and Qualley, then, highlight the problems of an overly formulaic notion of 
the writing process, the same problem Davidson sees in all appeals to conceptual 
schemes. Insofar as they assume that all discursive acts derive from conceptual schemes 
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and that effective rhetorics are those that correctly interpret the media shaping discourse, 
interlocutors can account for neither their misunderstanding of one another nor the 
consequences of their beliefs. Interlocutors, when relying on notions like “process” can 
only assume that they are unable to share meaning with others because they have not 
adequately mastered the appropriate interpretive process necessary for understanding 
their partner. 
While social constructionists like Kenneth Bruffee, Stanley Fish, Karen Burke 
LeFevre, and Richard Rorty appear to offer more nuanced understandings of how 
conceptual schemes shape the discursive practices that shape beliefs, they remain 
entrenched in the notion of process because they are firmly committed to the notion that 
language mediates between the self and the world, that is, they remain committed to 
social constructionism. The social constructionist position, John Trimbur suggests, 
influences the “social turn” in rhetoric and composition studies, which continues to shape 
the field, even though it appears under a number of monikers. Kent summarizes the 
constructionist position in the following way: “what we know is determined by or is 
relative to the community in which we live” (426). Thus, to communicate effectively 
with others, in and out of our discourse communities, requires that we interpret the 
“social issues” that shape discourse and can supposedly “be addressed through systematic 
analysis” (Lindquist 190). Determining the “linguistic” and “cultural” issues shaping 
discourse is a social “process,” according to the prevailing assumption. That is, 
interlocutors can learn the particular communication practices of a particular community 
through a process of analysis and interpretation, even though these practices are 
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understood to vary from person to person and change over time. Regardless, then, of the 
complexity of the definition, a constructionist view of discourse is incapable of providing 
a description of how meaning is shared. In fact, because conceptual schemes are unique 
and mutable, the real question is whether or not social construction can offer anything in 
the way of understanding how we share meaning. 
Summarily, then, the thrust of most contemporary rhetorical scholarship is that 
communal communicative practices change over time, and that an individual’s adaptation 
of these practices is also wholly unique and irreducible to a foundational knowledge 
derived from the community of origin. Unfortunately, this view attempts to maintain a 
belief in two contradictory positions. As noted above (and at length in the previous 
chapter) contemporary scholarship appeals to the notion of discourse communities, while 
at the same time promoting a belief in individual agency that suggests each speaker 
develops a unique application and presentation of discourse which derives from their 
“memberships” in particular communities (Bleich 53). David Bleich attempts to 
summarize this paradox when we writes, “People’s literacies and language uses reflect 
their different sets of memberships in society. How and what one reads and writes are 
governed by interpersonal and collective conditions” (53). Furthermore, “Study of 
different groups of literary respondents shows that even in seemingly homogeneous 
groups of readers the differences of perception, emphasis, and value among individual 
readers are so various as to defeat any attempt to predict similar responses” (55). Thus, 
like Kent, Bleich doubts that rhetoric and composition provides writers the means to learn 
a body-of-knowledge that can predict particular discursive outcomes; however, unlike 
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Davidson, Kent, and especially Yarbrough, Bleich’s statements remain firmly ensconced 
in the belief that language functions as a medium between the world and the self, or in 
Bleich’s own words, “individual identities are connected to how we already speak and 
write and what we read” (55). Bleich words fall in line with Krista Ratcliffe, who claims 
that language is both representational (it “represents that which already exists”) and 
“generative” (it “generates that which does not yet exist or is not yet named”) (9). In 
other words, our beliefs, even though unique from others, still derive from the particular 
adaptations of social conventions and norms. And, since our beliefs derive from 
conceptual schemes like “language” or “culture” all that we can know is that which we 
can represent in our language. 
The problems associated with linguistic representation remains the focus of 
literary scholarship and critical study today. My work, though, is not to continue the post-
structuralist’s critique of whether or not language represents the world accurately – I have 
no desire to continue with such a fruitless project. Rather, I reference the problem of 
propositional beliefs based on a representational view of language to demonstrate a 
crucial, but often misunderstood condition of discursive interactionism: beliefs are 
necessarily contingent, mutable, and require triangulation in order to be meaningful. That 
is, speakers approach a discursive situation with particular commitments—prior theories 
of how they expect to understand and be understood by their interlocutor. These 
commitments, I will demonstrate, are similar to what rhetoricians, at least since Aristotle, 
have called topoi. However, from the perspective of discursive interactionism, 
commitments are never absolute. Rather, commitments name how we expect to proceed 
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during communicative intercourse. These beliefs, however, will, to varying degrees, 
adapt, evolve and change during “the process of constant correction,” a key characteristic 
of the experience of triangulation (Yarbrough, Inventive 8). Interlocutors, then, do not 
develop commitments through a predictive interpretive process; rather, commitments exist 
as a response to the particular problems of specific discursive situations. In the simplest 
terms, all knowing is fluid and represents particular responses to specific environmental 
conditions. 
As Davidson, Kent, Yarbrough and others demonstrate, post-structuralists have 
sufficiently explicated the problems associated with language as a representational 
medium capable of accurately describing our experiences in the world. Ironically, 
however, theorists seem hesitant to drop the notion that language is a representational 
medium, even though they claim it cannot effectively perform this function.  
Therefore, rhetoricians remain locked in a contradictory position. On the one 
hand, social constructionism holds that all discourse, and thereby our identities, are 
assumed to “correspond to our personal, social, and more recently, political theories of 
discourse” (Weisser, “Ecocomposition” 81). Thus, as Anis Bawarshi argues, “We are 
constantly in the process of reproducing our contexts as we communicate within them, 
speaking and writing about our realities and ourselves to the extent that discourse and 
reality cannot be separated” (“Ecology” 71). Our discourse is social in the sense that it 
derives from both specific locations2 and specific conventions3, but, as Krista Ratcliffe 
points out, “What complicates matters is that symbolic systems often house competing 
cultural logics” (10). So, on the other hand, social constructionists hold that idiosyncratic 
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practices of the individual complicate arguments for the communal nature of discourse. 
Consequently, while social constructionists–whether understood as genre theorists, 
postcolonial thinkers, ecocompositionists, or even the new wave of rhetorical historians 
working to uncover the ideologies at work in the writing programs of yesteryear (see: 
Gold, Ritter)–attempt to complicate the traditional and naïve notions of process thinking, 
they nonetheless remain mired in the idea that speakers must internalize particular 
conceptual schemes before communicating with others. Or, as Yarbrough describes the 
constructionist problem, “How can we know whether the terminology we are using to 
describe an aspect of (outside) reality actually fits or corresponds in structure to that 
reality when the structure of the language was in place (inside) before we noticed that 
aspect?” (Inventive 7).   
From this perspective, then, misunderstandings arise because interlocutors cannot 
share the same beliefs. Since all speakers interact with discourse differently, they may 
share a few syntactical or grammatical conventions, but, as Davidson notes, from this 
perspective “what counts as real in one system may not in another” (Essential 196). From 
a constructionist point of view, at best, communicative intercourse allows interlocutors to 
recognize how their discourse use varies from others as a result of their interactions with 
economic, political, and social institutions (see: Berlin, Crowley, Lee, Miller). Therefore, 
when interlocutors find themselves in a discursive conflict – when our responses to an 
object differ from those of the other–the only explanation interlocutors have for these 
misunderstandings is the appeal to the notion that all we can ever know is that we can 
never know the object of the other’s intention. Interlocutors can never share meaning 
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about objects or create meaningful identifications because beliefs about the objects in the 
world derive from language, and language is idiosyncratic, inaccurate, and for the most 
part cannot be shared.  
The problem with beliefs, then, of course, is believing that they work as the 
theorists above imagine. If our beliefs form through particular interactions with 
conceptual schemes, like language and culture, and the goal of communication is to share 
meaning with others by composing accurate representations of the world and its objects, 
then it would seem that such goals are bound to fail. We can never share meaning since 
conceptual schemes of any sort are incapable of allowing us to do so. Moreover, if beliefs 
derive from language and are presented through language, then it seems unlikely that 
traditional notions of communication provide a means through which beliefs can be 
changed in response to the other since speakers arrive at the communicative situation 
with beliefs always already malformed. Thus, even if the sharing of meaning were 
possible, which, according to thinkers like Derrida, is improbable, it would require as 
Davidson says “massive conceptual change” (Essential 196). That is, to share beliefs 
would require speakers to share the same conceptual scheme, a process that would entail 
the transference of the bodies of knowledge and experience that influences a speaker’s 
communicative practices to the internal mental states of another speaker. To share beliefs 
would require that speakers share conceptual schemes, which implies that speakers would 
have to share the same experiences, languages, and cultures.  
Of course, if, as teachers of rhetoric and composition, we want to continue 
believing that the study of communication can help us avoid the perils of discursive 
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conflict, and make disagreements and misunderstandings generative rather than 
destructive, I think we should heed Yarbrough’s provocative claim: “language and 
culture are hypotheses unnecessary for understanding discourse except to the extent that 
people credit them” (After 54). In other words, what we believe about discourse matters, 
and if we continue to remain locked in the notion that language and culture shape our 
views of the world and, therefore, rhetoric names the methods by which we persuade the 
other to believe our inaccurate representations of the world, it seems any way forward is 
not only frivolous but potentially damaging. That is, discursive conflicts will continue to 
be squelched through force and violence, while the authentic sharing of meaning remains 
a theoretical impossibility.  However, if rhetoricians drop appeals to conceptual schemes, 
like language and culture, and instead re-conceive of our beliefs as commitments, the 
contingent, mutable, and collaborative topoi that influence our discursive actions in the 
world, then the sharing of meaning is not only possible, it is inevitable. That is, from the 
perspective of discursive interactionism, beliefs arise and exist during the process of 
sharing. 
 
Commitments: A Pragmatic Understanding of Belief 
I want to conclude by arguing for an alternative understanding of belief: meanings 
arise and exist during discursive interaction with another interlocutive being and an 
object of common cause.  A reconsideration of the aims of rhetoric and composition 
studies in light of discourse studies begins with the crucial definition of commitments, the 
term I use to name both the continually emergent beliefs interlocutors hold and employ 
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during discursive interaction, and the resultant beliefs of previous discursive encounters 
with which interlocutors initiate future discursive interactions. Each speaker approaches 
the other with expectations about what types of rhetorical maneuvers will help facilitate 
understanding about the objects of concern, and those rhetorical maneuvers they expect 
would lead to misunderstanding. 4 In short, commitments are made known during 
discourse; they exist in and affect the world as interlocutors triangulate. 
“Commitments,” as a critical term for the beliefs that people construct via 
discourse, draws heavily from two strands of thinking. First commitments are similar in 
nature to what Davidson calls a prior theory. Second, commitments are pragmatic, in the 
sense that they indicate how speakers have previously navigated the world and how they 
anticipate doing so in the future. Or, to paraphrase William James and C.S. Peirce, 
commitments name the rules of action we are willing to follow in a given situation. 
Rhetorically, commitments name the topical relationships we see as relevant to a 
particular discursive situation. However, commitments are not static, nor do they derive 
from a priori bodies of knowledge. Commitments, I argue, are better understood as a 
stance toward the objects of discourse – the pragmatic orientation toward the world that 
suggests beliefs are better understood as believings, active, methodological approaches to 
discursive interaction initiated by the “perception of differences” between speakers, or to 
borrow from Yarbrough, believings names the process of “inquiry about the causes of the 
differences we perceive” (Yarbrough, After 9). Interlocutors, I contend, may choose to 
approach discourse with the notion that their discursive beliefs are wholly interactive – 
all believing occurs because we interact with others and our world. Therefore, creating 
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meaning and establishing beliefs are part of the same contingent and temporally bound 
project.  
 
Prior Theories 
While Davidson’s concept of triangulation provides a description of how 
discourse occurs, it does not explain how previous discourse experiences influence a 
speaker’s utterances with which she initiates a discursive event with another. 
Communicative intercourse, as Davidson makes clear, is always a discreet and unique 
event, but these events do not, as Bakhtin remarks, represent speakers disturbing “the 
external silence of the universe” (951). Rather, speakers approach discursive encounters 
with the beliefs, intentions, and attitudes, developed during previous triangulations—
these anticipations derived from prior external acts of discourse are what Davidson refers 
to as a prior theory. An interlocutor’s prior theories develop from previous 
communication events. Prior theories, then, indicate previous discursive experiences with 
others and objects, but these prior experiences have little affect on future interactions. 
According to Davidson, “for the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in 
advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker…. For the speaker, the prior theory is 
what he believes the interpreter’s priory theory to be” (261). Prior theories are something 
like a speaker’s “basic linguistic competence,” which a speaker “shares with those with 
whom he communicates” (261). In other words, speakers’ prior theories are helpful 
insofar as they identify the beliefs, intentions, and attitudes derived previously and these 
propositional attitudes will no doubt affect the initial marks, noises and gestures, a 
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speaker uses to direct the attention of another toward the objects of discourse; however, 
“what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that communication succeeds, is not 
learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to the speaker 
and interpreter in advance” but what is shared is the “passing theory” (264). For 
Davidson, knowing the other and sharing meaning occur as passing theories emerge 
through discourse.  
Whereas prior theories represent the ways in which speakers intend to discourse 
preceding the actual discursive event, passing theories represent the discursive moves 
enacted as communication proceeds. “The passing theory,” Davidson writes, “is how he 
[the interpreter] does interpret the utterance” of his interlocutor and for the speaker the 
passing theory describes the interpretive theory she “intends the interpreter to use” (260-
261). Thus, the passing theory names “where agreement is greatest” between 
interlocutors (261). Triangulation, then, names the “cast of characters” involved in a 
discursive interaction, while the passing theory describes the phase of discourse in which 
interlocutors recognize they are in fact responding to the same objects in a shared world. 
From Davidson’s perspective, effective communication does not require sharing a 
common language, culture, or conceptual scheme in advance; rather, effective 
communication depends upon the ability of interlocutors to recognize how they each use 
marks, noises and gestures in response to objects, and thereby understanding describes 
the phase of discourse where speakers’ gestures are similar enough to direct the partner’s 
attention toward the same objects. When interlocutors begin to understand each other 
they have entered into a passing theory, which provides the mechanism by which their 
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discursive acts allow them to know the other’s beliefs, the objects in a shared world, and 
their own beliefs.  
From Davidson’s perspective, sharing meaning with the other, creating discursive 
identifications, does not occur prior to discursive interactions, but arises during 
interaction. Davidson makes this point clear when he writes: “For two people to know of 
each other that they are so related, that their thoughts are so related, requires that they be 
in communication” (“Second Person” 121). Communication, defined by triangulation, 
“begins where causes converge: your utterance means what mine does if belief in its truth 
is systematically caused by the same events and objects” (Essential 236). Yarbrough 
summarizes Davidson’s minimal theory of shared meaning as follows: “to understand 
what an utterance means is to understand the conditions that make it true” (“Modes” 
495). In this way, triangulation not only represents a causal definition of discourse, but a 
pragmatic one as well. To understand that meaning derives from the “process of 
discursive revision that continues until the responses that interlocutors receive are the 
responses they expect” (Yarbrough Inventive 23), is no different than Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s definition of pragmatism: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have 
practical bearing you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your 
conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object” (192). To share 
meaning from the perspective of a discursive interactionist means to experience discourse 
holistically – environmental conditions, objects, and others make our world and beliefs 
known to us. Once we triangulate with an interlocutor, “we sufficiently understand 
someone’s utterances or some understands ours – we consequently know the mind of 
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another, the world we share, and, of course, our own mind” (Kent “On the Very Idea” 
434). 
Davidson’s causal definition of communication begins with a description of the 
prior theories speakers hold as they approach a discursive situation. Since I believe 
Davidson when he contends that an interactionist view of communication erases “the 
boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world 
generally,” it might be relevant to present a non-linguistic, or “worldly” example of how 
prior theories influence our approach to the discursive situation (Essential 265). Take a 
backpacker for example. After completing her day’s hiking, the backpacker decides to 
pitch her tent for the evening. Given her previous experiences, she is committed to not 
only pitching her tent correctly but also using guy-lines to create a taut and more storm 
resistant shelter. However, her commitment to using these techniques does not prepare 
her for the particular conditions she encounters. Perhaps the soil is too soft for a stake to 
stay firmly planted, or perhaps she is pitching her tent on a granite outcropping and she 
will be unable to use stakes at all. Regardless of the situation, her commitment to 
properly “staking” her tent depends upon the particular environmental conditions she 
encounters. Thus, a belief in a particular way of pitching a tent is less helpful than 
believing, that is, actively adapting a commitment to address the particular conditions of 
the situation. 
This is not to say that our prior experiences are unhelpful for getting around in the 
world; they are extremely important. Our prior theories, however, cannot account for the 
conditions influencing a particular situation. Our commitments are, as Kent argues of 
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prior theories, “always embodied interpretations” (“Paralogic” 26). In other words, since 
discourse is causal and occurs in the world, the commitment to “stake down the tent” is 
neither true nor false unto itself; rather staking down the tent names the unique 
interaction, which is influenced by the conditions in which the discourse is carried out. 
Or, in terms of rhetoric and composition, “to write an essay” only becomes meaningful 
when understood as part of a dynamic interaction between speakers and objects in a 
particular environment under a specific set of conditions. We cannot, as Kent and 
Yarbrough explain, predict precisely how discourse will proceed prior to entering into the 
specific discursive context. All we have are our best guesses, our previous experiences 
and encounters, which make up our prior theories. 
The challenge for many rhetoricians encountering Davidson and his notion of 
prior theories results from a misunderstanding of what Davidson calls his “all-out 
externalist” view of language. Davidson’s externalism recognizes that “there are 
connections everywhere between the world and the contents of our thoughts” (Kent, 
“Language Philosophy” 6). Our thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes are verified in the 
experience of discourse. Discursive interaction with others in the world makes our 
thoughts, beliefs and attitudes known to us. “In fact,” emphasizes Davidson, “I would say 
if it weren’t for that [verification of our thoughts, beliefs, and attitudes requires 
intersubjectivity], we wouldn’t be able to interpret anyone else. It’s only because we 
share a world with others that we can get the hang of what they are talking about” (Kent, 
“Language Philosophy 7). Davidson gives the following example as a way of illustrating 
this concept: Imagine a person alone in the world – “that is, not in communication with 
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anyone else” – and he is enjoying a peach. If that person were asked what he is enjoying, 
he would most likely say the peach. However, if the person had no one to communicate 
with what would stop him from answering that his taste buds were providing the joy, or 
an event that occurred a thousand years previous that set the forces in motion that 
impinged on his taste buds. Alone, the person eating the peach would find “no answer to 
that question at all: nothing for him to check up on, no way to raise the question, much 
less to answer it” (8). Thus, Davidson concludes, the only way to understand our beliefs, 
the ways we intend to think or act in a particular context, is through communicative 
interaction with others. The only way we know that the peach is the source of pleasurable 
taste is because we can triangulate with another who responds to the same object. Thus, 
our prior theories, arise from experiences of triangulation, which is another way of 
saying that our beliefs are pragmatic: they arise as a response to the exigencies of 
particular discursive problems. 
As Davidson makes clear, our beliefs develop as a result of interactions with 
others in the world and our beliefs are made meaningful, that is, recognized, during 
interaction. Our beliefs, then, are contingent in the sense that they adapt, change and 
evolve depending upon the particular conditions under which they are employed. It is this 
condition that leads Davidson to conclude that our beliefs are made objective as a result 
of intersubjectivity. The actions we take toward objects in the world illustrates the beliefs 
we hold toward them; actions become meaningful as we interact with others who can 
respond to the same stimuli and thus verify our intentions. From this perspective then, our 
beliefs organize in “pragmatic relations that develop from the processes of our 
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interactions with others and with the objects of our common concern in a world we can 
come to share” (Yarbrough, “Passing Theories” 72).  
 
From Prior Theories to Commitments  
Davidson’s description of prior theories provides little in the way of application. 
This lack of clarification leads to some authors, like genre theorist Anis Bawarshi, to 
misconstrue the concept and treat prior theories as static bodies of knowledge, or genres 
(see: Bawarshi, Bazerman and Meadway, Devitt and Russell) that shape the objects of 
common concern encountered by speakers during discursive interaction. Bawarshi’s 
account, based on genre theory (a particular type of social constructionism) differs from 
Davidson’s account of prior theories, which asserts that objects become objects for us 
because of sharing passing theories.  
In his essay “Beyond Dichotomy: Toward a Theory of Divergence in 
Composition Studies,” Bawarshi intends to offer a description of how speakers move 
from their prior theories to the sharing of a passing theory. Bawarshi grounds his 
adaptations of Davidson’s ideas in both genre theory and the social constructionism of 
Thomas Kuhn and Robert-Alain de Beaugrande. Bawarshi is valiant in his attempt to 
describe the interaction between prior and passing theories in the traditional terms of 
rhetorical study, but his explanation of how prior theories affect discursive interaction 
diverges from Davidson’s causal understanding of communication in drastic fashion 
specifically because he maintains a belief in genres as “conceptual schemes.” Bawarshi’s 
reading of Davidson is unable to avoid the central tenet of social constructionism – the 
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notion that all knowledge derives from some type of conceptual scheme that mediates 
between the self and world. Bawarshi, even though he is working with Davidson’s 
theories, cannot avoid appealing to conceptual schemes.  He makes this clear when he 
writes, “Genres,” which function for Bawarshi as what Kent calls a “thin formulation” of 
social constructionism, “mediate to a great extent our experience of the world, 
determining our motives, what we deem valuable, and how we communicate these 
motives and values” (78).5 Genres, Bawarshi argues, “are dynamically linked to the way 
we conceptualize, order, and change, our world” (78). Therefore, “generic conventions 
linger with us from one communicative moment to the next, in many ways reconstituting 
every passing communicative act with vestiges of a prior one” (78). Bawarshi, therefore, 
concludes, “Every communicative act…is not ‘passing’ but divergent” (80). In other 
words, the actual communicative event may involve the use of generic devices in ways 
speakers may not have intended; all discourse, however, even if it diverges from the 
speaker’s prior theories, will, nonetheless, be the product of schemes that shape both a 
speaker’s use of marks, noises and gestures and her interpretation of the other’s use of 
marks, noises and gestures. 
While I appreciate Bawarshi’s continued commitment to engage the most pressing 
issues facing rhetoric and composition studies, his remarks nonetheless demonstrate why 
Davidson, Kent, and Yarbrough and others like Kevin J. Porter, Matthew Snead, and 
William Duffy, remain committed interactionists and thereby hold to a view of meaning 
that arises in the external interactions of people and things: appeals to genres, language, 
culture or discourse communities necessarily maintain the distinction between what an 
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object means and what an object is. In other words, if genres “reconstitute” passing 
theories then meaning is found not in the passing but in the prior, and again, there is no 
way to know if speakers are interacting with the same object or simply using their own 
idiosyncratic schemes to render the other as a version of the self. Thus, regardless of how 
dynamic, nuanced, and unique one imagines genres, discourse communities, or 
ecosystems to be, appealing to these notions simply reinforces the view that meaning 
develops via mediation. 
Yarbrough, however, offers a fully interactional definition of beliefs. In brief, 
Yarbrough is capable of providing such a definition because he understands beliefs to be 
causal and pragmatic in the same ways as our discursive acts. For Yarbrough, the 
movement from prior theories to a passing theory is a heuristic process “always at once a 
provisional solution to the problem of how the speaker believes his discursive partners 
will interpret him, as well as a question (even when not in question form) to those 
partners about the interpretability of the utterance” (“Passing Theories” 76). In other 
words, since meaning develops during “cooperative human interactions with shared 
objects in a common world” our use of discourse to make these beliefs clear to others is 
also a problem solving exercise – speakers using marks, noises and gestures so that they 
come to share meaning about the same objects.   
However, since discursive interactionism views all meaning as occurring 
externally and intersubjectively, the sharing of beliefs is also an interactive process. That 
is, our beliefs are better understood as believings, expectations we have toward particular 
objects as a result of the historical conditions under which we encountered them. 
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Therefore, my believings about the statement “Jack was misguided” has nothing to do 
with the representational nature of the words in the sentence, but everything to do with 
conditions in which the utterance occurred. So, Jack’s being misguided means something 
different when uttered following an angry outburst by Jack during a staff meeting as 
opposed to hearing the statement with regards to my father-in-law’s frustration over his 
expensive, guided fishing trip. These utterances, and what I believe them to mean, 
involves understanding the relationships between my interlocutor’s words, the object of 
common cause, and my own discourse. Or, in Yarbrough’s words, “objects are 
constituted” as a result of “relationships of historical problematic situations,” so, for 
example, “Finding out what a chair means, what a chair is, and what to do with a chair 
and the word ‘chair’ are exactly the same process” (84, 85).  
It would be foolish, of course, to claim that we approach each discursive 
encounter tabla rosa: “We each have in memory, of course, a repertoire of topical 
configurations associated with previously encountered situations, and having these – 
particularly sharing these with our interlocutor – speeds up the inferential process of 
triangulation. But these do not fully constitute [or, as Bawarshi argues re-constitute] what 
we eventually triangulate” (86). Thus, as an interactionist, I agree with Yarbrough when 
he concludes, “No system of language constitutes the objects to which signs can refer; 
words and other signs refer to the relations that have determined the objects we notice as 
relevant to the task of solving problems with others” (84). 
Yarbrough, then, offers an interactionist understanding of the movement between 
prior and passing; it is a problem-solving process that involves interlocutors’ recursive 
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adjustments to another’s discourse with regards to an object of common concern. These 
adjustments – the movement from prior theories to a passing theory – Davidson, Kent, 
and Yarbrough all make clear, cannot be anticipated prior to the discursive situation. 
This, of course, is no different from the backpacker who will not be able to say how she 
will stake the tent until she begins doing so at the campsite. In other words, Davidson, 
Kent, and Yarbrough all work from the position that to change our beliefs in response to 
the objects of our shared world does not involve massive “conceptual change” – the 
notion that for us to interact with the world differently would require that we somehow 
come to perceive the world in a radically new fashion.  
Rather, the adaptations we make as we discourse with the other are possible 
because our beliefs themselves are interactive. Or as Yarbrough suggests, our beliefs 
name our “apperception of a [discursive] situation’s social relations” (Inventive 171). Our 
beliefs represent the specific answers speakers employ in particular discursive situations 
to end the discord between expectations and experience. Yarbrough summarizes this view 
when he writes, “Change the conditions and you change how you can interact with 
things; change the interaction and you change the relevant relations; change the 
relations and you change the things themselves” (140). Our beliefs, then, exist in only in 
the believing, a pragmatic position originally expressed in the writing of C.S. Peirce and 
William James and their proto-interactionist definition of belief. 
In “What Pragmatism Means” William James writes “The most violent 
revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing…. To a certain 
degree, therefore, everything here is plastic” (149). James’ statement finds agreement 
! *)'!
with Davidson’s critique of Thomas Kuhn and his assertion that bodies-of-knowledge 
only change as a result of radical conceptual change. Briefly, Kuhn’s position, which 
plays a significant role in the development of social constructionism, contends that since 
our beliefs derive from unique conceptual schemes, ideas that arise outside of those 
schemes are only “translatable” if people embrace new perspective of the world, which, 
according to Kuhn, means a person would have to leave the world she currently occupies 
and move to inhabit another. Davidson, of course, argues that Kuhn’s position is self-
refuting primarily because Kuhn, like so many thinkers, maintains the distinction 
between beliefs (the function of conceptual schemes) and the world (where experiences 
supposedly make representation necessary). 6 Davidson, however, does not believe that 
meaning derives from conceptual schemes; rather, meaning, and thereby belief, are part 
of the discursive process and arise during these processes. 
Davidson’s understanding of belief is essentially the same as C. S. Peirce’s 
definition of belief in “How To Make Our Ideas Clear.” A belief, Peirce writes, “is 
something that we are aware of; second, it appeases the irritation of doubt; and, third, it 
involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or…a habit” (28). Therefore, 
“the essence of belief is the establishment of a habit” (29). Our beliefs, then, name our 
believing about objects in the world and how we intend to interact with them. These rules 
of actions, or habits, develop as we attempt the cessation of the “irritation of doubt,” 
Peirce’s phrase that describes the “inadequacy of a currently held belief (or habitual 
response) to a situation at hand” (Yarbrough, “Passing Theories” 77). Peirce’s 
pragmatism, like Davidson’s post-analytic philosophy, both support views of belief that 
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are “plastic” and relationally bound – beliefs are answers (habits of action) to specific 
questions (contingent, temporally bound, and environmentally influenced exigencies).  
This view of beliefs as bound relationally finds its roots, Yarbrough argues, in the 
rhetorical concept of topoi. For rhetoricians, “The alternative rules of action or habits that 
we may or may not find appropriate guides to our discursive behavior in a particular 
situation are,” Yarbrough purports, “precisely the same thing that the ancient Greek 
Sophists, rhetoricians, and philosophers called the topoi” (“Passing Theories” 78). And 
while “modern commentators, translators, and theorists give…divergent definitions” of 
topoi, Yarbrough nonetheless finds Donavan J. Ochs definition compatible with 
interactionism’s pragmatist understanding of belief. The topoi, Ochs concludes, are best 
understood as the specifics of a particular type of relationship (qtd. in Yarbrough 79). In 
essence, the topoi, or topics, are not rhetorical arguments in themselves, but instead name 
particular discursive answers to particular discursive problems. Thus, for the 
interactionist, the classical Greek notion of topos, the place or site, “the realm in which 
the rhetor thinks and acts” (Cosigny qtd. in Yarbrough 82) functions as a means to link 
Davidson’s notion of prior and passing theories to the disciplinary projects historically 
associated with rhetoric.  
In other words, interlocutors approach discursive situations with pragmatically 
and historically informed habits–recurrent ways of deploying topical relationships. 
However, these habits (or prior theories) do not determine the meaning that interlocutors 
will share in actual discourse. I quote Yarbrough at length because he offers a clear 
(albeit complex) explanation of this position by looking at a hypothetical discursive 
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exchange between interlocutors. In the exchange Yarbrough describes, interlocutors 
encounter “discursive conflict,” which is to say they “perceive different problems and 
therefore different topoi govern their discourse” (“Passing” 86):  
 
The topical relations that are relevant to the situation for her (alone) do not match 
those that are relevant for me (alone), but our need to cooperate makes it 
necessary for each of us to merge into a shared topical landscape – my problem 
becomes a problem for solving her problem, and vice versa – and so further 
discourse ensues. That is, now each of us must take into account the different 
topoi that determine what she and I perceive to be problems within our shared 
situation.    (86-87) 
 
 
Yarbrough’s definition of topoi as sets of relationships offers a fully interactionist 
explanation of how interlocutors move from prior theories to passing theories, without 
making Bawarshi’s mistake of appealing to conceptual schemes. To claim a belief, then, 
is to be in the act of believing, which is to say the process of discursive interaction with 
another with whom we share the world and its objects.  
Thus, we are now at a place to define beliefs as pragmatic and intersubjective. 
Beliefs are a phase of discourse, identified during the contingent, mutable, and 
temporally bound context of discursive interaction. This description of belief provides 
discursive interaction with a clear sense of what interlocutors “bring” with them to the 
discursive situation, without appealing to a priori conceptual schemes like language or 
culture as the determining factors of discourse. My concerns, however, are not purely 
theoretical. As a teacher of rhetoric and composition I believe that discursive interaction 
provides a description of communication that effectively addresses the exigencies of 
globalization. However, as a teacher, my work is primarily with students and often 
! **)!
students with little (if any) prior exposure to rhetoric, philosophy, and literary theory; 
therefore, these students would find the above definition of belief intimidating. Moreover, 
in many ways the above description of belief remains theoretical in the sense that most of 
us have not identified the relationships that comprise our believing. This of course, as 
should be clear, is not an indictment of anyone’s thinking; rather, our discursive 
interactions in the world do not require us to take into account all the relationships that 
comprise our beliefs; instead our beliefs “cohere associated in groups or clusters” 
(Yarbrough, Inventive 115). For example “to believe the ‘cat is black’ is to believe that 
‘cats exists’ as well as to believe ‘black is a color’; and to believe ‘cats have fur’ is to 
believe ‘cats are mammals’ and on and on” (115). Clearly, when we speak of cats we do 
not run through the entire gambit of beliefs associated with cats. Rather, we tend to only 
focus on those relationships that seem most relevant to the discursive situation at hand. 
As Yarbrough writes, “our beliefs become associated as a consequence of our discursive 
interactions in concrete situations with the objects our beliefs are about” (115). In other 
words, “how we order our beliefs depends upon the questions we have had to ask and the 
problems we have had to solve” (116).  
This final point is crucial to developing pedagogical practices that address “a 
culture increasingly fractured and polarized” by the ever increasing diversity of people’s 
discursive habits (Qually, Turns of Thought 5). As a discursive interactionist, I do not 
believe that changing our beliefs requires radical conceptual change; in fact, I am 
suspicious of the notion that when we highlight the over-simplicity of clichés and 
commonplaces we are necessarily asking students to drastically change their whole view 
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of the world. Instead, I argue, when teachers highlight the limitations of commonplaces 
and clichés, we are encouraging students to notice the myriad of relationships between 
the objects and beliefs of a shared world. In short, all of us, especially first-year writing 
students, hold unexamined beliefs.  
Teachers of rhetoric and composition see this all the time. A student interprets a 
phrase or a clause in a way that challenges a more literal reading of the text. For example, 
the student is not sure why, but he definitely disagrees with the President’s position on a 
particular issue, and we often see students’ frustrations when we ask them to elaborate on 
why they hold these opinions. Too often, teachers view these frustrations as 
“developmental challenges,” or cognitive disassociations, problems cured with exposure 
to more critical exercises and scholarly texts. Or, as Kent writes, “The idea here is that 
students can be led to see the truth – or knowledge, facts, certainties, ideas, concepts, 
universals, timeless categories, systems of thought, or the like – through open-ended 
discussion that results in the discovery of new knowledge on the part of the students” 
(“Externalism” 69). In other words, students develop clarity of thinking by replacing 
underdeveloped beliefs with more complex and nuanced beliefs. This, the guiding 
premise behind the process movement, requires, to varying degrees, the belief that 
changing a view of the world requires “conceptual change.” The best beliefs will 
represent the world most accurately, and the beliefs are the result of a teachable (and 
learnable) process that help students develop clearer thinking.  
From the perspective of interactionism, which is inherently pragmatist, beliefs 
organize pragmatically and historically with respect to other beliefs. What we believe 
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about the President’s speech relates to a person’s belief about Republicans and 
Democrats, to her belief about politics in general, and perhaps to her belief about her 
grandfather, the politician. This “nonsystematic” understanding of how beliefs organize is 
“extremely important” in developing pedagogical practices based on discursive 
interactionism (Yarbrough, Inventive 116) because, as Kent notes, it explains why “no 
process or system” can explain and thereby change a person’s unique organization of 
beliefs (69). Moreover, since beliefs signify a person’s unique interactions in the world, 
we can assume that where beliefs differ so do the causes influencing a person’s beliefs.  
I am now able to introduce a new critical vocabulary that names an interactionist 
conception of belief, which helps to provide clarity for the ongoing project of developing 
pedagogical practices that employ the beliefs of interactionist. I employ the term 
commitments to name the beliefs or topoi interlocutors bring with them to the discursive 
situation. I find this term invaluable in helping student writers understand why their ideas 
differ from others, and why it is often challenging (and some might say painful) when our 
beliefs change.  
First, by referring to our ideas about the world and its objects as commitments, 
instead of beliefs, students understand that what we believe is dynamic and contingent. 
Most of us are committed to acting in a particular fashion when confronted with a 
familiar situation; however, when the conditions change our commitments, if we want to 
solve the problem at hand we need to adapt to present conditions. From this perspective 
the inadequacies of the five-paragraph essay to meet the demands of college writing is 
not a developmental problem – this form has adequately addressed the pragmatic and 
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historical discursive needs of the student – instead, these inadequacies signal the 
pragmatic limitations of this particular discursive practices to address the historical and 
environmental conditions at hand. Simply put, the interactionist is not concerned with 
whether a belief is right or wrong in some moralizing philosophical sense; instead, an 
interactionist is concerned with whether or not our commitments solve the discursive 
exigencies at hand. 
Secondly, the term commitments helps to highlight the fully interactionist nature 
of our beliefs, and thereby the difficulty often felt in trying to solve discursive problems. 
Our commitments are in relation to other commitments. Adapting a commitment in 
response to the conditions of a particular discursive situation can also bring to the 
forefront the inadequacies of other commitments. My commitment to orphan advocacy is 
often challenged by my commitments to postcolonial theory, and my believing of 
postcolonial theorists often challenges my commitment to a causal understanding of 
discourse, and on and on. It is difficult (if not impossible) to determine what 
commitments will be affected as we encounter unfamiliar stimuli. Therefore, if one of 
rhetoric and composition’s goals, as Jennifer Enoch suggests, is to encourage the “critical 
investigation” of our discursive beliefs, then it seems an interactionist description of how 
these types of inquires proceed might offer the field an new way forward with regards to 
questions of belief and meaning.  
Drawing upon an experience with a student writer, I use the next section of the 
essay to explore how an interactionist view of discourse would describe the familiar 
experience of students struggling to critically inquire, especially when those inquires 
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challenge important commitments. If the goal of discourse studies involves helping others 
to understand the objects of our particular concerns then we need to prepare for the crisis 
of commitments that arise during discursive interaction. This phrase, crisis of 
commitments, names the embodied, emotional response of interlocutors recognizing the 
limitations of their commitments to ease the doubt created by particular discursive 
exigencies. In these moments of crisis, interlocutors must locate ways to proceed, ways to 
interact with the other in the hopes of finding solution to common discursive problems.  
The discursive decisions interlocutors choose to make, however, are complicated by the 
uncertainty of passing theories and triangulation.  
 
The Crisis of Commitments  
 
Of particular interest for my project are the ways in which reconfiguring our 
discipline in light of discourse studies would alter our understanding of guiding theories 
like rhetorical identification.  Identification, I argued, functions as rhetoric and 
composition’s method for exploring the implications of “encountering the other.” In order 
to reconsider rhetorical identification in light of discursive interactionism I suggested that 
we might benefit from a pragmatic and interactionist view of belief—of what it means to 
make meaning. Beliefs, according to my pragmatist version of interactionism, are best 
understood as activities, believings that develop and exist during interlocution. 
Commitments, I argued, provides just this type of description because it views beliefs as 
contingent, mutable, temporally bound, and existing, at least in any verifiable fashion, 
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during interlocution. The next step then, before I am able to argue for the efficacy of 
pragmatic empathy as an interactionist description of identification, is to demonstrate 
how, when our beliefs are understood as commitments, discursive conflict provides, if we 
choose, the impetus for discourse because, as Yarbrough writes, “The best motivation for 
discourse…is inquiry about the cause of the differences we perceive” (After 9).  
To illustrate how interlocutors’ differing perceptions of objects provide the 
impetus for discursive triangulation, I will conclude this chapter with an analysis of a 
simple narrative: the story of a writing teacher, myself, reconsidering my original view 
that conceptual inconsistencies in a student’s paper signaled cognitive disassociation in 
the student’s thinking. I did not believe what the student wrote because I did not believe 
her discursive choices accurately represented the situation she attempted to describe 
through her prose. In other words, I approached my student and her work as a committed 
social constructionist, and I viewed the inconsistencies of her text as “errors,” problems 
of interpretation – she could not identify the cultural-linguistic structures shaping her 
thinking about the problems she attempted to explore in her writing. Those moments in 
the student’s text that I identified as contradictory I perceived as hermeneutical problems. 
I assumed that my student did not have an accurate understanding of the “discourse 
communities” shaping her beliefs and attitudes, or of the beliefs and attitudes of those 
about whom she was writing. Perhaps most troubling, however, at least upon reflection, 
this narrative demonstrates my hubris as a teacher. When I encountered a difficult portion 
of text, I assumed that these difficulties stemmed from the student’s inability to write 
clearly. I assumed that she was unable to accurately represent the world through 
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language. These difficulties could have been attributed to a number of reasons, but, 
ultimately, regardless of the reason I chose to use, I intended my response to maintain my 
constructionist view that ineffective writing illustrates the student’s need to obtain “new 
discourses” that would help her develop as a capable academic writer. I no longer believe 
that this constructionist view makes meaningful sense. However, at the time of this 
encounter, I saw writing, communication of any sort for that matter, as representational; 
therefore, misunderstandings between interlocutors, like the one I am about to describe, 
had to have been the effect of inaccurate language use. I offer this narrative as a way of 
suggesting that our reliance on social constructionism inevitably leads to our continued 
suspicion of other’s discourse, especially during those moments of confusion and 
misunderstanding. This suspicion arises because our constructionist commitments tell us 
that our interlocutors’ world(view)s are incommensurable with ours as a result of 
idiosyncratic conceptual schemes. Constructionist thinking, then, forces upon us the 
following contradiction: the inability to understand the other’s discourse, and thereby 
world(view), is a problem that can only be solved if we believe that somehow we can 
find answers out of our world. Interactionist thinking, however, offers a much different 
description of misunderstanding –the crisis of commitments. 
I invoke the term “crisis” not (solely) for the purposes of provocation; rather, the 
term “crisis” helps ground this discussion of commitments in rhetorical theory. “Crisis” 
derives from the Greek word krisis, which shares affinity with kairos, the classical 
rhetoric term referring to the proper “timing” on the part of a rhetor (Sipiora and 
Baumlim 1). It is not difficult to see the relationship between Webster’s definition of 
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crisis – “an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is 
impending” – and Isocrate’s understanding of the effect of kairos – “a reliable correlation 
between rhetorical strategies and desired affects cannot be prescribed because the 
situational factor is paramount” (Cahn 133). Like the interactionists, ancient rhetoricians 
understood that environmental conditions would undoubtedly change how a speaker 
employed topoi to convey their message to the audience. In fact, Philip Sipiora sounds 
like an interactionist when he concludes, “it is precisely because a rhetor cannot 
anticipate every important situational circumstance that he or she must carry a flexible 
attitude into any given rhetorical situation” (9). Or, as I would say, an interlocutor’s 
commitments, because of their adaptive character, are capable of changing in response to 
the exigencies created by the specific conditions of a discursive situation.  
From the perspective of discursive interactionism, every communicative situation 
is kairotic – interlocutors never know precisely how passing theories will develop in 
response to the other and the objects of their discourse. In one sense, triangulation 
defines the nature of a discursive crisis – interlocutors, if they want to share meaning, 
must respond to the “impending” conditions at hand. For the interactionist, discourse 
brings into relief “the only kind of crisis there is, of what now shall we do” (Yarbrough, 
Deliberate Criticism 16). Sometimes, these kairotic moments pass without much ado. For 
example, the discursive event of ordering coffee at Starbucks is relatively stable. The 
barista at the register asks what the customer would like, and the customer, familiar with 
such practices, responds with “I would like a Grande Mocha Frappuccino.” With relative 
ease the two parties triangulate upon the object of their discourse–the coffee drink–share 
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meaning, and complete specific actions based on the implications of the situations 
intersubjective meaning–the transactional exchange of money for coffee. It is clear in this 
example that often the commitments we maintain prior to interaction may not be that 
different from the passing theories we actually use to direct the other’s attention. 
However, place that same customer in another coffee shop (a different 
environmental context) and his response “Grande Mocha Frappuccino” will create a 
discursive crisis. That is to say, the barista at a non-Starbucks coffee shop does not serve 
“Grande” drinks nor do they serve the patented “Frappuccino” frozen beverage. The 
customer and the non-Starbucks barista cannot share the object of discourse, at least 
initially, and thus “discursive change,” the type of change necessitated by a discursive 
crisis, is required for understanding to take place. In other words, when interlocutor’s 
initiate discourse, they draw upon their repertoire of prior theories, their commitments 
about the world, in order to shape the objects of discourse. When interlocutor’s 
commitments draw upon similar socially informed experiences, they are capable of 
inventing the objects of discourse quickly, as seen in the Starbucks example. However, 
when interlocutor’s share little in the way of experience, or, in the case of teachers and 
students, hold differing prior commitments about the conception of texts – the intended 
objects of discourse – triangulation that leads to shared meaning can be a difficult and 
daunting, if not impossible task. As the following example will demonstrate, often, 
intersubjective meaning, that is, understanding, never emerges through discourse. The 
crisis of commitments, in other words, remains and interlocutors halt interaction without 
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sharing meaning because they could not collaborate and recognize the triangulated 
relationships informing their responses to each other and the objects of their discourse. 
 
A Crisis Observed 
 When Kim’s conference time arrived, we sat in the worn blue chairs of my office, 
and I asked her about the progress of her current project, an essay connecting one of the 
readings from class conceptually to an event in her own life. I informed her that I believe 
the essay lacked coherence, and that she seemed unable to manage the contradictions 
appearing in her prose. The difficulties students face trying to negotiate complex ideas 
with the commitments they maintain from their adolescence are common in first-year 
writing; however, when I think back to that conference with Kim, I realize that at the time 
I cleverly believed that the disconnections other teachers would have identified as writing 
and thinking problems were, in fact, indicators of a successful middle-class education. I 
predicated this belief upon the constructionist view that learning is intended to help 
members of particular communities internalize those cultural-linguistic conventions. My 
commitment to social constructionism allowed me to view the inconsistencies within 
Kim’s text as illustrative moments of conflicting ideologies, moments that illuminated the 
tensions between incommensurable discourse communities. Kim’s membership in 
multiple discourse communities were coming into conflict, and this conflict brought to 
the forefront her intertextual subjectivity, which registered, on paper, as cognitive 
dissonance.  
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 In her essay, Kim took bell hooks to task for the ideas she forwarded in her piece 
“Columbus: Gone but Not Forgotten.” Kim writes that she found hooks’ attitude toward 
“all white people” offensive. For Kim, hooks’ generalizations about people negated the 
possibilities of individuals being viewed “equal in his or her own way.” Kim understands 
the continued existence of racism, evidenced through her description of the police officer 
that pulled her over in high school because she had four African-American male friends 
in the car with her. Kim complicates this personal encounter with racism in the next 
paragraph, which explains how some racist people, her grandmother for example, were 
raised in a “different era” when some people, “never grew up to ‘like’ African-American 
people.” Her grandmother’s upbringing conflicted with Kim’s choice of friends, a 
contention resulting in quarrels between Kim and her grandmother: “[she] told me that I 
should not hang out with them.” Kim’s complicated relationship with her grandmother 
frames the rest of the essay, which tries to articulate how white people reared in racist 
environments should not be held as representative examples of “all white people.” Kim 
believes racists like “Christopher Columbus” and “the slaveholders” no longer exist, and 
those few racist individuals still prone to bigotry hold no moral sway in our current 
cultural moment. Therefore, “whites” should not be held accountable for their 
“forefathers” actions, for “just because a person is white does not mean that they have 
power.” Kim’s argument relied upon her tenacious beliefs, the ready-made conclusions, 
or commitments she developed before coming into the classroom. Kim attempted to both 
describe herself as a non-racist individual in opposition to her culture’s racist tendencies, 
while defending her grandmother’s racist actions, which Kim claims are the result of 
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larger cultural influences beyond her grandmother’s control. Kim understood there to be 
an appropriate elaboration—commitments—for each position—commonplace 
understandings used daily within our culture to both excuse the actions of loved ones, and 
maintain an idealized sense of self. However, when brought together, as these ideas were 
in her essay, Kim noticed the contradictory nature of these competing conceptual 
schemes. Kim quite simply had no conceptual way to make sense of this experience. 
When these ideas appeared side-by-side on the page Kim began to feel the crisis of her 
commitments and these feelings registered the inadequacy of her habitual discursive 
practices to answer the exigencies of the current discursive situation. From the 
perspective of interactionism, to know anything is to share meaning with another. 
Therefore, the crisis of commitments often initiates as personal discomfort, but it is 
through discourse with an interlocutor that the severity of these crises are often clarified 
as they struggle to share objects of discourse.  
 Of course, neither Kim nor myself were committed interactionist at that moment, 
and therefore, I viewed her contradictory positions concerning race in her work resulted 
from a lack of critical perspective. At the time, I believed that “language” functioned as a 
medium through which experience was rendered; therefore, contradictory or unclear 
passages in students’ texts signaled an inaccurate representation of experience. In other 
words, I read student text with a distrustful eye—student mistakes were evidence of a 
writer’s inability to say what she meant, so how could I assume that she actually knew 
what she really wanted to say? Thus, I believed effective student-teacher conferences 
involved the instructor pointing out the incongruence of a writer’s assumption so that she 
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could write prose that demonstrates a more refined and mature view of the world – a view 
that demonstrates access to more critical and complex conceptual schemes. In short, my 
view of writing instruction–heavily influenced by the social constructionist like Berlin, 
Fish, and Russell, as well as those authors dealing with critical pedagogies, like Bizzell, 
Jarratt, hooks, and Lee—assumed that dealing with complex social issues involved 
students gaining membership in multiple discourse communities. 
 As a result of my thinking, I suggested Kim try to see the situation from the 
perspective of her grandmother, and to try to understand why she does not hold the same 
beliefs as Kim. I wanted Kim to “translate her grandmother’s language into her own 
idiom.” Kim readily admits her grandmother’s disapproval instigated conflict throughout 
high school, but when confronted with the possibility that her grandmother may be 
morally unjust – if held accountable to the moral code established by Kim – Kim’s 
commitment to the “golden rule” is abandoned in an attempt to explain the seemingly 
contradictory nature of her grandmother’s racism. What began as an essay espousing the 
importance of recognizing the individual becomes an argument against judging the 
individual. What I hoped Kim would recognize through this query was the “competing 
cultural logics” (Ratcliffe), or “activity systems”(Russell), or “discourse communities” 
(Bruffee), involved in shaping the competing narratives she and her grandmother held 
with regards to race. In an attempt to complicate her thinking through imagining 
another’s perspective, we both arrived at a moment of discursive crisis. I hoped she 
would recognize that no longer were her “ready-made conclusions” about the world able 
to withstand a dialogic encounter with alternative ideas and perspectives (Qualley, Turns 
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of Thought 35). I continued making reference to her essay, pointing out places where 
ideas conflicted and contradicted, moments within the text where I believed, as Susan 
Jarratt suggests, that the “multiple versions” of self that people maintain in order to deal 
experiences of “conjuction and disjunction, of association and substitution” were coming 
into focus for Kim (128). Influenced by the politics of critical pedagogy, I imagined that 
my role as “teacher” involved using dialogic encounters in order to raise the student’s 
awareness about competing discourses within their text. Eventually, however, my 
questions became too much, and Kim nailed her eyes to the green carpet of my office, 
and cried . . . and cried.  
 In the moment, I imagined that Kim’s tears signaled the cognitive dissonance our 
profession seems inclined to speak about with regard to students. I assumed that Kim was 
overwhelmed with the competing logics of her text. I assumed Kim was experiencing 
what Eve Wiederhold calls “representational fatigue. ” Wiederhold defines 
representational fatigue as the embodied state that combines agitation with weariness” a 
state of emotion that “emerges from feeling muddy about what to say and how to deliver 
one’s opinion” (126). Representational fatigue, Wiederhold continues, “hovers around… 
the ‘quiet elision’ – that space in which the aim to represent simultaneously omits 
component parts within any representational scene” (127). From Wiederhold’s 
perspective, Kim could not represent herself simultaneously as both the loving 
granddaughter of a seemingly racist grandmother and the supportive, non-racist partner 
of an African-American male. This “quiet elision” when brought to Kim’s attention 
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resulted in an embodied emotional response, her tears, and as such, created a rhetorical 
moment where we could “pause and notice differently” (144).  
 As Wiederhold points out significant work has been done by rhetoricians like 
Lynn Worsham, Jacqueline Jones Royster, Cheryl Glenn, and Kristie Fleckenstein, to 
provide “more complex visions of the relationship between language, embodiment and 
judgment”; however, these theorists continue to maintain in their work the ontological 
distinction between words and things, and therefore to them language use remains, as 
Weiderhold’s comments demonstrate, an act of representation. Conversely, those quite 
elisions, which are often painful and embodied through our emotions, only point to the 
failure of language to represent the interiority of an agent attempting to engage the 
complexities of multiple discourses. So, while a student’s emotional response often elicits 
embodied responses on the part of the teacher, these shared expressive displays bring us 
no closer to understanding why we cannot deal with complexity and contradiction in our 
rhetorical acts. As discussed in Chapter One, affective responses can signal to us, if we 
choose to believe the interactionists, that our current habitual discursive actions are 
incapable of answering the questions at hand and initiate the process of triangulation.  Of 
course, given that most of rhetoric and composition scholarship continues to derive its 
orientation to discourse from poststructuralism and social constructionist thinking, 
misunderstandings continue to be thought of as cultural-linguistic schemes— 
idiosyncratic and incommensurable world(view)s—coming into conflict. That is, 
misunderstandings are the lies the other tells about my world. Moreover, there is no 
hermeneutic that leads us out of this trap. Instead, as Davidson suggests, before 
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interlocutors enter into discursive triangulation, they must first apply the principle of 
charity to the other’s discourse.  
 “The principle of charity,” Davidson explains, is essential for triangulation to be 
effective. At its core discursive interactionist theory is pragmatic because it assumes that 
beliefs matter. Therefore, discursive triangulation proceeds only when interlocutors 
believe they can in fact share meaning with others. To do this, Davidson concludes, 
requires that interlocutors maintain two commitments to discourse. First, “if we want to 
understand others, we must count them right in most matters” (Essential 207). By this 
Davidson means that in order to maintain a commitment to intersubjective meaning 
interlocutors must maintain a commitment to the notion that when “interpreting others 
[interlocutors have] got to make their thoughts hold together to a certain extent,” which is 
to say, “you can’t understand people if you don’t see them as logical in the way that you 
are” (Kent, “Language Philosophy” 7). And, as Davidson’s externalism and my 
interactionism make clear, the logic that holds our thoughts together are related to the 
environmental conditions that shape our relationships to objects and others in the world. 
Therefore, since interlocutors are often made aware that they do not use marks, noises, 
and gestures in the same way, there must some other means by which interlocutors can 
find an initial point of agreement, some starting point for discourse where they share 
enough in common to believe that communication will lead to a fuller understanding.  
 The starting point, and second precondition for discourse is that interlocutors 
maintain a commitment to a shared world. This commitment is rather simple: if 
environmental factors shape my beliefs—the causal relationships I recognize between 
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objects in the world—then I must assume those same rules govern others’ beliefs. Or, as 
Davidson states, “you can’t understand people if you don’t seem as sharing a world with 
you” (Kent “Language Philosophy,” 7). Pedagogically, then, the principle of charity 
provides a means for interpreting the other’s (student’s) discourse. As Kevin J. Porter 
writes, “Without charity, we cannot link what the speaker says, what the speaker does, 
and the world.” In other words, “if we assume uncharitably that the speaker is nonrational 
(i.e., not acting for any reasons), then we could not even guess at the meaning of an 
utterance because ‘any interpretation would be equally likely’ or unlikely” (“Pedagogy” 
586). It is important to point out that the principle of charity does not justify 
commitments; rather it assumes that the other’s beliefs are generally true to the extent 
that the other responds to the same, shared world as the self.  
 As discussed earlier, our commitments are bound to particular historical 
conditions. Moreover, people tend to change beliefs as little as possible. If our habitual 
use of marks, noises and gestures allow us to get around in the world without pause or 
conflict, then we tend to maintain these commitments. These characteristics also explain 
why certain groups of people communicate more effectively –they tend to employ similar 
discursive habits in their interactions with objects of discourse. There is no reason to 
appeal to notions like conceptual schemes like, language, or culture, to make this 
argument; rather, it is enough to say that frequent, consistent, and sustained interaction 
with the same people will result in similar responses toward objects of discourse. When 
interlocutors discourse with those with whom they are unfamiliar, the ease with which 
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they are able to direct the other’s attention toward objects of discourse is often a 
frustrating challenge, as was the case with Kim and me. 
 Looking back on this experience, I realize that I did not discourse with Kim 
through the principle of charity. My constructionist commitments did not allow for the 
view of discourse interactionism provides. What I saw as inconsistencies in her thinking 
may have been inconsistencies, but in order to claim that I could locate error in her prose 
I first needed to demonstrate that I could locate consistency, and in order to accomplish 
that task I needed to assume that we shared the same world and that world shaped our 
causal relationships and thereby thinking. If I had approached our discursive encounter 
with charity then I would have realized that Kim’s visceral, affective expressions 
signaled the crisis of her commitments. The crisis of commitments brings to the surface 
the limits of our habitual responses—the rules we imagine to govern our responses to 
situations—and  in order to proceed toward understanding, interlocutors must be willing, 
as Yarbrough describes, “to go beyond the rules” (Inventive 136). Moving beyond the 
rules, Yarbrough contends, means entering into the “ethical phase of discourse”; 
however, as Yarbrough effectively argues, ethos functions much differently for an 
interactionist than for rhetoricians who employ the classical definition of the term, 
“character of the speaker.” This is not to say that an interactionist description avoids 
questions of character; ethos does correspond to the qualities of the speaker, but from this 
perspective “character” is an interactional process with objects. “Ethos is best thought of 
interactionally,” Yarbrough writes, “as the set of social relations we project upon a 
situation that determines how we interact with things” (Inventive 170). Commitments are 
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therefore part of an interlocutor’s ethos, which is to say, an interlocutor approaches a 
discursive situation with the particular commitments they intend to project upon the 
situation. While limited, our prior discursive experiences—commitments—are all we 
have to go on, and, thereby, for triangulation to occur interlocutors must assume the other 
is ethical in their discourse. That is, the other’s commitments are shaped by experiences 
in the same, shared world.   
 And while our commitments are real—they influence our actions in the material 
world—they are always changing. While Yarbrough does not use the term commitments, 
he is getting at the same idea when he explains how we develop our discursive ethos. He 
writes, “rather than a fixed essence or a continually changing network of beliefs, ethos is 
more like the role or roles we play in a socially determined situation, sometimes 
according to the script but usually improvisationally,” which means, while we often do 
not because of discomfort or cost (both material and social capital),  “we can assume 
different roles” (170). That is, because our commitments are fluid, temporally bound, and 
determined in the interactions with others and objects, we can commit to new triangulated 
relationships with others and objects in the world.  
 And, as a teacher, this interactionist description of belief gives me hope that we 
can make the most of encounters with students like Kim. In order to do so, however, we 
must be willing to extend charity. Furthermore, as teachers we must be willing to believe 
that the world that conditions our discursive responses is the same world conditioning our 
students’ responses. Quite simply, with regards to Kim, I did not allow Kim her full-
weight because I never allowed her responses to condition my commitments—the 
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interactionist way of saying, “I did not believe her.” I want to suggest that instead of 
continuing to view the other’s discourse with suspicion we see moments of 
misunderstanding as moment of crisis; and since these crises occur in the world we share 
with others it behooves us to work collaboratively toward amelioration. Changing our 
beliefs about believing allows us the freedom to view change as possible, to say that 
ethical development is possible and that we can change how we commit to respond to 
others and objects. When we abandon beliefs and embrace believings, we are one step 
closer to sharing meaning with those with whom we share a world. 
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NOTES 
1. Investigating the problems of rhetoric and composition’s commitment to 
hermeneutics rather than the materiality of texts is the focus of Raúl Sánchez’s 
monograph The Function of Theory in Composition Studies. 
 
2. Ecocomposition continues to challenge the notion of “place” as a central tenet 
of discourse. For an excellent introduction to these ideas see “Breaking Ground in 
Ecocomposition: Exploring Relationships between Discourse and Environment” by 
Sidney I. Dobrin and Christian R. Weisser. 
 
3. Kenneth Bruffee’s and Stanley Fish’s work, perhaps more so than others, 
focuses on the conventions that arise as discourse communities develop complexity and 
tradition.  
 
4. It is important to note that from the perspective of interactionism, resistance 
names the challenge interlocutor’s face as they attempt direct the attention of each other 
toward shared objects. Regardless of intent, interlocutors are wrapped up in the process 
of resistance when they interact with the world differently from their partner. In other 
words, from an interactionist perspective, we can resist the other’s discursive 
commitment to objects and choose not to allow the other’s discourse to affect us.  
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5. Kent uses Joseph Harris’s essay “The Idea of Community in the Study of 
Writing” to define the “thin formulation” of social construction. For Harris, all discourse 
is socially constructed but not over determined. That is, “one is always simultaneously a 
part of several discourses, several communities, is always already committed to a number 
of conflicting beliefs and practices”(19). From my perspective, Harris’s definition 
represents the contemporary view of community.  
 
6. Davidson’s critique of Kuhn stems from Kuhn’s argument that scientist 
operating in different traditions “work in different worlds” (Kuhn 134). Therefore, to 
understand change requires that scientists radically change their conceptual schemes, and 
thereby see a new world. Such a notion, Davidson argues, is self-refuting because if true 
scientists would never be able to make these conceptual changes because they would not 
know the customs, conventions, and grammars of this new place. This contradiction leads 
to Davidson’s quip, “Kuhn is brilliant at saying what things were like before the 
revolution using – what else? – our post-revolutionary idiom” (Essential 197).  
!
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CHAPTER IV 
 
(AN)OTHER WAY 
 
Stanley Fish is probably right. Rhetoric and composition studies cannot change 
the world, especially if the world is as social constructionists like Fish describe it. So 
while Fish’s “wholesale condemnation” of rhetoric and composition studies in his new 
book Save the World on Your Own Time, is intended to shed light on the problem of over-
politicized writing classrooms, I cannot help but think that the problems he is referencing 
are simply the natural outcome of three decades of believing that all discourse is socially 
constructed (Bizzell “Composition” 175). Therefore, when Fish writes that “Students 
who take so-called courses in writing” that emphasize marshalling arguments around 
current issues “…certainly [will] not be learning anything about how language works; 
and without a knowledge of how language works they will be unable either to spot the 
formal breakdown of someone’s else’s language or to prevent the formal breakdown of 
their own,” I am inclined to agree with him (41). However, my agreement is ironic and 
stems from my belief that it would be impossible for students to locate “breakdowns” in 
discourse with the other when they rely on concepts like “interpretive communities,” 
which can’t tell us anything “about how language works.” Fish says that to identify 
“breakdowns,” the discursive conflicts resulting from misunderstandings between 
interlocutors, requires that speakers share access to the same “interpretive community.” 
So while Fish may cleverly argue that within the classroom setting speakers can 
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“objectively” share the same contingent and mutable conceptual schemes as a result of 
being in the same interpretive community (the classroom) (“Save the World” 138-139) he 
cannot, at least in the world he imagines, describe this process without raising the 
question, “if all discourse is relative to a particular community/culture/language/etc., how 
can we ever claim to know the minds of others, ‘someone else’s language,’ if their 
discourse derives from beyond the scope of our particular ‘interpretive community?’” 
As Thomas Kent points out, the above question illustrates the problem of trying to 
understand how we “communicate across difference” when discourse is believed to be 
socially constructed. Kent clearly articulates what is at stake when he writes, “If all we 
have to authorize our beliefs is the internal coherence strategies of our own communities, 
we possess little hope of understanding the outsider, and the outsider possesses even less 
hope of acquiring the moral status enjoyed by outsiders” (“Ethnocentrism” 95). The 
reason for this dilemma, Kent believes, comes from the social constructionist belief that 
“knowing the world means knowing a particular conceptual scheme, and knowledge is 
something we acquire by learning and internalizing the normative conventions that 
constitute our conceptual schemes” (“On the Very Idea” 428). Therefore, the social 
constructionists cannot avoid the contradiction at the heart of their position. Stanley Fish 
draws attention to this contradiction when he writes, “communication occurs within 
situations and…to be in a situation is already to be in possession of (or to be possessed 
by) a structure of assumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to 
purposes and goals that are in already in place” (318). That is to say, from the view of the 
social constructionist, language is both determined by and the creation of a specific 
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interpretive community’s shared conceptual scheme. If all that speakers know is derived 
from the language created by the conceptual schemes with which they identify, how can 
interlocutors share meanings with others without re-configuring the others’ discourse into 
versions of their own? In attempting to translate the other’s “language” into the 
“language” of the self, via rhetorical acts like identification, speakers engage in a form of 
ethnocentrism, “the tendency to judge others according to the conceptual scheme held by 
one’s own culture” (Kent “Ethnocentrism” 92). Given the discursive exigencies resulting 
from globalization and the increased diversity in both our classrooms and our 
communities, locating ways to “communicate across difference” while avoiding 
ethnocentric discursive practices seems ever more important. However, I do not believe 
the capacity to describe these communicative practices is found in the thinking of social 
constructionists like Fish; rather, it seems time to redefine what it means to share 
meaning with the other, which requires a move away from identification, a central tenet 
of the rhetorical tradition that aligns itself with the work of social constructionists and the 
theoretical position most frequently invoked when discussing the rhetorical problems of 
communication across difference.  
Kenneth Burke makes clear that rhetorical identifications are social constructions 
when he describes them in the following way: “You persuade a man only insofar as you 
can talk in his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image attitude, idea, 
identifying your ways with his” (Rhetoric of Motives 55). Burke’s theory of identification, 
which functions as “an accessory” to “persuasion” (the term traditionally emphasized by 
rhetorical study), names the mechanism through which speakers both recognize and are 
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recognized as members of a particular discourse community. Identification is central to 
social constructionist thought because it provides a theoretical model describing how 
individuals make linguistic connections for mutual benefit. Or, as Burke reminds, 
identification “is hardly other than a name for the function of sociality” (Attitudes 267). 
“I speak to another,” in the social constructionist paradigm, simply names what Burke 
called the “invitation to rhetoric” – the interaction of speakers as they attempt to learn 
each other’s conceptual frameworks (language/culture/conventions) in order to 
understand for mutual social benefit. However, as Reed Way Dasenbrock points out, 
social constructionists like Burke and Fish “cannot know whether we are seeing 
something different unless we can understand each other’s perspective” (25).  That is to 
say, I cannot locate “breakdowns” unless I can claim to know the other’s intention for 
speaking, and if knowledge of intention is possible then I must have at least some idea of 
the objects the other is directing my attention toward. And, if I can understand another’s 
intentions, then “the radical otherness” supposed by thinkers like Fish cannot be keeping 
speakers from sharing meaning; rather, discursive conflict – the crisis of commitments – 
if we allow it, signals the potential for generative discourse, a moment where speakers, if 
they choose, can enter into discursive triangulation, which results in intersubjective 
meaning.  
To know that we share the world with others and, thereby, the objects that affect 
our discourse, are the key characteristics to Donald Davidson’s notion of radical 
interpretation, which, as Stephen R. Yarbrough argues, is a “fully interactionist” account 
of how communication occurs (“Modes” 494). For discursive interactionists, “language 
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does not operate by one set of laws while things operate by another”; rather, discourse 
involves our interactions with environments, “and environment includes things and 
people and the marks and noises they make to affect one another” (Inventive 14). Sharing 
meaning, then, involves exactly the same kinds of environmentally conditioned 
interactions that take place all the time. As Yarbrough notes, to share meaning is to share 
the conditions that influence another’s discourse: “If we want to understand” other people 
then “we want to know what caused them to speak as they did” (After 6). In other words, 
“We begin to communicate with others once the causes that condition our speech begin to 
coincide with the causes that condition theirs” (7). Whereas the social constructionist 
views identification as the sharing of meaning through the process of translating the 
other’s cultural-linguistic schemes Davidson, Kent, and Yarbrough, understand shared 
meaning as a implicit to discursive intercourse, naming those moments when 
interlocutors respond to the same objects of common concern. From the position of 
discursive interactionism, intersubjective meaning does not require translating or learning 
the language of the other; the sharing of meaning, names the experience of 
communication—an interlocutor recognizing the conditions that influence the other’s 
discourse and allowing those conditions to influence her responses, thereby becoming 
like (an)other with regards to the same object of common cause.  
The goal for this chapter, then, is to articulate how intersubjective meaning as 
interactionsism’s methodological imperative avoids both the problems of conceptual 
relativism and ethnocentrism. The sharing of meaning across differences, I argue, is 
accomplished via pragmatic empathy, which names the orientation of speakers that view 
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their communicative acts as contingent, mutable, temporally bound, and dependent upon 
the collaborative, that is coordinated, interaction of at least one other who can respond as 
(an)other. I employ the term “(an)other” as a critical challenge to poststructuralism’s 
“other.” While the term “other” implies incommensurability, “(an)other” is meant to 
imply an interlocutor with whom we can share the conditions through which the 
relationships between objects and interlocutors emerge in a given discursive interaction.  
In order to articulate this interactionist methodolgy, I illustrate how the traditional 
notion of rhetorical identification, which serves as the methodological imperative for 
constructionist rhetorical thought, cannot avoid charges of ethnocentrism and relativism 
and is thereby vulnerable to Davidson’s critique of conceptual schemes. In order to avoid 
the inherent contradictions of conceptual relativism, I will turn to Davidson’s notion of 
triangulation and demonstrate how pragmatic empathy is a function of passing theories, 
the critical term Davidson uses to signify “where…agreement is greatest” (Essential 261) 
between interlocutors and the marks, noises, gestures they use to direct the other’s 
attention to the causal relationships shaping their orientation to the object of common 
cause. Along the way I will seek help from a number of pragmatists, who, while varied in 
their particular articulations of pragmatism, are nonetheless committed to understanding 
meaning as deriving from specific environmental conditions, verified only in the 
intersubjectivity of collaboration. Ultimately, I hope to provide rhetoric and composition 
studies with a methodology for engaging difference without losing touch with  our world 
or each other. In the end, I agree with Fish that we must locate the means by which to 
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understand each other’s discursive breakdowns – I just happen to believe there is 
(an)other way. 
 
Identification and Conceptual Relativism, or, Unfortunate Ethnocentrism and the 
Sharing of Meaning  
As mentioned previously, Elaine Scarry tells us that what we believe about others 
will determine how we will interact with them. At least since Burke, rhetoricians have 
imagined “others” as belonging to particular discourse communities that shape speakers’ 
experiences in the world by determining the symbolic choices available for describing 
those experiences Social constructionism employs what James Berlin calls “socio-
epistemic rhetoric” to describe how discourse functions. This “dense formulation,” Berlin 
writes, assumes that signifying practices determine “subject formation within the 
framework of economic, social, and political conditions” (77). In other words, “There can 
be no identity without identification, and there can be no identification without 
figuration” (Davis, “Burke and Freud” 127). From the perspective of social 
constructionist like Burke and Fish, the symbolic figures used to construct our identities 
and our worlds derive from particular discourse communities. 
Yarbrough points out that terms like “community,” when employed to describe 
discourse production, typically mean something like the “sharing of beliefs, conventions, 
linguistic habits and values” in order to communicate with others (After 6). Whether 
described in terms of Bruffee’s discourse community, Fish’s notion of interpretive 
communities, or, simply, as the “ubiquity of language,” the term used by Richard Rorty 
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to describe language’s function as a medium through which we reconcile our experiences 
in the world, the prevailing sentiment within rhetoric and composition studies remains 
that a person’s discourse derives from a particular social location (also see: David Bleich, 
Sharon Crowley, Sidney Dobrin, Susan Jarratt, and Krista Ratcliffe) . Perhaps Fish 
summarizes this thinking best when he supposes that speakers create meaning “not on our 
own,” but “in a publicly available system of intelligibility” (“How to Recognize” 1028). 
These publics, then, “are formed by individuals, with different orientations and identities 
but with enough in common to recognize one another as members of a polity or 
community” (Bernard-Donals, “Against” 32). Therefore, “our knowledge of others and of 
the world” will always be “relative to the community in which we live” (Kent, “On the 
Very Idea” 426). 
  As Anis Bawarshi, Reed Way Dasenbrock, Thomas Kent, and Stephen Yarbrough 
have pointed out, discourse communities are similar to what Donald Davidson calls a 
“conceptual scheme.” In his essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” 
Davidson confronts the “heady doctrine and exotic doctrine” of relativism – the belief 
that reality “is relative to a scheme,” and “what counts as real in one system may not in 
another” (196). The prevailing assumption within the humanities, Davidson suggests, is 
that everyone speaks a “language,” which is the production of a particular “conceptual 
scheme” (197). For the philosopher or rhetorician that believes all discourse derives from 
the social, conceptual schemes “are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of 
categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which 
individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene” (196). Consequently, then, 
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“where conceptual schemes differ, so do languages” (197). The current emphasis in 
rhetoric and composition studies, therefore, focuses on the hermeneutical challenges 
associated with discourse, given that communicative acts arise from supposedly 
incommensurable conceptual schemes.  
Rhetoric and composition studies, Raúl Sánchez argues, follows literary theory in 
this way. The prevailing epistemologies and pedagogies attempt to examine the 
underlying cultural, linguistic and socio-economic schemes shaping texts, which 
ultimately demonstrate the conditions of incommensurability between speakers of 
different discourse communities (4-5). It is not surprising, then, that an important focus of 
rhetorical study lies in the examination of “culture.” As discussed in Chapter One, culture 
is the ubiquitous term currently used to designate the “substance” through which all 
discourse is mediated. And as mediums, cultures are metaphysical entities worthy “of 
scientific study” because they possess “causal properties”; however, cultures are seldom 
studied as “historically developed analytical tools” (101). Thus, a social constructionist 
has no problem understanding Krista Ratcliffe’s search for “codes of cross-cultural 
conduct”; Theresa Kulbaga’s (“Pleasurable Pedagogies”) desire to identify the rhetorical 
function of empathy in discussions of transnational feminist discourse; David Bleich’s 
emphasis on disclosure for the purposes of identifying memberships; ecocompositionists, 
like Sidney Dobrin’s and Christian Weisser’s illustrations of the powerful role of place 
on culturally specific discourse practices; or the explanations of genre theorists, like Anis 
Bawarshi’s, Amy Devitt’s, and David Russell’s explanations of the relationship between 
discourse conventions and cultural practice. Each of these views make sense to the social 
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constructionist because each, as Raúl Sánchez points out, maintains a “hermeneutic 
disposition” toward discourse study (4). That is, each assumes that the study of discourse 
should focus on how language mediates our experiences in the world, and how languages 
(often referred to as specific literacies) derive from particular cultures. Rhetoric and 
composition assumes, along with Patricia Bizzell, that “foundational knowledge is really 
the product of cultural activity, shaped by ideology and constituted, not merely conveyed 
by rhetoric” (664). The prevailing assumption remains that we never experience 
unmediated touch with the material world; the cultural schemes that give meaning to our 
experiences shape our identities, and limit our abilities to create rhetorical identifications 
with others. 
Understanding these relationships between identity, identification, discourse and 
culture represents, as Christian R. Weisser points out, “most of the research, scholarship 
and teaching of the past four decades,” which was “intended to enable students to better 
understand who they are and how language shapes their conceptions of themselves and 
the conceptions others have of them” (“Ecocomposition” 81). He continues, 
“Specifically, our conceptions of how identity is formed have corresponded to our 
personal, social, and more recently our political theories of discourse” (81). In other 
words, the past four decades of rhetorical study have been defined by what John Trimbur 
calls the “social turn,” a “post-process, post-cognitivist theory and pedagogy that 
represents literacy as an ideological arena and composing as a cultural activity by which 
writers position and reposition themselves in relation to their own and others' 
subjectivities, discourses, practices, and institutions” (109). Discursive competence, to 
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know the mind of the other via communication, “cannot be understood strictly on 
cognitive grounds; it means rather joining new communities and taking part in new 
conversations” (Trimbur, “Consensus” 443). Shared meaning develops through the 
translation of the other’s conceptual schemes, a complicated process in which speakers 
must account for the social, historical, political, cultural, and environmental conditions 
that shape the other’s discourse.  
These acts of translation, however, are even more complicated given the current 
theoretical sentiment that each speaker is a wholly unique example of a particular cultural 
group. The above description of how culture (or any conceptual scheme) effects 
discourse assumes a relatively stable notion of discourse community, or as Bryon Hawk 
notes, an overly “deterministic notion of social construction” (222), which allows for a 
tidy description of how discourse communities shape peoples’ discursive practices. 
Similarly, Bizzell contends that discourse communities are “unstable,” and “fraught with 
contradiction”; moreover, “that instability is a sign of its health, its ability to adapt to 
changing historical conditions” (662-663). Bizzell’s remarks concerning the larger social 
nature of discourse communities echoes the sentiments shared by those theorists 
concerned with understanding how individuals both replicate and deviate from socially 
constructed narratives about the world.  
The individual, from the perspective of the social constructionists like Bizzell, is 
unique, dynamic, nuanced, and inextricably connected to particular cultures. To be clear, 
while membership within a particular culture is taken as a given, no person is simply a 
replication of communal values and norms. The “radical particularity of the self,” 
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Bernard-Donals reminds other social constructionists, is never completely resolved 
within the construction of “we” (36). Currently, then, the emphasis of rhetorical studies 
addressing issues of “cross-cultural” identification is two-fold. First, these inquires must 
address the impact of culture upon a speaker’s discourse practices; and secondly, cross-
culture communication requires an understanding of how speakers deviate from a 
particular cultural narrative. As Krista Ratcliffe cautions, “a text or a person is associated 
with—but not necessarily representative of—an entire cultural group” (79). Therefore, to 
avoid the trap of essentializing difference (positing that the other is representative of a 
particular culture that can be studied scientifically), rhetoricians, as Susan Jarratt 
suggests, need to understand the ways speakers often engage in “self-multiplication,” a 
“metonymic process of subject construction,” in which speakers illustrate their 
associations with, but also differences from, cultural groups (111,114). As the writers 
above demonstrate, there are no neatly defined discourse communities, no self-evident 
cultures that provide foundational knowledge for speakers. Instead, discourse 
communities are dynamic, evolving, and mutable systems that interact with 
environmental, social, and political conditions to shape the conceptual schemes that 
mediate people’s experiences in the world. Or, as Burke notes, even “two students, sitting 
side by side” will “identify the subject differently” (27).  
Timothy Crusius in his essay “Neither Trust or Suspicion,” illustrates the divided 
nature of Burke’s thinking, and ultimately the irony that is central to social 
constructionism in general. Crusius contends that for Burke “shared meaning is the basis 
of identification” (86). Burke’s claim only further complicates the problem of describing 
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how people communicate across difference. If what we know of the world results from a 
process mediated by conceptual schemes, and if these schemes are unique to each 
individual, such that they cannot be shared with any certainty, then how can speakers 
claim to make identifications with others? Diane Davis further complicates this problem 
with her reading of Burke. Davis, following Crusis, suggests, “identification is a function 
of (rather than the condition for) shared meaning” (129). In other words, identifications 
are the evidence of shared meaning even though interlocutors supposedly speak wholly 
different and unique languages. Thus, the difficulty for rhetoricians concerned with 
understanding how interlocutors create identifications across difference and share 
meaning lies in explaining how speakers, all of whom are supposed to have their own 
unique conceptual schemes, could ever conceive of sharing meaning with others. 
Davidson phrases the problem in the following way: “The problem of interpretation [the 
term Davidson uses to denote the sharing of meaning] is domestic as well as foreign: it 
surfaces for speakers of the same language in the form of the question, how can it be 
determined that the language is the same?” (184). Or, to reshape Davidson’s question for 
the purposes of this argument, how can interlocutors know if they have constructed 
identifications capable of sharing meaning when they are supposedly incommensurate 
with each other?  
Burke, much like Ratcliffe and Jarratt, never addresses the question of how we 
know that we know the mind of the other. Instead, Burke famously writes, “put 
identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just 
where one ends and the other begins, and you have the characteristic invitation to 
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rhetoric” (25). For Burke, like the social constructionists, people exist within the always 
already framework of culture. There is no determining a person’s pre-discursive identity 
because as Diane Davis writes, summarizing Burke’s views on sociality and 
identification, “There can be no identity without identification” (127), and identification 
always involves discourse. Burkes makes this point clear when he states, “we are clearly 
in the region of rhetoric” when considering how a person’s cultural and linguistic 
practices mark them as “a participant in some social or economic class” (Rhetoric 28). In 
other words, Burke concludes, “’Belonging’ in this sense is rhetorical” (Rhetoric 28). 
According to Burke, then, “there is no essential identity”; rather, every person is “the 
incalculable totality” of “complex and contradictory identifications” (Davis 127). Thus, 
like the social constructionists who borrow his notion of identification, Burke attempts to 
articulate a theory of how interlocutors share meaning – identification – while at the same 
time maintaining a belief in incommensurable conceptual schemes.  
This contradiction at the heart of Burke’s theory of identification (and social 
constructionist thought in general) makes it impossible to explain how interlocutors know 
if they are in fact sharing meaning with the other. Burke’s notion of identification 
assumes that speakers come to share meaning, as Davidson might say, by translating “one 
idiom” into another (Essential 184). Such a project is, at best, impossible – we always 
already understand the world differently from others based on our unique adaptations of 
cultural experiences – and, at worst, ethnocentric. As Thomas Kent argues, when 
speakers believe that cultures “control what we believe, there will always be outsiders – 
‘others’ – residing outside of our community whom we do not regard as our moral equal” 
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(“Ethnocentrism” 94). Often this inequality is demonstrated in what Kent calls the 
“exclusionary ethic” of social constructionism, in which the worth of the other’s 
utterance “is evaluated exclusively in an idiom inaccessible and even forbidden to the 
outsider” (“Ethnocentrism” 96). Consequently, we are often slow to identify with others 
because we evaluate their utterances based on our own sense of the situation. That is, we 
evaluate the other’s discursive acts by imagining how we would have spoke in the same 
situation, and if the other’s utterance does not align closely enough with this imaginary 
assessment we are less likely to share her meaning. 
With little hope of providing descriptions of how rhetorical acts create shared 
meaning, thinkers like Michael Bernard-Donals and Rául Sánchez encourage an 
abandonment of the project altogether. Sánchez in his monograph The Function of 
Theory in Composition Studies suggests that rhetoricians should focus on the 
“materiality” of texts, the “(f)act of writing,” in which scholars “theorize writing fully as 
cultural (re)production, that is, as the production of the conditions for representation” 
(71). In other words, Sánchez wants to focus on the recursive relationship between 
culture and cultural production. Bernard-Donals, in contrast, wants to abandon notions of 
culture, or “publics” altogether. Rather than focusing on how speakers use discourse to 
make rhetorical identifications and share meaning about the world, Bernard-Donals 
suggests that rhetoricians begin “doing away with notions of the public altogether” (31). 
Since it is impossible to determine how publics, whether understood as cultures, 
discourse communities, or any other conceptual scheme, provide “common locations” for 
speakers to share meaning via discourse, rhetoricians might be well served to understand 
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rhetorical acts as “beginning with the instability of the human subject” (31). In his 
formulation, “otherness (difference) cannot be overcome through discourse but is made 
radically evident through discourse, and that because language is founded upon 
displacement,” which is to say, there are no identifications, cultures, or discourse 
communities to which discourse can make appeals – “there is no stable foundation for 
discourse” (39).  
So while Burke and the social constructionist view discourse as a kind of 
“mediatory ground” that establishes, to a limited extent, identifications, Bernard-Donals 
argues against such grounds. Yet, although Bernard-Donals attempts to move beyond the 
influence of Burke and social constructionist thought, he cannot avoid the same 
contradiction, which Reed Way Dasenbrock clearly articulates: “we cannot know 
whether we are seeing something different unless we can understand each other’s 
perspective, translate each other’s language [or culture]; and if we can understand and 
translate each another’s perspective” then we are not confined to believing that our 
radical otherness will prevent us from sharing meaning (“Do We Write” 25). It would 
seem that the importance of sharing meaning with others is knowing when sharing 
between interlocutors occurs. Constructionist theories of discourse cannot articulate this 
type of knowing. Interactionism, however, offers a description of knowing that avoids 
contradiction, and thereby leads to an articulation of intersubjective meaning that allows 
interlocutors to know when they share meaning with the other. In order to understand 
interactionism’s description of shared meaning we must first articulate how discursive 
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interactionsism differs from the prevailing sentiments of rhetoric and composition 
studies. 
Bernard-Donals and Sánchez, most rhetoricians for that matter, take as given the 
notion that language is a medium through which we apperceive our experiences in the 
world. As noted earlier, conceptual schemes (whether understood as language or culture) 
create a “metaphysical gap” between nature and culture, where “things” – material 
objects – function under one set of physical laws while language functions under another 
set because language is assumed to be ontologically distinct from other objects and 
therefore interacts with the world differently. Jacques Derrida labeled these beliefs as 
“structuralist” and ushered in the current mode of discourse analysis, “post-
structuralism,” by demonstrating the impossibility of conceptual schemes being able to 
determine “truth.” And since most theorists are unwilling to give up their belief in 
language’s capacity as a media, and the “concomitant belief that one set of laws applies 
to ‘things’ while another, completely different, set applies to ‘language’ and ‘culture,’ 
they divorce the determination of meaning from the determination of truth” (“Modes” 
493). “Consequently,” Yarbrough continues, “no matter how individual, multiple, or site-
and-history-bound they conclude the production of meaning to be, they still assume that 
‘truth’ is necessarily determined after meaning, and so they further assume that truth is 
relative to meaning, or, rather, to the cultural-linguistic systems…that they believe do 
determine meanings” (492). What something means never objectively articulates the truth 
conditions that made a particular discursive event possible. Thus, in the same way, 
rhetorical identifications never objectively articulate the truth conditions that make shared 
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meaning possible; moreover, since the existence of conceptual schemes and their 
consequential effect on speakers is never questioned, examinations of rhetorical 
identifications simply question whether they actually perform their perceived task. 
It is clear, then, that rhetorical identifications, as presently conceived, rely upon 
unfortunate ethnocentrism. Regardless of our good intentions, Burke’s constructionist 
notion of identification offers no way to conceive of shared meaning other than as 
appeals to conceptual schemes, and in making such appeals speakers necessarily exclude 
the other because the process is wholly dependent upon the person’s ability to apperceive 
situations subjectively. Most of us, however, want to value difference, and believe 
sharing meaning with the other provides a clear example of this value. Unfortunately our 
current postmodern and poststructuralist understandings of discourse do not provide 
coherent descriptions of how to accomplish these goals. Therefore, as Rey Chow points 
out, the “preferred benevolent gesture” of thinkers dealing with problems of 
communication across difference is to “displace and postpone” others “to a utopian 
unrealizable realm” that “cannot materialize in the present” (1917). In other words, since 
we can never claim to know the mind of the other, and therefore can never claim to share 
meaning, we abandon the project altogether and instead focus on how to delay and avoid 
the inevitable conflict that will ensue as people encounter others’ alternative versions of 
the world.  
However, it is possible both to describe how interlocutors come to share meaning 
and thereby create discursive identifications and to avoid the trap of ethnocentrism. To do 
so, however, requires us to abandon the belief in an ontological difference between words 
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and things, nature and culture, and instead view discourse as causal. That is, when 
speakers take an interactionist approach to communication, discourse functions like any 
other interaction, we respond to the environmental conditions that shape our responses to 
objects, which includes others. Therefore, to share meaning and create identifications are 
phases of the same process.   
 
Passing Theories Through Pragmatic Empathy 
Richard Coe in his essay “Defining Rhetoric – and Us” attempts to make clear the 
importance of Burke’s work on rhetoric and composition.  As discussed earlier, Coe 
summarizes Burke’s work on rhetoric making abundantly clear the connections between 
Burke’s thinking and the tenets of social constructionism. For Burke, Coe suggests, 
human behavior is “symbolic action,” which is to say, “motive mediated by symbols, not 
mere motion” (41). From a Burkean perspective, Coe concludes, “everything we do is 
mediated by our symbols” (41). For Burke knowledge is “not the result of the 
confrontation of the individual mind with reality” but instead discursive acts that 
“organize the available means we have at any given time to talk about reality” (Trimbur, 
“Consensus” 443). In other words, our acts of discourse are never part of the world 
governed by causal principles like other objects. Instead, as Trimbur’s remark makes 
clear, discourse is assumed to be an ontologically distinct entity that interacts with the 
material world metaphysically. For the most part, rhetoric and composition studies 
operates from this perspective, assuming that “language is an entity, a systems of signs, 
the function of which is to mediate between mind and world,” and therefore the emphasis 
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of study remains centered on “whether language [or other conceptual schemes like 
culture] can successfully perform that function” (Yarbrough, Inventive 7).   
In “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” Davidson continues building his theory of 
a causal definition of discourse – meaning is derived from the interactions of people with 
things, situations that are wholly unique and unlikely to be repeated. Therefore, “we 
should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions” 
(Essential 265). Conventions, another name for conceptual schemes like “culture” and 
“language,” are assumed to be the means by which people represent their interactions 
with the world. Discourse, which supposedly derives from conventions, cannot, therefore, 
allow unmediated interaction with the material world. Or as Rorty suggests in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, we are “never encountering reality except under a 
chosen description” (xxxix).  
The problems in believing that conceptual schemes always mediate between our 
minds and the world are numerous (see: Dasenbrock, Kent, Snead, Yarbrough), but of 
critical importance for this discussion are the ways in which conceptual relativism (and 
hopefully by now it is clear that Burke’s notion of identification and Fish’s social 
constructionism are versions of this relativism) never allows interlocutors to claim they 
know the mind of the other and thereby share meaning in the world. Instead, knowing is a 
delayed occurrence. Appeals to conceptual schemes make clear that human discourse can 
never accurately describe the world because discourse never occurs in the world. That is, 
discourse, from the perspective of structuralism and post-structuralism, is never bound by 
environmental conditions that influence other physical encounters. This position leads to 
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one of the prevailing assumptions guiding rhetorical study, “the idea that any language 
distorts reality, which implies that only wordlessly if at all that the mind comes to grips 
with things as they really are” (Davidson Essential 197).  
Of course, the situation is further complicated if what we refer to as “identity” is 
derived from conceptual schemes. So, if all we have is “linguistic identity” (Chow 1911), 
we cannot claim to “stand outside our language or culture in order to judge the 
effectiveness of our language and culture,” and we are inextricably bound by the limits of 
discourse (Yarbrough Inventive 15). To create identifications with the other, then, 
represents a cynical acceptance of solipsism: I imagine the other as meaning what I 
would and nothing beyond my idiosyncrasies is intelligible. This is what C.K. Ogden and 
I.A. Richards call the “Proper Meaning Superstition,” the belief that “the speaker is 
referring to what we should be referring to were we speaking the words ourselves” (qtd. 
in Yarbrough Inventive 20). Since “truth” occurs in the material world, and is therefore 
pre-linguistic, events are made to mean something through appeals to language or culture, 
which are unique to the individual. To create identifications and share meaning, from this 
perspective, means that interlocutors would have to share the same conceptual schemes, 
and to do this would require sharing the same experiences, which of course is impossible. 
As Thomas Kent notes, our current understandings of rhetoric and composition can only 
help speakers “modify” their “background knowledge,” but a social constructionist view 
of language “cannot teach [students] how to employ” discourse in the same way they 
interact with their environment (“Paralogic” 37). And since we cannot employ discourse 
to work in the material world, the idea of making identifications across difference is at 
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the very least a deferred task (see: Derrida, Homi K. Bhabha). The irony is even more 
pronounced when rhetoricians like Gary Olson claim that the future of rhetoric and 
composition studies lies in determining how our acts of discourse allow us to “interrogate 
how gender, race, ethnicity, and power relationships manifest themselves in discursive 
practices” and thereby leads “toward understanding the encounter with the Other” (93). 
Such a position results in the ethnocentrism described earlier by Kent, and forces scholars 
interested in the possibilities of communication across difference to locate pre-linguistic 
means of explaining identifications. 
Recently, Theresa Kulbaga investigated how “rhetorics of empathy” (which in 
Kulbaga’s argument function the same as Burke’s notion of identification) help 
individuals make connections across cultures. Through reading and discussing the lives 
of others, Kulbaga claims people can cultivate rhetorical empathy as the “ability to 
imagine another as a distinct and unique individual” (517). In other words, empathy, “the 
vicarious, and spontaneous sharing of affect,” which supposedly allows us to “mirror 
what a person might be expected to feel in [a particular] condition or context,” is intended 
to provide a pre-linguistic explanation of how our physiology allows us to share meaning 
with the other (Keen, “Narrative Empathy” 208).  The problem, of course, for Kulbaga 
and others, who appeal to emotional constructs like empathy as sites for identification, is 
that these connections exist only as an unspoken hypothetical. As soon as a speaker 
begins to symbolically represent these connections through language they return to the 
present dilemma: reducing the other to the self. As Bernard-Donals argues, “The other is 
other only to the extent that we can identify features of an interlocutor” (37). Empathy, 
! "&%!
when bound to the notion that all discourse mediates between the self/world, 
culture/nature, simply functions as a means by which a person reconciles the sights and 
sounds of the world, which includes the other, to themselves through language. And, as 
Suzanne Keen points out, since we can only use discourse to articulate our perceptions of 
the other’s experience into our own idiom, we are liable to engage in “empathetic 
inaccuracy,” an affective response at “cross-purposes” with the other’s intentions (222). 
In other words, we cannot locate the meaning of the other’s discourse because we cannot 
share closely enough the conceptual schemes that shape their discursive acts. Thus, Keen 
and Kulbaga, use empathy as a conceptual scheme, and inadvertently demonstrate the 
limits of viewing empathy and identifications as constructionist processes. For the 
constructionist, to empathize with the other is to project one’s subjectivity—how he or 
she apperceives the world—onto another .   
Claiming to know the minds of others without reducing them to a linguistic 
version of the self remains the glaring problem for rhetoricians exploring the discursive 
problems created by increased globalization. More than ever it is crucial that rhetoric and 
composition studies demonstrate its capacity as a discipline to offer descriptions of how 
communication occurs across perceived differences. As I hope my argument to this point 
has demonstrated, there is no useful definition of identification derived from a view of 
discourse that maintains the ontological distinction between language and reality, culture 
and nature. Post-structuralism and postmodernism have effectively demonstrated the 
limitations of viewing language as a representational medium, and there seems no 
usefulness to continue making these critiques. It seems the only way forward is, as 
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Yarbrough encourages, to “drop the concepts of language and reality” altogether and 
instead focus our attention on how to describe the causal effects of communicative 
interaction.  
Davidson, frustrated with the implications of believing in the ontological 
distinctions between nature and language/culture, offers an alternative description of how 
communication functions, a view that neither imagines speakers as sharing the same 
conceptual schemes nor being so radically other as to make communication impossible. 
Building from his early work on radical interpretation, Davidson, in the essay “The 
Second Person,” posed the question “How many competent speakers of language must 
there be if anyone can be said to speak or understand a language?” (107). In answering 
the question Davidson points out the problems of believing that all speakers are speakers 
of their own language. Davidson reminds the relativist that “in order to mean something a 
speaker must intend to have a certain effect on a specific hearer or hearers” (112). 
Meaning, from Davidson position, signals temporally bound interactions between 
speakers in which meaning and truth are part of the same process. If, as Bernard-Donals 
suggests, everyone is “singularly infinite” and speaks her own language then there is no 
way to describe without contradiction the process by which speakers direct the attention 
of others. At best, a theory of rhetorical identifications that adheres to the classic 
distinction between nature/language and embraces Bernard-Donals notion “that otherness 
(difference) cannot be overcome through discourse but is made radically evident through 
discourse” would only be able to suggest that any identifications (any shared meaning) 
made between interlocutors is simply luck – it cannot be explained, recognized or 
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recreated (39). Ultimately, the idea that interlocutors can construct identifications with 
others is simply a hypothetical position that can never be verified. 
As Davidson points out, however, speakers are not concerned only with the 
hypothetical or the abstract: “Our practical, as opposed to our purely theoretical, interest 
in linguistic phenomena is this: we want to understand the actual utterances of others, and 
we want our utterances to be understood” (“Second Person” 109). Davidson points out, 
however, that if our discursive differences arise from adherence to conceptual schemes, 
which cannot be translated by others, then the problem with understanding any 
propositional belief, like the rhetorical identifications that discursively connect us to 
others, stems from “the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker 
and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of 
interpretation” an impossibility given the prevailing notion that deems a person’s 
discourse as relative to a conceptual scheme and infinitely singular (Essential 265). In the 
end, there is no way around this complication – if language mediates experience and all 
languages are unique, communication, to know the mind of the other, is impossible, if we 
continue to believe that ontological differences exist between “language” and “reality,” 
“words” and “things.” If interlocutors choose to abandon the notion that language has 
“causal properties” on its own without human involvement, then descriptions of discourse 
interactions are no longer rooted in the Cartesian duality of internal subjectivity / external 
objectivity; rather, language simply provides a description of how people use marks, 
noises and gestures to affect others by directing their attention to an object of common 
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cause, which is precisely the description of language Davidson begins to construct when 
he discusses the notion of triangulation.1 
Since it is impossible to suggest that interlocutors could somehow internalize 
every prior experience of their discourse partner and thereby respond in exactly the same 
fashion, communication, Davidson concludes, requires a “minimal theory,” one that can 
explain how we understand each other in a given discursive interaction, but also a theory 
that breaks from the problems created by viewing communication as the sharing of 
conceptual schemes. Davidson offers triangulation as this minimal theory. Davidson 
illustrates this concept by describing a scene in which an adult speaker and a child 
interact around a table. When the child makes a noise similar to the noise the adult 
speaker makes for table, the child is encouraged to continue vocalizing. As adult and 
child encounter other tables in the future, the adult again encourages the child when she 
verbalizes in a way that denotes her attempt to vocalize, “table.” This pattern of 
interaction Davidson summarizes as follows: “The child finds tables similar; we find 
tables similar; and we find the child’s response in the presence of tables similar. It now 
makes sense to call the responses of the child responses to tables” (119).  
The interaction between adult, child and table form the points of triangulation. 
“The relevant stimuli are the objects or events we naturally find similar (tables) which are 
correlated with responses of the child we find similar”; thus, “it is a form of triangulation: 
one line goes from the child in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the 
direction of the table and the third line goes between us and the child. Where the lines 
from child to table and us to table converge ‘the’ stimulus is located” (119). While the 
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stimulus in this example is a table, objects for Davidson are conceptual as well as 
material, which leads Davidson to conclude, “The considerations I have put forward do 
not apply to language only; they apply equally to thought in general. Belief, intention, 
and the other propositional attitudes are all social in that they are states a creature cannot 
be in without having the concept of intersubjective truth” (121). Davidson offers, then, a 
causal description of discourse, eschewing the notion that communication involves a 
process of interpreting another’s conceptual scheme by translating another’s idiosyncratic 
use of symbols. Instead of positing meaning as relative to a conceptual scheme, Davidson 
argues, as Thomas Kent observes, that “mental states [beliefs, intentions, and other 
propositional attitudes] come into being through the interactions of three elements: 
someone who thinks, other sentient beings, and a world they know they share” (431). Or, 
to draw upon the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead, meaning emerges as we 
discourse. 
As Davidson and Kent’s remarks imply, a causal view of discourse eliminates the 
problem of conceptual relativism because nothing like social norms or cultural 
conventions mediate meaning between speakers. Rather, from a Davidsonian perspective, 
our internal mental states derive from discursive interaction, which is to say, we cannot 
make meaning concerning the objects of common cause by appealing to internalized 
conceptual schemes – our interlocutor has no access to such concepts; the only way to 
verify that we are sharing meaning with the other is to know that we are directing our 
partner’s attention to the intended objects of our discourse. In other words, interpretation 
“can not be reduced to a shared repertoire, grammar, system of reading conventions, or 
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interpretive framework . . . . Interpretation in other words, cannot be reduced to 
something usually called linguistic competence” (Kent, “On the Very Idea” 432). Every 
discursive interaction is unique and temporally bound. 
While Davidson’s concept of triangulation provides a description of how 
discourse occurs, it does not explain how previous discourse experiences influence a 
speaker’s utterances during a discursive event. Communicative intercourse, as Davidson 
makes clear, is always a discreet and unique event, but these events do not, as Bakhtin 
remarks, represent speakers disturbing “the external silence of the universe” (951). 
Rather, speakers approach discursive encounters with the beliefs, intentions, attitudes, 
developed during previous triangulations – these internal mental states derived from 
external acts of discourse is what Davidson refers to as a prior theory. An interlocutor’s 
prior theories develop from previous communication events, which is to say they 
represent experiences with others and objects, but these previous experiences have little 
affect on future interactions. According to Davidson, “for the hearer, the prior theory 
expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker. . . . For 
the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s priory theory to be” 
(261). Prior theories are something like a speaker’s “basic linguistic competence,” which 
a speaker “shares with those with whom he communicates” (261). Speakers’ prior 
theories are helpful insofar as they identify the beliefs, intentions, and attitudes derived 
previously and these propositional attitudes will no doubt affect the initial marks, noises, 
and gestures a speaker uses to direct the attention of another toward the objects of 
discourse; however, “what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that 
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communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or 
conventions known to the speaker and interpreter in advance is not (necessarily) shared.” 
For Davidson, sharing meaning occurs through establishing a passing theory.  
Whereas prior theories represent the ways in which speakers intend to discourse 
preceding the actual discursive event, passing theories represent the discursive moves 
enacted as communication proceeds. “The passing theory,” Davidson writes, “is how he 
[interpreter] does interpret the utterance” of his interlocutor and for the speaker the 
passing theory describes the interpretive theory she “intends the interpreter to use” (260-
261). Thus, the passing theory names “where agreement is greatest” between 
interlocutors because it is where interlocutors demonstrate the ability to anticipate the 
utterances of the other (261). Triangulation, then, names the “cast of characters” involved 
in a discursive interaction, while the passing theory describes the phase of discourse in 
which interlocutors recognize they are in fact responding to the same objects in a shared 
world. Communication depends not on sharing a common language, culture, or 
conceptual scheme; rather, communication depends upon the ability of interlocutors to 
recognize how they each use marks, noises and gestures in response to objects, and 
thereby understanding describes the phase of discourse where speakers’ gestures are 
similar enough to direct the partner’s attention to the same objects. When interlocutors 
begin to understand each other they have entered into a passing theory, and it is during 
this passing phase of discourse that commitments emerge and are maintained. In other 
words, the epistemological end of discursive triangulation is the passing phase of 
discourse because this is where meaning emerges.  
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From Davidson’s perspective, shared meaning prior to discursive interactions is 
impossible. Davidson makes this point clear when he writes: “For two people to know of 
each other that they are so related, that their thoughts are so related, requires that they be 
in communication” (“Second Person” 121). Communication, defined by discursive 
triangulation “begins where causes converge: your utterance means what mine does if 
belief in its truth is systematically caused by the same events and objects” (Essential 
236). To share meaning from the perspective of a discursive interactionist means to 
experience discourse holistically–environmental conditions, objects and others make our 
world and beliefs known to us. Once we triangulate with an interlocutor, “we sufficiently 
understand someone’s utterances or some understands ours – we consequently know the 
mind of another, the world we share, and, of course, our own mind” (Kent, “On the Very 
Idea” 434). Shared meaning then is not a serendipitous addendum to knowledge; rather 
discursive interaction suggests that all meaning emerges in our sharing with others.  
Triangulation, then, provides a minimal theory in the sense that it explains how 
interlocutors can share meaning without assuming that they must share conceptual 
schemes. As Davidson notes, triangulation is an alternative account of discursive 
competence “that doesn’t depend upon people doing the same thing” (Kent, “Language 
Philosophy” 11). It is also minimalist in terms of its presumed efficacy, or as Anis 
Bawarshi summarizes, “every communicative act becomes a dialectical hermeneutic, an 
on-the-spot interaction that lasts only as long as the triangulation lasts” (“Beyond 
Dicotomy” 73). If all “Belief, intention, and the other propositional attitudes are all social 
in that they are states a creature cannot be in without have the concept of intersubjective 
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truth,” then identifications and the sharing of meaning are temporally bound to those 
moments of discursive interaction (Davidson, “Second Person” 121). The experiences we 
take away from our discursive encounters may eventually become prior theories or 
commitments; however, these commitments have little to do with triangulation. 
Yarbrough rightly simplifies the sharing of meaning via triangulation when he writes, 
“The difference between expectations and their fulfillment establishes the norm of 
communicative success” (Inventive 21). Communication is bound by the temporality of 
actual intercourse and the interlocutor’s knowledge that the other is intentionally 
directing her attention toward objects of common cause. Without all points of the triangle 
engaged in sharing meaning establishing a passing theory is impossible. 
Our discourse with the other is the same as any other interaction in the physical 
world: our responses are shaped by the specific conditions. Our noises, marks, and 
gestures are intended to illicit responses from the other with regard to an object of 
common concern. In other words, it is impossible to “know” the “meaning” of an object 
without being actively involved in collaboration—discursive triangulation. This 
description of communication as triangulation does not claim to predict or know the 
value a speaker places on particular objects, but it does allow for interlocutors to know 
what the other’s concepts are concepts of, i.e. the objects with which they both interact. 
“If we consider a single creature by itself,” Davidson writes, “its responses, no matter 
how complex, cannot show that it is reacting to, or thinking about, events a certain 
distance away rather than, say, its own skin. The solipsist’s world can be any size; which 
is to say, from the solipsist’s point of view it has no size, it is not a world” (119).  To 
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know that we have concepts concerning objects, whether these be the beliefs concerning 
political institutions or matters of spirituality, requires that we be in collaboration with 
other interlocutors in the one world because these discursive interactions provide us the 
means by which we verify our actions toward objects. “The constitution of objects of the 
interlocutors’ attention, their interpretation of the discourse, and their comprehension of 
the relations between the objects and their discourse are one in the same event: objects 
become objects for us” (“Modes” Yarbrough 498). Rather than assuming interlocutors’ 
incommensurability, discursive interactionism assumes that speakers can say with 
certainty when they share meaning, which is another way of saying that rhetorical 
identifications are always identifications with regards to another and an object of 
common cause. 
The pragmatic, contingent, and temporal nature of Davidson’s theory is 
instrumental in helping scholars like Dasenbrock, Kent, and Yarbrough determine that 
rhetoric and composition studies should no longer teach that rhetorical acts like writing 
are acquired through repeatable and codifiable processes. For Kent, “no process system 
can explain, in any precise way” how interlocutors come to share meaning 
(“Externalism” 69). This belief leads Kent to conclude that if rhetoricians took seriously 
the externalist position inspired by Davidson’s notion of radical interpretation then they 
would be “forced to acknowledge the impossibility of teaching writing and critical 
reading as an epistemologically centered body-of-knowledge” (“Paraglogic” 35). As 
discussed earlier similar, Yarbrough offers “discourse studies” as an alternative approach 
to the traditional rhetoric and composition course and suggests that teachers of rhetoric 
! "'%!
spend their time helping students “understand the objects of [their] own concerns, and to 
seek together the common causes of [their] questions and problems” (After 210). Every 
discursive encounter creates its own particular exigencies, and those problems, Kent 
reminds, “cannot be determined in advance for us by something like an ethnocentric 
discourse community” (“On the Very Idea” 442). To know the mind of the other and 
thereby create identifications through the sharing of meaning occurs in the “give-and-take 
of communicative interaction” (Kent “Ethnocentrism” 104), or as Davidson describes the 
communication, the experiencing of a passing theory, which “is like a theory at least in 
this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and wisdom” (265).  
What Davidson and Kent do not explore, at least not fully, are the implications of 
a temporally bound and contingent definition of shared meanings on rhetoric and 
compositions’ current project of understanding the other. In concluding this chapter, I 
want to suggest that each phase of discursive interactionism depends upon the sharing of 
meaning between interlocutors and the objects of their discourse. In this way pragmatic 
empathy is the essential methodology the emergence of passing theories. Moreover, 
pragmatic empathy is a definition of intersubjectivity that neither reduces the other to a 
version of the self nor perpetuates the notion of “radical otherness,” which supposedly 
makes shared meaning an impossibility. If, as Gary Olson contends, globalization forces 
each of us to re-evaluate our experiences with others because we can no longer appeal to 
“the bulky, impersonal apparatus of official ethics” (85), then it seems fairly clear that 
rhetoric and composition studies needs a methodology for how we know each other in 
discourse and not another description of how we imagine the other after the (f)act of 
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discourse. To conclude this chapter, then, I offer pragmatic empathy as the method by 
which passing theories are discovered, maintained, and changed.  
 
(An)other Way: Passing Through Pragmatic Empathy  
Davidson’s description of passing theory provides the necessary first step in 
describing an alternative version of rhetorical identification. Specifically, Davidson’s 
idea leads to an understanding of shared meaning that I call pragmatic empathy. 
Triangulation demonstrates that sharing meaning emerges through the discursive 
interactions of at least two interlocutors and an object of common cause. As Yarbrough 
summarizes, “in order for communication to succeed, the interaction cannot be only an 
interaction between interlocutors with words,” but “it must also be an interaction between 
interlocutors with words with things they can share” (“Modes” 494). I want to conclude 
this chapter by illustrating how rhetorical identifications are imbedded in the passing 
experience, and are defined by interlocutors sharing objects of common cause and 
thereby responding to each other as (an)other, the critical term I will define and use to 
challenge to prevailing assumption that interlocutors remain radically “other.” Defining 
pragmatic empathy thus begins in clarifying the pragmatic nature of passing. 
C.S. Peirce summarized pragmatism’s orientation toward meaning in the 
following way: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearing you 
conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is 
the whole of your conception of the object” (192). Peirce’s description of what it means 
to know something is bound up in the notion that knowing is the same as understanding 
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the effects objects have in the world. Moreover, as Peirce’s comment makes clear, 
pragmatist thinking, like Davidson’s notion of radical interpretation, is “fully 
interactionist,” which is to say, “learning together what things are is the same process as 
learning what the words that refer to those things mean (Yarbrough “Modes” 494). For 
the interactionist, passing denotes the phase of discourse where interlocutors recognize 
their emergent intersubjectivity because “their comprehension of the relations between 
the objects and their discourse are one and the same event: objects become objects for us” 
(497). The sharing of meaning, then, is a causal experience; we use discourse to 
coordinate our interactions with another interlocutor and we direct our attentions toward 
objects of common cause. When we respond to the same objects, we have entered into 
the passing phase of discourse, a description of meaning that shares a great deal with 
pragmatist thinking. 
As Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly point out, the pragmatic method is one 
that “explains how theories and practices work together,” and therefore what is “true” is 
also that which is effective in meeting the requirements of inquirers (618). Rather than 
focusing on prior assumptions (which function in the same fashion as prior theories) 
pragmatism emphasizes the making of meaning through experience and observation 
(618). Ronald and Roskelly also point out that one of the philosophical tenets of 
pragmatism is its belief that meaning making is “a process of observation, hypothesizing, 
and experimenting” in which “an idea is defined by its consequences” (619). This 
summary of the pragmatic method sounds almost exactly like Davidson’s description of 
how interlocutors interact in order to arrive at a passing theory. Davidson writes, “a 
! "'(!
passing theory really is like a theory at least in this, that it is derived by wit, luck, and 
wisdom” (265). Or, in other words, interlocutors arrive at passing theories pragmatically 
by observing their partner’s responses to objects, hypothesizing how best to direct each 
other’s attention and then determining whether their discursive efforts successfully 
directed the other toward the object of common cause. As Kent and Yarbrough point out, 
however, the meaning of objects is bound to the specific temporal dimension of the 
discursive interaction. The meanings we share with others during the passing theory, 
which is simply another way of saying the discursive identifications we recognize during 
intercourse, are contingent and bound to the specific exigencies of the interlocutors’ 
encounter. 
To view shared meaning as contingent, mutable and temporal, is of course 
pragmatic. For the pragmatist, meaning is “communal, not uniquely individual” and “it is 
contingent, determined by the special characteristics of the sites of inquiry” (Ronald and 
Roskelly 619). Shared meaning occurs as speaker and objects triangulate, and this 
process arises within a particular context, or “to put it slightly differently, the principle 
purpose of discourse is to determine in what sense what the other says is true, for 
knowing the conditions in which what the other says is true is the same thing as knowing 
what the other means” (Yarbrough “Not Yet” 9). Since meaning and truth occur 
simultaneously as a result of understanding the conditions that make our discourse true, 
shared meaning is bound up in the particular environmental context of the discursive 
situation (this position has profound pedagogical implications that will be explored in the  
next chapter). Change the conditions and you will inevitably change the meaning. 
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Moreover, changes to conditions occur in the midst of discourse, that is to say, passing 
theories are not stable entities that exist in a present moment; rather, passing theories, 
continually form and re-form in the midst of evolving discourse. 
It is not enough, however, to simply say that intersubjectivity develops 
pragmatically and emerge in the passing theory. This description is incomplete because 
as the principle of charity makes clear, triangulation only proceeds if we believe our 
interlocutor. Thus, pragmatic empathy is holistic; it is part of every phase of discursive 
interaction. We must share with others the belief that we can share (the principle of 
charity) prior to discourse, and we must share as we triangulate if want to determine the 
relevant conditions and relations shaping the other’s conception of objects. That is to say, 
in order for discursive triangulation to occur, interlocutors need to believe that they could 
in fact be (an)other – one capable of responding to the world and the objects in it in the 
same fashion as the other with who they discourse.  
As Davidson makes clear to claim that we can speak a language and thereby 
direct another person’s attention to specific objects in the world “there must be another 
sentient being whose innate similarity responses are sufficiently like his own to provide 
an answer to the question, what is the stimulus to which the speaker is responding” (120). 
Simply, “a condition for being a speaker is that there must be others enough like oneself” 
(120). This claim challenges the prevailing, albeit “heady and exotic” doctrine that every 
speaker is radically other. As Bernard –Donals points out, the ethical dilemma in 
studying rhetoric as a means of creating intersubjective meaning with others is that “the 
other is other only to the extent that we can identify features of an interlocutor,” which 
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implies that “difference is never altogether different” (37). The problem with Bernard-
Donals position, then, is relatively straightforward: he must think everyone, including 
himself, speaks non-sense.  
To imagine that the only way to avoid ethnocentrism is to assume that all speakers 
are “radically other” simply destroys the possibility of communicating. If speakers can 
never share meaning, or, at the very least, never know when they do, communication is 
rendered irrelevant, and the only purpose of studying discourse would be to identify those 
discursive situations that really create problems (Bernard-Donals view that discourse 
does not lead to shared meaning is not unique, and it perhaps helps to explain why so 
many composition courses “teach the controversies”). Thus, Bernard-Donals believes 
discourse can only highlight the differences between “ourself [sic] and the neighbor” 
differences that “cannot be traversed” (48). In other words, Bernard-Donals believes it is 
impossible to create identifications and share meaning because we cannot fundamentally 
understand what each other means. Consequently, the other can only speak non-sense 
because we have no way of verifying via conceptual schemes the truth conditions that 
make the other’s discourse meaningful. 
Bernard-Donals problem is precisely the same problem Yarbrough sees when 
speakers appeal to conceptual schemes. In assuming that conceptual schemes mediate our 
experiences in the world, we “divorce the determination of meaning from the 
determination of truth” (492). That is, events occurring in the physical world are “truths” 
only insofar as they remain pre-discursive. For these events to mean something, however, 
requires the assistance of a conceptual scheme (like language or culture) to function as a 
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medium between internal cognition of the mind and the external physical world. 
Discursive triangulation specifically addresses claims like those made by Bernard-
Donals: we can share meaning because it is pragmatic (contingent, mutable, and 
temporal) but also because triangulation allows for speakers to remain different and 
intelligible. That is, in order to communicate with another person we have to, at the very 
least, hold them in high enough regard to believe that their uses of marks, noises, and 
gestures have the same systematic coherency as we intend of our discursive acts. As 
Yarbrough suggests, “we cannot doubt what do not first understand, and we cannot 
understand what we are not prepared to believe” (Inventive 22). For triangulation, and 
thereby communication, to occur requires only that interlocutors are willing to believe 
that the other is trying to direct their attention to particular objects, and while this seems a 
simple belief, the implications of such a belief challenge the notion of radical otherness 
that lies at the heart to contemporary rhetorical theory.  
To claim that the other is directing our attention in ways at least as systematic as 
our own, is to say that we, if in the same situation, under the same conditions, and 
addressing the same purposes, would respond in a similar fashion. To enter into a passing 
theory is to know when causes converge, when objects of common cause become objects 
for both parties as a result of triangulation. Discursive triangulation explains the process 
of how propositional attitudes arise – we cannot know anything unless triangulation 
occurs. Moreover, the other’s discursive acts must be “knowingly and intentionally” 
responses to the same stimuli. That is, “the only way of knowing the second apex of the 
triangle – the second creature or person – is reacting to the same object as oneself is to 
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know that the other person has the same object in mind” (Davidson, Subjective 121). 
Therefore, even if the other’s discursive practices “differ from our own, we may through 
charity assume to be affected by the same or similar conditions that affect our own” 
(Yarbrough, Inventive 63). When our discourse draws the attention of the other to the 
object we have in mind, we are also highlighting the conditions that make them object for 
us. Conversely, when the other responds to the same stimulus, the same object we intend 
by our discourse, we can assume she is experiencing the object under similar conditions. 
The other, then, is responding as another would when affected by similar conditions, 
which is to say, triangulation that leads to a passing theory is defined by pragmatic 
empathy. 
Pragmatic empathy describes when acts of discourse allow interlocutors to 
recognize common stimuli, and thereby share the contingent, mutable, and temporal 
meaning that occurs as a result of sharing affect. Pragmatic empathy replaces the social 
constructionist notion of rhetorical identification, which, like any conceptual scheme, can 
never avoid the problems associated with relativism or ethnocentrism. As we have seen, 
the most influential aspect of Burke’s notion of identification—the view that shared 
meaning that is determined prior to discourse—remains unverifiable because Burke (or 
anyone else for that matter) does not offer a description of how discursive interactions 
with the other warrant these determinations. In contrast, pragmatic empathy offers a fully 
interactionist definition of what it means to come to share meaning with (an)other—an 
interlocutor who neither has to use discourse in the same way nor share the same socio-
historical experiences as we. Instead, (an)other simply refers to an interlocutor with 
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whom we share the experience of triangulation. From this view, emergent 
intersubjectivity is not a rhetorical construction in the sense that the “truth” of these 
connections between interlocutors is relative to the “meaning” their conceptual schemes 
can provide. Rather, pragmatic empathy illustrates that there are no schemes, only a 
shared world.  
 
(An)Other Way Forward 
Discursive conflict, which names interlocutors’ struggles to triangulate their 
discourse with others and objects in the world, is the central concern of discourse 
studies.3 As Yarbrough notes, “Discourse is motivated by the perception of differences, 
by the disparities between the responses that we expect to our utterances and the actual 
responses we receive” (After 9). These disparities, however, do not signal that we are 
“radically other”; rather, our experiences in the world encourage people to organize their 
commitments in differing fashions. Sometimes these differences are minimal. Speakers 
that grow up in close proximity and under similar conditions may arrive at passing 
theories more quickly, and thereby experience pragmatic empathy more frequently. In a 
similar fashion, speakers from different backgrounds may have a more difficult time 
sharing meaning.  
Whether the process of communication is relatively easy or difficult, however, is 
irrelevant. Instead of thinking of “cultures, backgrounds, and periods” as “sort of blocks 
that are fixed one way or another,” Davidson proposes, “we might think of them as just 
variance which we understand in terms of what we share and see ourselves as sharing” 
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(Kent, “Language Philosophy” 12). Davidson continues, “Understanding other cultures is 
not different from understanding our next door neighbor, except in degree. It’s not a 
difference in kind” (12). Yarbrough shares a view similar to Davidson’s when writes, 
“we all are aliens, always” (After 7). Too often, then, “we are faced with these 
differences,” and assume “what’s required to understand” is “an entirely different kind of 
act” (12). That is, when confronted with difference, speakers imagine that how we 
typically interact and understand our world will not help us understand the other. 
Moreover, since we believe our ways of discoursing with others will not allow us to 
communicate, we assume that discursive conflict marks irreconcilable differences among 
people, cultures, languages, etc. This belief, and I agree with Davidson on this point, is 
“dangerous” because “it leads us away from simply doing our best to accommodate 
somebody else’s view of the world” (12).  
I believe Davidson’s comments are also useful when thinking about traditional 
notions of rhetorical identification. Too often, speakers believe that to share meaning 
with the other is impossible because the supposed differences our discourse must traverse 
are too great, or because the speaker’s beliefs are too naïve by assuming that we can 
actually empathize with others in a way that does not reduce them to a version of the self. 
Instead of remaining locked into these problems of social constructionist thinking, 
pragmatic empathy offers an interactionist description of how meaning is shared. 
Pragmatic empathy is inextricably woven into the fabric of discursive triangulation and is 
therefore part of what it means to communicate. In short, pragmatic empathy offers 
(an)other way of approaching discourse, and given the problems associated with 
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globalization, we are in need of alternative theories of what it means to share meaning 
with others.  
As I explained in the previous chapter, if we choose to understand beliefs as 
commitments, which emerge through discourse, then emergent intersubjectivity is 
necessary in order to claim we hold any beliefs whatsoever. Moreover, because our 
commitments are commitments about how we interact with objects and others, we are 
able to determine when we are sharing meaning: we do when we respond in similar 
fashion to similar objects in similar conditions. In other words, pragmatic empathy names 
the method that allows collaborative engagement between all apexes of the discursive 
triangle. Take away (an)other or the object of discourse and so goes the potential for 
intersubjectivity.  
Pragmatic empathy infers collaboration, as I will define in the next chapter, and 
any discussion of its pedagogical uses must explore this orientation to discourse. The 
fourth and final chapter will examine the pedagogical implications of examining 
discursive conflict from the perspective of pragmatic empathy, and how these types of 
examinations require a collaborative environment that allows students to understand the 
degrees of difficulty involved in trying to understand the other. In other words, changing 
our definition of what it means to identify with the other, necessarily forces upon us the 
project of re-imagining what it means to know when identification is possible. Now we 
must imagine how and why would speakers employ pragmatic empathy as a means of 
settling discursive conflict? 
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NOTES 
 1. Anis Bawarshi, Matthew Snead, and Thomas Kent all deal, at great length, with 
the implications of Cartesian dualism. Interestingly, it is Cartesian dualism that Marco 
Iacoboni’s sees as the philosophical roadblock to a more interdisciplinary application of 
mirror neuron research because so much of Western thought depends upon dualistic 
thinking. 
  
2. Much can be said about Davidson’s emphasis on “objects of discourse,” but 
one of the issues I find fascinating, but am unable to explore in this project is how 
interactionism changes our understanding of lying. When language is understood as a 
medium, lying is indistinguishable from truth – both misrepresent the actual world 
because language cannot fulfill its representational function. For the interactionist, 
however, speaker’s can only direct others toward objects of discourse. That is, we choose 
which objects to direct the other’s attention toward and assume they will interact with the 
object in the same fashion. In this way, interactionism does not have a concept of “lying,” 
but it also does not hold to the poststructuralist view that even our best efforts at shared 
meaning are misguided. Instead, interactionism understands all discourse as deliberate 
and intentional.  
  
3. I am indebted here to Stephen R. Yarbrough and his comments on an earlier 
draft that helped me rethink the nature of discursive conflict and its generative potential. 
 
!
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CHAPTER V 
 
ON SHARING THE WORLD WITH OTHERS 
 
 
“If this analysis of discourse production and rhetorical analysis proves valid, we are 
forced to deny the possibility that textbooks can represent adequately the acts of 
producing and analyzing discourse, more important, we are forced to acknowledge the 
impossibility of teaching writing and critical reading as an epistemologically centered 
body-of –knowledge.”  Thomas Kent 
 
 Since pragmatic empathy influences every phase of discursive interaction, it is 
impossible to offer pedagogical practices that will “construct” these moments on demand. 
Rather, interactionism, as demonstrated throughout this study, assumes the social nature 
of discourse, and in many ways the pedagogical implications of pragmatic empathy begin 
by unpacking Davidson’s pronouncement that, “Belief, intention, and the other 
propositional attitudes are all social in that they are states a creature cannot be in without 
having the concept of intersubjective truth” (121). Since pragmatic empathy emerges 
through the sociality of discourse, extrapolating its pedagogical implications involves 
creating classroom practices that remain cognizant and attuned to the socially inventive 
nature of discourse. That is, if pragmatic empathy is a pedagogical aim, then the 
classroom practices must be conducive to discursive interaction. Since we cannot, as the 
Kent quotation suggests, prescribe techniques or practices that will lead to specific 
outcomes, I want to close this project by suggesting that an interactionist writing 
pedagogy needs to focus on how pragmatic empathy informs our approach discursive 
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encounters with others. In order to share meaning, as we will see, interlocutors must 
understand the locally and temporally bound nature of pragmatic empathy. 
 In the end, I hope that by highlighting these methods I will supply a more robust 
vocabulary for an interactionist pedagogy, one which can help in rethinking the goals of 
the typical first-year writing course. Of course, in order to remain committed to my own 
theoretical beliefs, I cannot claim that any of these methods will necessarily lead to clear 
and codifiable outcomes; rather, I hope these ideas provide the impetus for further 
conversation and allow rhetoric and composition to more fully explore the usefulness of 
interactionism to the study of discourse. I can only claim that at the moment, and given 
my previous experiences, these methods provide a starting point for a more substantial 
dialogue with other teachers of rhetoric and composition. And, of course, like all 
commitments, these are subject to change as a result of these interactions with others. 
 
Pragmatist Collaboration – Interactionism’s Methodological Imperative  
Following Peirce’s pragmatism, how we understand the consequential effects an 
object brings to bear on the world defines our beliefs about that object. Peirce’s 
pragmatism is central to interactionist thinking, but the complexity of this thinking often 
frustrates students. Therefore, an essential first step in pedagogies based around 
interactionism is to demonstrate the centrality of consequence to– objects become objects 
for us only as we interact with them. My hope is to demonstrate to students that language 
is not a medium through which experiences are made meaningful; rather, language, a 
description of the marks, noises, and gestures we use to affect others, is a constitutive 
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element of the world. Or as Yarbrough states, “Discourse is part of the world in the same 
way that an organism is part of its environment,” which is to say, change our marks, 
noises, and gestures, and we necessarily change the world (Inventive 14). 
 By emphasizing the difference between communication as “correspondence” and 
discourse as “casually indicative” I am modeling the pragmatic method. For William 
James, “The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference 
it will make to you and me at a definite instance in our life, if this world-formula or that 
world-formula be the true one” (114). Therefore, a pragmatic methodology should 
explore problems for the sake of locating differences that have effects in the world, and if 
differences in their effects cannot be located, then there is no difference in their meaning. 
Exploring the “Save Darfur” campaign on the social-networking site Facebook provides a 
contemporary rhetorical problem that helps students unpack the implications of James’ 
pragmatic maxim. The “Save Darfur” campaign on Facebook seeks to “raise awareness” 
about the genocide that haunts the people of Darfur. Facebook users can sign an online 
position statement that provides readers with the “awareness” necessary for putting up a 
“Save Darfur” hyperlink on the user’s “wall-page.” The “Save Darfur” group has more 
members that any other “awareness” group on Facebook, and the organization, which 
also raises funds to send to the war torn regions of Sudan, has been able to leverage this 
growing sense of awareness into roughly six cents of donation money per “Save Darfur” 
member. Thus, when one asks the pragmatic question, “what is the altruistic difference 
between someone who is “aware” of Darfur’s genocide and one that is not?” the 
pragmatist must answer, “six cents.” Words like “save” and “awareness” seems to 
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suggest the primacy of action. But, as this Facebook example demonstrates, the 
conceptual object of “awareness” mean something quite different depending upon the 
environments in which we are interacting with the term. 
 What this very simple, albeit practical example, especially for young first-year 
writers, of the “Save Darfur” group demonstrates is that meaning, in its everyday use, is 
not referential. That is, words do not refer to true things. Words, as David Bleich 
reminds, create meaning in the midst of use (xv). Therefore, in this example, to identify 
as a member of the “Save Darfur” cause in the context of Facebook, entails displaying a 
hyperlink on a personal web page, not volunteering to work in Sudan or pamphleteering 
door-to-door. What objects mean (and here “Save Darfur” is a conceptual object) 
depends upon the specific conditions and the others with whom we discourse. Or, as 
Hepzhibah Roskelly and Kate Ronald might suggest, a pragmatic view of discourse 
understands that meaning is defined by consequences (619). In other words, a pragmatic, 
interactionist approach to rhetoric deemphasizes the representational function of 
“language” and instead focuses on the material consequences that our beliefs about 
objects bring to bear on the world. That is, pragmatism promotes precisely the same 
epistemology alluded to in Davidson’s statement, “speaking a language…does not 
depend on two or more speakers speaking in the same way; it merely requires that each 
speaker intentionally make himself interpretable to the other” (“Second Person” 115).  
 Like the pragmatists, Davidson is concerned with what Kevin Porter calls 
“meaning consequentialism,” the connection between meaning, action, and time. 
Davidson is suspicious of the notion that “meaning” is simply the function of 
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correspondence between words and things. Instead, Davdison’s criticism of conceptual 
schemes leads him to a causal explanation of communication – meaning, causes, and 
reasons are all part of the same discursive process. Davidson names this process 
triangulation and argues that it answers the question, “How many competent speakers of 
a language must there be if anyone can be said to speak or understand a language?” 
(107). As we have seen, the answer Davidson gives is at least two. To speak a language, 
and by extension share a culture or a history, is to share meaning with the other. Thus, 
like the pragmatists, Davidson understands consequences as characteristics of meaning; 
knowing anything is the consequence of intersubjectivity. Therefore, when he writes that 
speakers make themselves “interpretable to the other,” he is highlighting the centrality of 
pragmatist collaboration to discursive triangulation. That is, to be interpretable to the 
other is to engage in pragmatist collaboration, which I define as interlocutors deliberately 
affecting the other’s interactions with objects, thereby influencing what the other will 
practically bring to bear on his conception of the object.  
 The result of pragmatist collaboration, which, as should be clear, is simply 
another name for interactionism, is the following: Pragmatist Collaboration refers to the 
continual inventive processes through which two or more individuals engage in reflexive 
interaction in order to identify objects under particular, changing conditions. As I have 
argued, pragmatic empathy names the method through which interlocutors develop 
passing theories and thereby meaning with regards to the objects of their attention. This 
method is inherently collaborative. That is, emergent intersubjectivity is simply another 
way of saying that interlocutors recognize and respond to the objects emerging through 
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the collaborative process of discourse. Thus, discourse is, as Yarbrough argues in After 
Rhetoric and Inventive Intercourse, an intrinsically inventive and collaborative process, 
and any pedagogy attempting to draw upon interactionist thinking must keep invention 
and collaboration at the heart of the discussion.  
 Perhaps the most profound pedagogical implication of interactionist epistemology 
is that to “teach writing” is irrelevant. “What is required to teach writing?” is an 
unanswerable question because discourse simply is – human beings discourse in order to 
interact with the world; therefore, discourse itself cannot be a problem. As Yarbrough 
argues, drawing upon and adapting the work of the pragmatist George Herbert Mead, 
discourse is simply there for us; therefore, problems of communication arise within 
discourse, but are not problems of discourse’s representational capacity to accurately 
name the world of experience. The inventive nature of discourse requires that pedagogies 
associated with discourse studies focus on how inventive processes occur, or, perhaps 
more accurately, provide opportunities for students to understand how changing the 
conditions of triangulation changes the meaning we share with others. That is, if 
triangulation names the interaction between interlocutors and objects, a pedagogical 
approach to discourse studies with an emphasis on pragmatic empathy, includes an 
examination of both how environmental conditions (place and time) effect discursive 
outcomes and how interlocutors determine when they have entered into triangulation. The 
latter requires an understanding of how we recognize other interlocutive beings with 
whom pragmatic empathy is possible.  
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 As Kent and Yarbrough contend, when discourse is no longer viewed as the 
product of conceptual schemes, then it is impossible to claim that we can “teach 
discourse,” or “teach writing.” As Yarbrough quips, “All we can say about the teaching 
of life we can say about the teaching of discourse because once we erase the distinction 
between language and things, nature and culture, we have erased the difference between 
say and doing – and so to the difference between discourse and life” (After 213). Of 
course, these remarks are intended to caution teachers against holding the belief that 
writing develops as a result of codifiable practices and procedures that lead to effective 
prose, regardless of situational constraints. However, there is a difference between 
teaching and learning. I cannot tell students, much to their chagrin, how to “write” in 
every context and under every circumstance. But, I can help them experience particular 
discursive exigencies (those assignments and tasks I ask them to complete) in a particular 
context (the classroom conditions that make every teaching situation unique). That is to 
say, instructors may not be able to teach “how to write” but students can certainly learn 
“to write” – the discursive moves we make in particular situations, with particular 
objects, under particular conditions. A pedagogy that embraces an interactionist view of 
discourse cannot rely on the practices of traditional language study. Instead, an 
interactionist approach to first-year writing requires that teachers provide opportunity for 
students to explore the nuances of triangulation. That is, to help students develop 
discursive wisdom is to help them understand, through interactions with others in a 
shared world, the characteristics shaping discourse: objects and conditions. 
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Here and Now: The Discursive Conditions of Pragmatic Empathy  
 
 There is a tendency, as pointed out earlier by Theresa Kulbaga, to imagine that 
people might develop empathy and share meaning with others from a distance, even 
transnational distances. However, as pointed out by Marco Iacobani, mirror neurons 
suggest that mirroring the actions of another changes depending upon the subjects 
perceived spatial relationship to the other performing actions. When the subject is able to 
observe the actions of the other from a closer distance, more specific neurons fire; when 
the distance between subject and other increases, fewer and less specific neurons fire in 
the observer’s brain. Simply, the closer a subject remains to the other with whom they are 
mirroring, the more closely their brain activity resembles each other.  
 Our genetic dispositions, then, suggest that proximity functions as a crucial 
component of identification. Thus, rather than continuing with the project of “examining 
the other” from a geographical and experiential distance (read: the literary study of the 
other), I argue that pragmatic empathy is unique to local discursive contexts because 
triangulation, like “mirroring” requires interlocutors to be in close proximity to each 
other. In other words, emergent intersubjectivity, does not take place beyond the physical 
frame of interlocutors’ reference. The frame of reference for interaction, as Davidson’s 
description makes clear, is the space in which interlocutors are capable of noticing each 
other’s resistance to objects, which allows them to adapt their discourse accordingly. 
When readers and writers attempt to pragmatically empathize with those beyond the 
scope of their physical frame of reference, they are no longer in the realm of 
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triangulation; instead, as we will see, they are in the realm of speculation, or non-
discursive reflexivity. When rhetors attempt to engage questions of identification with the 
absent other, through reading and writing, the outcomes of these “case-studies” are useful 
insofar as the help to construct prior theories that may be useful in future discursive 
encounters with interlocutive beings. In many ways, my claim appears to be 
counterintuitive: to share meaning with the other is a local process, which implies to 
know the other is to know our neighbor.1 
 Deepika Bahri echoes my sentiment when she criticizes the emphasis 
contemporary theory places upon the relationship between physical distance and 
otherness, which results in the undervaluing of local discursive encounters. In her essay 
“Terms of Engagement,” Bahri highlights the often-ironic practice of examining 
postcolonial texts in order to “sensitize students to the other cultures” (77). The goal in 
using transnational texts is to help students experience the other in a deliberate, reflective 
and meaningful fashion; however, these experiences often come at the cost of the local. 
In these types of classroom environments, the other simultaneously represents difference 
and distance, “as always beyond the local shores” (77). Viewing the other in this fashion 
leads to the tendency to privilege “distance difference instead of examining the complex 
ways in which difference and marginality are produced in particular contexts rather than 
being inherent by virtue of category” (77). Thus, terms like “difference” and “other” are 
assumed to also mean “foreign” and “far away,” which leads students and teachers to 
assume that within the local borders of the classroom similarities between students are 
greater than their differences. Therefore, teachers and students often explore questions of 
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identification and empathy with the assumption that these practices only serve situations 
and environments beyond the walls of the classroom. As often is the case, students and 
teachers ignore the discursive exigencies present within local bodies for the supposedly 
more important work of imagining the distant other.2  
 Pragmatic empathy, however, as a phase of discursive interaction, which 
understands discourse as the human mode of interacting with the environment, views all 
interactions as unique, collaborative, and involving (an)other. The discursive moves we 
make, whether in the classrooms of American universities, the cafés of Florence, or the 
noodle-houses of Shanghai, will share common characteristics: our discursive moves 
represent adjustments in discourse as a result of environmental conditions, which include 
others and objects. In other words, becoming a more experienced rhetor capable of 
identifying with diverse audiences is something that always develops locally because 
discursive situations that lead to discursive identifications via pragmatic empathy are 
defined by the proximity of (an)other with whom to share affect in a particular time. That 
is, local interaction is also a temporal experience, or as George Herbert Mead suggests, 
discursive interaction, like all human action, occurs in the present, the locus of reality. 
 As I argued in the previous chapter, interactionism understands discourse as a 
unitary process: “what ‘chair’ means, what a chair is, and what to do with a chair and the 
word ‘chair’ are exactly the same process” (Yarbrough, “Passing” 85). Moreover, 
because “there is no chair except as a set of relations” between interlocutors and objects, 
to share the meaning of chairs is necessarily to share the meaning of chair in a particular 
time (85). Mead’s idea of the present helps make the importance of the temporal aspect of 
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discourse clear. As Mead suggests in The Philosophy of the Present, no measurement 
exists to objectively gauge the linearity of time, a concept that supposedly proceeds by 
mapping time onto a continuum. For time to exist in this fashion would require that 
competing fields of space exist. In simple terms, to see time would require a space 
outside of time, a view that ultimately disrupts physics and thereby the world.  
 Instead of imagining time as a continuum, which ultimately leads to totalizing 
historical interpretations and static understandings of experience, Mead suggests that 
people view all actions as emerging from the present, the locus of reality. As Mead states, 
“The world is a world of events” (35). That is, human beings cannot stop being a part of 
the movement of the world; instead, our attempts to understand events – to make 
meaning – is part of the “world of events.” We cannot stop to interpret the world and the 
other, because even these attempts serve as constitutive elements of what we recognize as 
the world. In Mead’s pragmatic understanding of being, past experiences are only past 
experiences insomuch as we attribute this description to them in the present moment, and 
future possibilities are simply the name we give to the anticipatory emotions experienced 
under present conditions. What Mead provides for discourse studies, then, is a 
interactionist account of temporality, which carries with it a pedagogical imperative: to 
develop our capacity for identification also requires interlocutors to understand that 
shared meaning is bound to present conditions. Therefore, a pedagogy that takes 
discourse studies and discursive identification seriously is also a pedagogy that helps 
students reconsider the relationship between meaning and time, and the implications of 
such relationships to future discourse.  
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 Before moving forward and examining a sample exercise that draws attention to 
locality and time, I want to caution against reading interactionism as a type of relativism. 
To say that meanings emerges under particular conditions with others and objects in a 
shared world implies that what an object means, in that space and time, is 
intersubjectively true. Interlocutors recognize and interact with the same object. And, it 
should also be noted, that simply because interlocutors recognize the same object does 
not mean that somehow they agree as to the implications of that object. Shared meaning’s 
goal, as Davidson contends, “is to make meaningful disagreement possible” (“On the 
Very Idea” 207). The same can be said about objectivity. For the interactionist, meaning 
and truth name characteristics of the same discursive process. And, if interlocutors are 
able to reproduce the conditions in which objects emerged as objects for them, then the 
truth will remain. Of course, reproducing conditions, objects and interlocutors is difficult. 
Therefore a classroom guided by the principles of interactionism, needs to make helping 
students experience the difficulties of reproducing conditions one of its pedagogical aims. 
 The Collaborative Notebook (Appendix A) represents an assignment designed to 
engage questions of location and time with regard to discourse and highlight the 
inventive nature of discourse by demonstrating the difficult nature of reproducing 
conditions. While I have employed this assignment in a number of courses, I will keep 
my remarks centered on the use of this assignment in first-year composition. In focusing 
on the first-year compositions course, I am signaling my belief that if I, along with the 
others with whom I am drawing upon in this work, believe that discourse functions in this 
fashion then it seems imperative that I bring these commitments to bear on my pedagogy. 
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In other words, I do not find interactionism to be a purely theoretical pursuit; however, I 
do find pedagogical adaptations of interactionism very challenging. The notebook, then, 
represents a tentative means by which to address my theoretical commitments in the 
context of teaching first-year students. 
 The Collaborative Notebook holds a collection of student-produced artifacts and 
serves as a discussion piece for an end of semester conference between the student 
collaboratives and myself. Comprised of four to five members, chosen at random at the 
beginning of the semester, student collaboratives spend between one-third and one-half of 
class time each week working on their end-of-the semester projects. The end of the 
semester project is a class presentation that examines a “magnet text,” a novel or 
monograph that engages one of the central themes of the course, with regard to an issue, 
idea, event, or policy relevant to the first-year experience. The final project that I ask 
students to complete is nothing particularly revolutionary. Like many presentation 
assignments, the final product is intended to demonstrate the students’ capacity to make 
arguments about a text, make connections with other texts, and learn about working with 
others in a project setting. In the end, these final presentations tend to be insightful and 
well produced, and from developing them the students gain a sense of how intellectual 
arguments within the humanities develop. Generally, then, the collaborative notebook 
serves to “mark the journey” from the beginning of the semester to the final project, with 
particular attention paid to the collaborative’s discursive exchanges as they read, wrote, 
and discussed in support of their final project.  
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The Collaborative Notebook, it should be noted, accounts for a substantial portion 
of the final course grade, but students were informed at the beginning of the course that 
receiving an acceptable grade simply depended upon their ability to complete the tasks of 
the day, most of which involved writing of some sort and comprised the texts of the 
notebook. If collaboratives did the work, they would receive full credit. In lowering the 
stakes of the assignment’s grade, I intended to highlight for students that this assignment 
sought to illustrate for them the central tenets of discourse—contingency, mutability, 
temporality, and collaboration—without fear of a high stakes assessment. Students read a 
number of texts during the course of the semester dealing with ideas associated with 
interactionism, identification, and empathy, and I provided handouts and lectures that 
reinforced these ideas. For the most part, however, it was not until the final exit interview 
that students began to grasp how the intersubjective meaning that emerged during their 
group’s discursive interactions with each other depended heavily upon the particular 
situations – the time and place of interactions – within which they discoursed.  
  During the exit interview, I sought to highlight the distinct differences and 
similarities I perceived in the collected artifacts. When asked to explain why an 
ostensibly similar text elicited one type of response on one day, but a different type of 
response on another day, students tended to resort to a kind of cheap relativism. The 
differences marked their distinct personal styles. For example the influence of the 
chairperson might change the dynamics of the group, or the clarity of the secretary’s 
notes might have skewed the information gathered on a particular day. And, while all of 
these observations seemed correct, students typically found the following question very 
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difficult to answer: “If you know the reasons behind these discrepancies, why did you not 
control the situation so that you spoke of ideas, concepts, and texts in a consistent 
fashion?” In other words, I was asking them a question derived from the social 
constructionist notion of “discourse community.” If they were a group and they 
developed a shared sense of knowledge about the texts they engaged (as most groups 
claimed they had) why did shared meaning about the same objects change over time?  
  The tendency is to answer the question in the following way: “we learned more 
about our subject as we progressed through the semester and therefore our understanding 
of objects became more nuanced.” This position, which I would argue parrots a 
characteristically process-oriented pedagogical assumption, is, as Reed Way Dasenbrock 
points out, a fairly incoherent position. In “Do We Write the Text We Read,” Dasenbrock 
examines the implications of Davidson’s thinking on literary theory, especially as it 
pertains to Stanley’s Fish’s notion of interpretive communities. Fish’s explanation of 
interpretive communities is similar to the response given by the collaboratives above. 
Communities, when confronted with discursive problems – what does something mean – 
will adapt and adjust their understandings until they share the same belief about a 
particular object. However, since meaning is shaped a priori, it is part of and influenced 
by the interpretive community’s interpretation of texts. According to Fish’s notion of 
interpretive communities, different interpretations signal different community 
memberships, while shared meaning implies the power of the community to create and 
sustain beliefs about texts. Or, as Jonathan Culler points out, for Fish an interpretive 
community “creates everything but learns nothing” (72). Fish’s theory assumes, like most 
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of contemporary theory, that texts can only be understood “on our own terms,” which 
necessarily implies “that the text cannot be understood and at the same time be 
understood to be different from us” (Dasenbrock 32). Therefore, as Dasenbrock 
concludes, appeals to conceptual schemes like interpretive communities do not allow 
interlocutors to learn from experience. That is, from the perspective of social 
constructionist like Fish, The Collaborative Notebook assignment can only track the 
journey toward communal membership or disassociation – there is no way for objects and 
others to maintain their full weight. 
  Interactionism, however, allows for a much different interpretation of why 
meaning changes over time: objects and others are different. Our shared meanings are 
temporally bound, mutable, and collaborative. Moreover, every discursive encounter is 
novel to a certain extent; time, place, and conditions (including the emotional and 
cognitive conditions of the others with whom we discourse) change constantly. However, 
this does not mean that the meanings we share are always novel. As Davidson’s notion of 
prior theories tells us, we develop particular stances toward situations, we are prepared to 
move forward discursively in certain ways; therefore when the objects and others with 
whom we discourse put up little resistance to our discursive moves, shared meaning is 
easier to come by. The Collaborative Notebook, therefore, is attempt on my part to help 
students explore the importance of locality and time to the production of discursive 
identification via pragmatic empathy. The hope, then, is that this assignment will help 
students understand that discourse assumes the meaning of objects will continue to 
! "&(!
change, but these changes will be clear as long as we continue to discourse with each 
other.  
 
The Other, The Object, and Discursive Reflexivity 
 
  Time and place influence the conditions within which objects and interlocutors 
triangulate, but understanding the environmental and temporal conditions of discourse 
cannot provide an answer to the question, with whom can interlocutors experience 
pragmatic empathy and share meaning? To answer this question requires an 
understanding of the difference between what Donna Qualley and Elizabeth Chiseri-
Strater call reflexivity and what I call discursive reflexivity. In articulating the difference 
the pedagogical implications become clear: pragmatic empathy does not arise in the 
process of non-discursive reflexive inquiry. That is, pragmatic empathy is limited to those 
moments of triangulation when a speaker responds to objects and (an)other in the shared 
world.  
  In their essay “Collaboration as Reflexive Dialogue: A Knowing ‘Deeper Than 
Reason,’” Qualley and Chiseri-Strater build upon Kurt Spellmeyer’s argument for 
dialogic composition pedagogies. For Qualley and Chiseri-Strater, dialogic pedagogies 
are necessarily collaborative and involve “two recursive moves: dialectic encounter with 
another (a person or idea) and a reflexive engagement with the self” (111). Recursivity, 
the turning back to the self in response to an external stimulus, is central to the 
interactionist approach to discourse that I am arguing for in this project. As Davidson’s 
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theory of triangulation clearly demonstrates, shared meaning explicitly involves the 
turning back to the self in an attempt to adjust discourse in order to direct (an)other’s 
attention to an object of common cause. However, reflexivity, as defined by Qualley and 
Chiseri-Strater, is only part of the triangulation process that leads to passing theories. 
Reflexivity, in Qualley and Chiseri-Strater’s view, is non-discursive; it does not include 
all three apexes of the triangle—at least two interlocutors and an object of common 
cause. 
  In her monograph, Turns of Thought, Donna Qualley distinguishes reflexivity 
from the related term reflection. Reflection, Qualley contends, names the process of 
accessing the contents of the mind “independently of others” (11). When a person reflects 
the goal is to determine cognitively, without dialogic encounters with the other, the 
answers to problems. We reflect to know more about what we think we know about 
ourselves. That is, the process arises, exists, and comes to an end within the interiority of 
the subject. Reflexivity on the other hand, “does not originate in the self but always 
occurs in response to a person’s critical engagement with an‘other’” (12). Qualley argues 
that these encounters with others provide new perspectives that “we must hold up to our 
current conception of things,” and in doing so, “The juxtaposition of two different 
representations often reveals their ill fit. In order to make sense, we are compelled to 
identify and examine our own underlying assumptions” (12). In the end, Qualley believes 
that “Reflexivity enables us to look at the implications of our linkages and to take 
responsibility for our judgments” (156). As I noted earlier, I am in agreement with 
Qualley and Chiseri-Strater that reflexivity, changing our discursive actions as a result of 
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encounters with others and objects is essential to an interactionist account of discourse; 
however, I want to suggest that reflexivity can either be non-discursive (the type Qualley 
and Chisteri-Strater describe) or discursive (reflexivity as a constitutive element of 
discursive triangulation). This difference derives from our differing views of the term 
“other.”  
  For Qualley and Chiseri-Strater, the “other” can be both person and idea. This 
understanding of other is the prevalent view and derives from the postmodern notion that 
“nothing is not a text.” Everything, which includes artifacts and individuals, requires 
interpretation, or “reading.” Thus, the guiding assumption for Qualley and Chiseri-Strater 
is that an “other” provides the impetus for change because often our “readings” of the 
world meet resistance from the others we attempt to read. Therefore, these moments of 
resistance, if we choose to allow them, can help an individual change their thinking about 
the world. For Davidson, Yarbrough, and myself, however, the “other” is a person 
whereas an idea, concept, or material artifact is an object. That is to say, Qualley argues 
that both people and things can be read and responded to in the same fashion – as others. 
From my perspective, though, interlocutors sharing conceptions about an object under 
particular conditions defines communication. Therefore our discursive interaction with 
others varies from our discursive interactions with objects. They must because without 
being able to recognize others as different from objects, we would never be able to 
identify the points of triangulation. 
  In suggesting that Qualley presents a definition of non-discursive reflexivity, I am 
drawing upon the pragmatism of George Herbert Mead and Yarbrough’s adaption of his 
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ideas for use in rhetorical study. Mead, in The Philosophy of the Act, distinguishes 
between our interactions with sentient beings and non-sentient objects. This distinction, 
as Yarbrough has pointed out, is crucial because in Mead’s work we find the first “non-
metaphysical explanation of how communication is possible” (Inventive 18). For Mead, 
interactions with other sentient beings depend upon the recursive process of responding 
to the other’s response to our gestures. In short, we know the importance of our actions 
because of the responses they elicit from others. Of course, because we share the world 
with others as well as objects, we also interact with non-sentient objects – objects that do 
not respond to our actions. Mead makes this point clear when he discusses the possible 
responses a person may choose when he notices the oncoming storm. The person will 
necessarily respond to the storm in some fashion, whether he retreats or enjoys the 
shower is inconsequential. Regardless of the person’s actions, his gestures will have no 
impact on the actions of the storm. That is to say, “Noticing the signs of weather takes 
pragmatic precedence over noticing my own responses to them” (17). “Reactions toward 
weather conditions,” Mead summarizes, “has no influence upon the weather itself” 
(Selected Writings 131).  
  It is the distinction that Mead draws between other discursive beings – those with 
whom we share the recursive process of discourse – and non-discursive objects that 
provides the foundation for a causal understanding of discourse. Yarbrough, more so than  
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Davidson, summarizes this view well when he writes: 
 
 
  This distinction between the ways we intepret non-interlocutive beings and  
  interlocutive beings makes possible the coordination of interaction between  
 interlocutive beings with respect to other objects of common attention by 
  means of the dialogic process that a “conflict of actions initiates.”   (18) 
 
 
In other words, because there is a difference between objects and others, interlocutors can 
claim to share meaning with the other because they are able to determine if they are 
interacting with the same objects in the world. When we assume that our interactions 
with (an)other are the same as are interactions with objects, the emphasis is necessarily 
placed on the interpretation: Did I locate the other’s intended meaning when interpreting 
their discourse? However, in the interactionist model of discourse, the emphasis of 
communication is not placed on interpretation but interaction; rather, interpretation is 
simply an implied phase of discourse because “meaning is necessarily recursive, residing 
in the actual effect of a discursive act upon another being, and the effect of that same act 
upon oneself” (18).  
  Mead and Yarbrough, then, provide a definition of discursive reflexivity, the 
recursive nature of discourse that involves the continual reshaping of utterances in 
response to (an)other’s response to their partners actions toward a common object. 
Discursive reflexivity, then, represents a function of pragmatic empathy. Non-discursive 
reflexivity, however, leads exactly to the same problem discussed in chapter three– to 
claim that we respond reflexively to the other (objects and people), is no different than 
claiming I respond to the other through particular conceptual schemes, and if I respond 
to others through conceptual schemes, I do not allow others to retain their full weight, 
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and I have no way to claim that the meaning I impose on the other is objective, rationale, 
or fair. At best, and I believe it is fair to say that Qualley wants the best for people, a non-
discursive reflexivity helps inform prior theories; that is, non-discursive reflexivity 
provides a means by which we are able to speculate about the commitments we intend to 
hold when confronted with future discursive situations. 
  However, commitments, as discussed earlier, are speculative and necessarily 
refined and changed as a result of interactions with the other and objects in a shared 
world. This refrain, “others and objects in a shared world” is crucial to understand 
because it provides the basis for any pedagogy seeking to investigate the role pragmatic 
empathy plays in creating discursive identifications. There is perhaps no better place to 
see the value of this refrain than when examining the reading habits of a composition 
classroom.  
 
Pragmatic Empathy, Triangulation and How to Read 
 
  As Thomas Kent points out in “Paralogic Hermeneutics and the Possibilities of 
Rhetoric,” the standard practices within the composition classroom might be understood 
as “case-study” approaches to learning. In these models the students read and write about 
texts with the hope that their prose sufficiently demonstrates both appropriate use of 
language and accurate interpretation. “We assume,” Kent writes, referring to composition 
instructors, “that the writer can discover, in some predictable way, what it is she wants to 
say and how to say it” (36). As interactionism has shown us, however, such predictability 
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is impossible – discursive interactions are unique, temporally bound, and seldom 
repeated. Thus, as I argue, the goal of a first-year composition course should be to help 
students explicitly monitor their discursive exchanges with others as they use marks, 
noises, and gestures to direct each other’s attention toward objects of common cause. In 
other words, I want students to experience the locality of discourse, the temporality of 
discourse, and the recursive nature of discourse. But, to accomplish these goals, “the 
student needs an object for her discourse”: students need to discourse in particular 
contexts with others and particular objects so that they can determine how their 
conceptions of objects differ and how they might go about identifying and responding to 
those distinctions.  
  Whether its the work of a well known writer, or the essay of a first-year student, 
reading presents the greatest challenge to an interactionist pedagogy because the 
prevailing assumptions guiding how we understand reading are so historically 
entrenched. Broadly, reading is currently understood in much the way Qualley describes, 
a single reader’s interaction with a text. And, because Qualley, like Bizzell, Bruffee, Fish, 
Jarrett, Olson, and others, view both objects and others as “texts,” even “group 
discussions” are individual exercises: the individual “reads” the “responses” of others and 
changes her thinking according to her understanding of those responses. Therefore, when 
reading texts that deal with the experiences of the postcolonial other, or the marginalized 
other, the “reader,” at least from the popular view of reading, cannot ever move beyond 
him or herself to share meaning with others. Readers can only aim to make idiosyncratic 
adjustments to their thinking. In this case-study approach to reading, the goal remains 
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proper interpretation – locating what a text really means and thereby falling into the same 
trap of conceptual relativism: How is it possible to move beyond the interior and the 
personal and claim to share meaning with the other? 
  Interactionism provides an answer by suggesting that interlocutors share meaning 
when they invent collaboratively. Therefore, when interlocutors engage in the “reading of 
a text,” this names a collaborative endeavor in which the object of discourse is the text at 
hand. When understood as a non-discursive reflexive process, reading lacks the 
triangulating features that define interactionism. Reed Way Dasenbrock makes this point 
clear in his critique of Stanley Fish’s interpretive communities. From Fish’s social 
constructionist perspective, the text with which interlocutors engage can never be a 
distinct object. Since interpretations always already exist as a result of the interpretive 
community, readers cannot “assign any otherness to the text itself, for it is always 
something we possess and have written according to our beliefs,” beliefs which stem 
from our membership in particular discourse communities (31). The problem, then, is not 
simply that social constructionists cannot explain how we discourse with the other 
without reducing their discourse to a version of our own or that from this perspective 
there is no “difference between the us [readers] and the text;” no, “the more serious 
problem is that this inconsistency trivializes the study of literature by denying us any 
productive encounter with difference” (31). As Mead shows us, interacting with the other 
in regard to a particular object allows for people to retain their “full weight” and provides 
opportunity to engage real difference, difference beyond our internal cognition, because 
we respond to an object that exists in the shared world. Therefore, to engage difference, 
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from the perspective of interactionism, names the process by which interlocutors direct 
their partners attention to objects differently, thereby allowing the other to notice 
something different – the object as conceived and interacted with through (an)other’s 
discourse. 
   For triangulation to occur readers need to locate the apexes of the discursive 
triangle. Locating these points, however, is impossible if readers continue to believe that 
the “other” names both the object of discourse and the actual others with whom we 
discourse. If we cannot locate the points of triangulation then the objects of our discourse 
cannot resist our readings. The problem, as Yarbrough sees it, is that too often texts are 
seen as artifacts of previous discourses. Texts, then, are read as the consequence of prior 
exigencies; to interpret a text is to locate the cultural, historical, and social conditions that 
brought it into fruition. As Yarbrough points out, this view of reading “effectively 
eliminates the third leg of Davidson’s triangle, the object with which interlocutors must 
interact” because interlocutors instead focus on the “other’s means of interacting with 
us…as if these were an object” (Inventive 157). That is, rather than focusing on the 
objects of the author’s discourse—what the author writes about—interlocutors instead 
focus their discursive attention upon the text as an object itself, upon the ways in which 
the other went about describing the world’s objects. Instead of using their marks, noises, 
and gestures to determine the relevant relationships between each other and their shared 
world, interlocutors direct their marks, noises, and gestures toward the other’s marks, 
noises and gestures, which diverts “our attention from the actual objects of the discourse 
in question, preventing us from understanding it” (157). When reading is understood as 
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locating the proper meaning of the text, regardless if “proper meaning” is understood as a 
close-reading in the vein of formalism or locating the intersecting social and cultural 
practices that shape a person’s discourse, as is the view of social constructionists, 
interlocutors cannot share meaning because there are no objects to resist their readings – 
resistance which would be evidenced in the other’s interactions with the same objects. 
  This complicated theoretical summary plays out over and over again in the 
composition classroom. Take for example peer review. Students are asked to produce a 
text. This text’s expressed purpose is to complete the demands of the assignment. The 
student-writer produces this text and brings it to her peers for peer review. For the most 
part peer review draws its theoretical framing from Stephen North’s notion that teachers 
and critics should aim to “make better writers, not better papers.” Therefore, peer review 
discussions often focus on how the writer performed the task but not on whether the 
essay successfully gesticulates the object of discourse made relevant by the questions 
posed in the assignment. Does the essay produced interact as expected within the context 
of the assignment? Answering this question is further complicated by the fact that 
student’s assume that the production of a text (any text, regardless of form) in response to 
the provocation of an assignment necessarily meets the demands set forth in the 
instructions. Simply put, from the students’ perspectives, there is always only one 
assignment: write something after you receive (or infer) directions from the instructor.  
  This statement should not be read as an indictment of student writing, but rather 
as an encouragement to instructors to create assignments that allow students to 
triangulate, which require assignments that allow students to respond to objects of 
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discursive situations. When given assignments like the popular, “write about an 
educational experience that shaped your life in some fashion, and remember this 
experience does not have to be something experienced in the classroom,” students tend to 
respond by producing texts that they believe answers the question posed by the 
assignment. Then, when asked to review the work of their peers, the responses students 
give each other tend to focus on how the writer wrote, “I like when you did x,” or “I think 
you should have said x like y.” In both cases, the object of study is the writer’s discourse, 
but not the intended object of the discourse, the student essay. Simply put, students 
cannot triangulate because in this example, as with most assignments, there is no object 
to study, which is to say—interlocutors are not invested in the objects of the other’s 
discourse. Students, quite pragmatically, recognize that another’s essay is just that, 
someone else’s work, which has little material effect on their lives; therefore, peer 
responses are quite often unhelpful because student’s responses do not represent attempts 
to share meaning of an object of common cause. There is no common cause. For the most 
part, student’s are right when they assume the object (student essay) is important only to 
the student writer and perhaps the instructor, but these objects create no particular 
exigencies for (an)other. 
  The implication here is fairly clear. In most reading and writing assignments 
students are not asked to engage actual discursive exigencies, those situations where the 
problems needing to be solved through discourse are shared among interlocutors. To 
accomplish this, however, requires assignments and practices that allow students to 
participate in contexts that require attention to be paid to objects. So, we might rewrite 
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the assignment above in the following way as a means to create an actual discursive 
situation. The new assignment might read something like this, “You and your 
collaborative are the board of trustees for a small liberal arts college and assigned the task 
of determining which extra-curricular activities should continue to receive funding. Write 
a short essay that describes an important educational experience that occurred outside of 
the classroom. Use this essay as departure point for your collaborative’s discussion about 
the programs you will choose to keep.” In structuring the assignment in this fashion, the 
student now writes under particular environmental conditions; moreover, the object of 
discourse – what programs to keep – represents something that can be resisted by others 
in the collaborative. That is, “what to keep” is an object that carries with it a number of 
conceptions, and only through triangulation will students be able to create the meaning 
they wish to share about the object of common cause. 
 
Some Final Considerations 
   
  In the end, I am sympathetic to Kenneth Burke’s desire to articulate how rhetoric 
aids in the project of shared meaning. In truth, my sympathy stems in part from my 
admiration for his work, and how, given the constraints of structuralist and 
poststructuralist thinking, Burke tried but could not articulate a description of 
identification that moved beyond the “skeptic’s question” and allowed others to maintain 
their “full-weight.” Discursive identification via pragmatic empathy, as I have argued in 
this study, provides a description of shared meaning that both answers the skeptic and 
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allows the other to be (an)other – an individual with whom we do not have to share our 
language, culture, or history before we can share meaning about objects in the world.  
  I conclude this study by returning to the initial argument of this chapter, if 
discourse is how we get around in the world, then pedagogies about discourse are 
irrelevant. Discourse is epistemological—how we know, is how we know, and like 
everything else we learn how to discourse through inference, experience, and from others 
to whom we attribute wisdom. Thus, the epistemological implications of discursive 
interactionism are also the pedagogical implications: to learn how to discourse is to 
discourse with an awareness of our choices.  
  An interactionist pedagogy requires a classroom setting that encourages, 
promotes, and continually practices collaboration. In emphasizing collaboration, 
instructors would also need to highlight the importance of location and time to meaning 
making, a quality that requires students to understand the difference between non-
discursive reflexivity and discursive reflexivity. And, in order to understand any of these 
qualities requires assignments and exercises that place student writers in specific contexts 
with specific objects of discourse. In focusing on the centrality of location, time, and 
context, an interactionist approach to discourse studies lends itself nicely to the concerns 
of Writing in the Disciplines (WID) and Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) 
initiatives gaining ground in many universities. WAC and WID initiatives provide 
students the opportunity to direct their discursive efforts toward specifics objects in 
specific contexts. These initiatives assume that writing is the answer to specific problems. 
As teachers of rhetoric and composition we are best prepared, given our experiences with 
! ('+!
discourse, to take the lead in these initiative areas. What Davidson, Kent, Yarbrough, and 
others provide rhetoric and composition is a means to argue for the continued value of 
studying discourse. As the world becomes more globalized, the local context will become 
increasingly diverse, and thereby communication more complicated. In order to meet 
these challenges we need a theory that both allows for difference, and provides a 
description of how we share meaning without sharing conceptual schemes, like 
languages, cultures, or histories. An interactionist approach to discourse studies provides 
the answers to these questions.  
  While I am in support of providing a theoretical approach to communication that 
will keep me gainfully employed, the goal of this project is much more simple – how can 
we share meaning with another person without eliminating difference? The answer, I 
conclude, begins with understanding pragmatic empathy as interactionism’s 
methodological imperative. Pragmatic empathy, as I have argued, is limited—bound by 
time, space, and the conditions under which we discourse. I am committed that in order to 
engage the exigencies of a globalized world we must abandon the prevailing sentiment 
that we can somehow empathize with the absent other, that we can create rhetorical 
identifications without objects upon which to direct the other’s attention, and that we can 
share meaning without accounting for the conditions under which our discourse occurs. 
Intersubjectivity emerges through triangulation and implies collaboration with others. 
This is not say the study of others and the environmental conditions that shape their 
discourse is without merit; but it is to say that this work is speculative, that is, 
subjective—the perspectives drawn from these types of study are necessarily 
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idiosyncratic. To arrive at truth, as Davidson tells us, requires intersubjectivity, the 
experience of sharing objects with others. In the end, I hope pragmatic empathy 
contributes to the projects begun by Jeremy Rifkin and neuroscientists like Marco 
Iaconbani by providing a useable rhetorical theory of empathy.  
  I am committed to the notion that ultimately what we know is what we share with 
others. What we share emerges as we discourse, a local and temporally bound process 
that emphasizes the delicate and passing nature of shared meaning. This is not a grand 
theory; rather, pragmatic empathy is a simple approach to discourse—it neither requires 
an omnipotent understanding of the other nor a belief that interlocutors need to use 
marks, noises, and gestures in the same way in order to communicate. Discourse begins 
where causes converge, where the discursive problems that inflict others impinge upon 
us, and pragmatic empathy emerges as we share those problems with each other. As this 
theory suggests, differences between interlocutors remain because triangulation provides 
a non-metaphysical description of discourse—what we know and what we share with 
others emerges through interactions with objects, a process that does not rely on appeals 
to pre-discursive identification or the sharing of conceptual schemes. Pragmatic empathy 
as a methodology demands little of us as interlocutors– we approach discursive 
interactions as we are, without presuppositions or shared histories but with a willingness 
to believe the other has done the same.  
  There is nothing we must share with (an)other in order to empathize, save, the 
world.  
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NOTES 
 
 1. Donald Davidson shares a similar sentiment. The following is a remark made 
while being interviewed by Thomas Kent. “Understanding other cultures is no different 
from understanding our next door neighbor, except in degree. Its not a difference in kind” 
(Kent, “Language Philosophy” 12).  
 
 2. Similarly, critical pedagogies working with the ideas of Paulo Freire often 
become too determined to illustrate how American university students are like the poor 
farmers with who Freire established his cultural circles. As Ronald and Roskelly point 
out, however, these are problems of application not problems of Freire’s thinking 
(“Untested”).  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Collaborative Notebook | A Journey Through Texts 
 
The collaborative notebook is both a product and a process. The final product will be turned in at the end of 
the semester before your final group presentation. The following document describes both the practices we 
will engage on Wednesdays in our collaboratives and the final product that is being produced. 
 
The Notebook  
As a group you need to find a notebook/binder to collect all of the materials you will gather. I would 
suggest at least a 2”three-ring binder. Next, your group will need to divide the notebook into three sections, 
which can be easily done using dividers. The three sections are Artifacts, Attendance, and Notes. I will 
explain each of these categories in more detail on Monday. The most important thing to keep in mind is 
this: The notebook will be graded, in part, on the breadth and scope of the artifacts you collect and on the 
quality of its organization. 
 
Wednesday: Collaborative Practices  
The goal of these collaboratives is to create a thoughtful and intelligent presentation for the end of the 
semester, and toengage in a reflective inquiry that addresses the following questions: How do we work 
together? How do disagreements affect the function of a group?; Is it possible that collaboration is messier, 
but delivers better thinking and writing? To answer these questions we will keep a record of our 
Wednesday meetings. These notes will be used at the end of the semester when you meet with John and 
discuss your experiences in these collaborative groups. Along with taking copious notes, each member of 
the group will fulfill a different role on Wednesdays, and by the end of the semester you should have 
completed each role at least twice. A description of each role follows: 
 
Chairperson 
The chairperson’s responsibility is to make sure each member of the group is completing their particular 
task for that day. The chairperson is also responsible for making sure each person has the opportunity to 
listen and speak. During the course of a class, I may ask your group how collaboration is proceeding – my 
expectation is that the chairperson for that given day will be able to explain your groups project and 
progress at that particular moment. 
 
Secretary of the Collaborative 
The secretary’s responsibility is to take clear, concise, and thorough notes regarding the day’s proceedings. 
The secretary should focus his or her attention on the conversations taking place and the discussions 
concerning the artifacts presented to the group. The secretary should see their job as trying to paint a clear 
picture of the group’s interactions, so that if I were to examine the notes taken on a particular day I would 
be able to get a sense of what took place. 
 
Historian/Fact Finder 
The role of the historian/fact finder is to make connections between the artifacts. The historian needs to be 
an active participant in the group’s discussion so he or she can make connections between the current 
discussion and the notes and artifacts from previous meetings. This role is crucial, especially early in the 
process, because locating connections will help the collaborative find a direction for their project. 
 
Ethnographer  
The role of the ethnographer is to listen and observe. The ethnographer’s work is difficult, but will be 
incredibly rewarding when the project comes to an end. There will be a separate handout for this position, 
but for the sake of summary I will say that the ethnographer’s job is to help us define the following 
question: What makes our collaborative a group? By analyzing the ethnographer’s notes we can begin to 
locate habits, features, and traits that might help define your group as such. 
